

VOLUME 25

OCTOBER, 1946

NUMBER NOV 3 1946
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SOCIAL FORCES

A Scientific Medium of Social Study and Interpretation

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A DEFINITION OF THE FOLK FOR FOLK-REGIONAL SOCIOLOGY

BY GEORGE L. SIMPSON

A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE
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Published four times a year, October, December, March, May for

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

& THE WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY, Baltimore, Maryland, U. S. A.

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R ✓ 25 Oct. 1946 - May 1947

OCTOBER, 1946

VOLUME 25, NO. 1

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OCTOBER, DECEMBER, MARCH, MAY

For THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

By THE WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY

Communications for the Editors, and all manuscripts, should be addressed to THE EDITORS, SOCIAL FORCES, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. Business communications should be addressed to The Williams & Wilkins Company, Baltimore, Md.



SOCIAL FORCES

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
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SOCIAL FORCES

October, 1946

POPULATION AND POWER: SOME COMMENTS ON DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN EUROPE*

KIMBALL YOUNG

Queens College

THE most striking changes in the power relations of contemporary Europe are associated with the continuing increase of population, ample resources, and the industrialization of the Soviet Union in contrast to the aging and relatively stationary population and industrial maturity of western Europe. Against this background this paper examines some of the implications of the effect of the recent war upon the relations of eastern and western European nation states.

THE BACKGROUND OF PRESENT DEMOGRAPHY IN EUROPE: INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETY

Population changes in Europe may be analyzed against the background of its culture and social organization. The most striking cultural feature of Europe is its high degree of industrialization and urbanization. Following Karl Mannheim we may call this "mass society." The shift toward such a cultural-societal combination has been under way in western and northwestern Europe for about one hundred and fifty years, in varying degrees and rates for different countries and regions. In the Soviet Union this change has taken place in our own lifetime at an amazing rate.

For present purposes it is not necessary to do more than enumerate the generally accepted criteria of mass society. It is marked by increasingly extended machine production and standardization of processes which culminate in such things as uniform interchangeable parts put together with remarkable speed on the assembly line. Associated with this is a great deal of specialization and the disappearance of the handicrafts wherever the machine takes over. Individual

ownership tends to give way to corporate organization of enterprises, either privately or state-owned. Linked to machine production and corporate organization go increased importance of management and bureaucracy. On the political side the power of the state has greatly increased. Also there has emerged a plethora of special interest or pressure groups of owners, managers, bureaucrats, workers, consumers, and others in competition for power and monetary or other rewards.

As to matters of population there is a marked density of numbers, rising standards of living for all classes, linked, at least in western Europe, with a declining birth rate and the small family system. In turn, there is an increased life expectancy at birth and a general improvement in health which in connection with the decline in the birth-death ratios has made for an aging and relatively stationary population in certain countries.

For the individual, living in mass society is featured by the loss of primary group membership and the tendency to develop temporary touch-and-go contacts in which personal participation is unstructured and compared with conditions in primary societies, unstable and segmental. Emile Durkheim aptly characterized one feature of mass society by the term *anomie*, that is, psychological isolation from one's fellows. Moreover, the atomization of the individual's interests, skills, and loyalties has tended to stress the rationality of means and utilitarian ends.

Putting the demographic and the economic-political-psychological together, one might say that mass society is distinguished, paradoxically, by a congestion of numbers and a dissolution of psychic contacts.

Viewed historically, the main features of mass society in Britain, France, Germany, and their neighbors began to be dominant in the final quar-

* Presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Princeton University, May 31, 1946.

ter of the nineteenth century. The trend was obviously accelerated by the demands of World Wars I and II. Though the industrialization of western Europe was marked by many dislocations in population and disturbances in economics, politics, and class structure, on the whole, the change was relatively gradual. Moreover, in these countries it was associated with high inventiveness, modern capitalism, constitutional-representative democracy, political liberalism, and an emphasis on individualism.

In sharp contrast is the emergence of mass society in the Soviet Union. There it was a case, not of slower evolutionary development, but of rapid change. While Czarist Russia had witnessed a mild impact of the factory system and while urbanization had begun, in the large, the coming to power of the Bolsheviks marked the true "Industrial Revolution." This was imposed on a relatively illiterate, essentially rural agricultural society by a highly disciplined, skillful, and, at times, militantly ruthless minority. Yet to attribute the successes or failures of these changes in Russia entirely to the Communist Party is clearly particularistic. Rather it appears that there was a combination of strong incentive, pioneer zeal—not unlike that which marked our own industrialization—and a willingness to borrow liberally the technologies already at hand elsewhere, all of which was coordinated by strong Party drive, leadership, and total planning.

Yet, despite political differences, the developments in the East and the West resemble each other rather closely in many ways. In Russia there was an increase in urbanism, a high division of labor, and a standardization of production. So, too, there emerged mass communication, mass education, improved public health, and modern forms of recreation. As to agriculture, though western Europe has seen some industrialization, it is in Soviet Russia that mechanization has really "taken over" the farmer.

Demographically, however, the Soviet Union has only, in part, followed the pattern set by western Europe and the United States. While there has been a growth in cities, that is enhanced population density, and while differentials in urban and rural fertility have continued, and while there has been a gradual decline in the total birth rate, on the whole, Russia continues to have the most rapidly increasing population in Europe. This is one of the most noticeable differences between East and West, and probably bespeaks the persistence

of certain pioneer conditions and a strong, virile, reproducing reserve of rural people. At this point we naturally ask: Will the U.S.S.R., as it becomes increasingly industrialized and urbanized, move toward a steadily declining birth rate and the small family system of western Europe? The answer to this question lies in the lap of history. I am not completely convinced that the trends apparent in other mass societies represent a universal sociological law, such as is implied in Frank W. Notestein's words: "... Only when the stream of life is everywhere maintained by the efficient balance of low fertility and low mortality will mankind be truly free to follow the paths of civilization."¹

Much doubtless depends upon the effects of a rising standard of living, the appearance of more leisure and luxury among the masses, and the permissive diffusion of methods of birth control. But a combination of state-directed indoctrination and even perhaps state-managed artificial human insemination with a follow-up of state care of babies and children might keep the reproduction rates at a high level.

As to the effects of mass society in Soviet Russia upon the individual and the community, we know far too little. But there is reason to believe that sense of impersonality, segmental living, and loss of strong interpersonal bonds have already appeared, at least, in the large urban centers. However, it is well to bear in mind that in a police state controls over the individual tend to be minute and omnipresent. Resort to threat and terror are common and individualism as we know it does not thrive under such circumstances. In Russia, in terms of their age-long traditions and present indoctrination and practical day-by-day controls, the individual *qua* individual does not count for much except in relation to those means and ends which foster collective solidarity.

However, it should be noted that the ruthless practices, reported from the Soviet Union, do not rest alone on communistic ideas but rather show continuity of Byzantine-Muscovite cultural traits of long standing. Although some of our college and university students seem to believe that Russian history began with the Revolution of 1917, even a layman's knowledge of Russian history enables one to note cultural persistences. Western

¹ Frank W. Notestein, "International Population Readjustments," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, January 21, 1945, p. 102.

Christian, democratic, individualistic, and humanitarian ideals never penetrated very deeply into the masses of Russia though these "virtues" were accepted by many among the upper classes, the intellectuals, and the emerging bourgeoisie.

It is clear, then, that in two respects at least, mass society in the Soviet Union differs from that which developed in western Europe and the United States. The first is the continuation of relatively high birth rates, due perhaps to the rapidity of industrialization and the current nationalistic ethos. And second, individualism, democracy, and humanitarianism, which if not born of industrialization, have persisted in western Europe, are not, as yet, a marked feature of Russian culture.²

With regard to the further development of mass society in Soviet Russia, three basic facts must be noted, and these regardless of the form of political control: (1) There is a vast and rapidly increasing population. (2) There are enormous natural resources: land, minerals, forests, waterways. And (3) industrialization will continue to expand. So long as Russia was characterized by a high birth rate and relatively untapped material resources, she remained a hinderland, at least economically, to the industrialized sections of Europe. Her role in power politics in Europe has been greatly altered by the rise of the third factor: an expanding industrialization.

In contrast to this emerging colossus of population and power, mass society in western Europe has been marked by a trend toward a stationary or even declining population. Moreover, many of its natural resources have been seriously depleted, although modern science may provide new forms of energy for industrial use. But just how much further the process of industrialization

² In this connection it should be noted that Nazi Germany was moving in the direction of a highly regimented mass society-state in which many of these "virtues" were being destroyed under the program of *Gleichschaltung*. There is some historical evidence that with respect to humanitarian, individualistic, and democratic dogmas, Germany has represented something of a mid-point between the East and the West. I believe that in treating the political and economic future of Germany this fact should be remembered. Certainly in many ways the differences between totalitarianism under the Nazis and that under the Communist Party in Russia are less evident than some of our wartime and postwar propaganda would lead us to believe.

will or can go in these countries, especially in view of like developments, not only in Russia, but in India, the Far East, and elsewhere, remains to be seen.

We have, then, a powerful U.S.S.R. and its satellite states made up largely of Slavic peoples, and even though these latter are not themselves rapidly industrialized they provide added support to the Soviet Union. These stand vis-a-vis a still disunited number of increasingly less effective nation-states so far as manpower goes. Winston Churchill and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi probably sense the danger of continued fragmentation of the West in their pleas for some kind of federal union among the western European powers.³

The crucial relations of East and West involve, however, not only the population pressures of the Slavs upon the latter, as Eugene M. Kulischer indicates⁴ but a large number of economic, political, and ideological matters as well. But population pressures, as reflected in births, deaths, and other indices, are not merely biological matters. They are immersed in a whole complex of cultural and social psychological elements that make up our life. Some of these latter as related to demographic changes now at hand in Europe will be discussed in the balance of this paper. In particular comments will be made first, regarding family relations as they are likely to be influenced, in short or in long run, by the impact of the war upon individuals, and, second, regarding some effects of public policies upon the class structure, especially those people who make up the intellectual élite.

THE IMPACT OF WAR ON THE REPRODUCTIVE PATTERNS

Total war is particularly disturbing to family life. The chief factors which have operated in Europe are shifts in the civilian working population on the home front, evacuation from bombed areas or from sections which have been under military ground action, changes in family pattern due to removal of men of military age or the

³ See, for example, Churchill's speech at The Hague, as reported in *The New York Times*, May 10, 1946, and Coudenhove-Kalergi's letter, *The New York Times*, June 1, 1946.

⁴ See Eugene M. Kulischer, "Redistribution of Population After World War II," a paper read at the fortieth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in Cleveland, March 2, 1946.

intrusion of such groups under war needs, and the existence of enforced labor, either civilian persons or prisoners of war. Many of these changes will have but temporary effects, though some may have repercussions for some time to come.

Looked at in the large, and despite the effects of evacuation or enforced labor, of population mobility stimulated by war production needs, and the departure of men of military age, for Britain, France, and the Low Countries the total influence of the war on family members was probably less than sensational newspapers might lead us to imagine. The effects of some of these factors on urban Germany will probably be more lasting, though, again, less than many now believe. However, let us note some specific problems that need further study. Among others are those of illegitimacy, health, and the readaptation of veterans and displaced persons to family and community life.

Illegitimacy. Illegitimate births have always played some part in the reproductive folkways in both rural and urban Europe, although such births are contrary to the Christian mores. Gradually changes in public attitudes have brought about a certain acceptance of such practices, but notably in Scandinavia and in Germany under National Socialism. In fact in Nazi Germany there was a certain glorification of childbearing outside the traditional family. Such love children were hailed by the propagandists as contributions to the *Führer* and the state.

There is some indication that wartime experiences may actually have further altered the public views on illegitimacy. This, in turn, may lead, in time, to further breakdown of family solidarity accompanied by a shift to state care and training of increasing numbers of the new generations as they come along.

Certainly as far as Britain goes there is some evidence of changes in the public reaction to illegitimacy. One report in the *London Times* of last September stated that of first births during the war, one in four was illegitimate, and of all births, one in eight came in that category. I am not sure how this compares with prewar rates, but I suspect it is higher. But, in any case, shifts in the status of unwed mothers is worth noting.

There is little doubt but that American, Canadian, and Polish soldiers contributed to the genes pool of the British population. And soci-

ologically there seems to have been a general acceptance of these war babies not only by their own mothers but in the communities themselves. A writer in *The New Statesman and Nation* for July 28, 1945, in discussing unwed mothers in Britain, has this to say:

The girls haven't a qualm about their position. They all take their babies to be baptized and choose romantic names for them—Cynthia Rose, Paul Adrian, and the like—and are aggrieved if there is any delay in publishing these christenings in the Parish magazine . . .

These war babies are a remarkable crop, healthy, intelligent, handsome, and I am assured by the doctors, strides ahead of the children born five or six years ago. They learn to walk and talk, they cut their teeth at so early an age that our grandparents would have considered them phenomenal and might actually have been alarmed by their precocity and strength. It is probably because the mothers have no scruples and no fears and are themselves a young and healthy lot, partly because the fathers are in such excellent physical form, and partly because the diet for expectant mothers is plentiful and good and that for the infants themselves excellent . . .

However, no matter what impact the temporary residence of Allied military personnel may have had on the British wartime birth rate and on the attitude toward children born out of wedlock, the traditional family patterns are likely to persist. Yet both familial and community tolerance for illegitimacy seems to have been somewhat definitely developed.

As to Germany there is no doubt that evacuation of the civil population had at least temporary and intensive effects on family life and perhaps on the birth rate. Even today German newspapers, at least in the American zone, carry frequent personal inquiries seeking the whereabouts of family members scattered during the war.

Regarding illegitimacy in wartime Germany, we have no accurate information but we may anticipate a continuation of the tolerance which marked the prewar years. Moreover, while our newspapers and rumor may exaggerate the extent of fraternization of our troops with German women, there is every reason to believe that wherever our soldiers are stationed for any length of time, we may expect a crop of babies from unwed mothers. So, too, while we have no information about the Russian zone, it is quite probable that the sexual interests of the occupying forces

will overcome any political and official taboos on intercourse. Thus, in Germany, as in Britain and in various Nazi-occupied countries, the war has brought about a considerable mixing of genetic strains. These will have some effects on the morphology of the people if not directly upon the social-cultural traits of the future Europe.

Physical Health. The increase in the incidence of venereal disease in some sections of Europe may influence not only births outside but inside marriage as well. Though preventive and prophylactic measures have been improved and widely used, they have not completely met the problem. In this connection note may be made of the evident limitations of various agents of prophylaxis. For example, the treatment of certain venereal diseases by sulpha drugs is somewhat estopped by the fact that some individuals under treatment develop a resistant capacity to infection which may be transmitted through sexual intercourse to future partners. Such facts present a challenge to public health agencies dealing with childbearing and maternal health.

The persistence of substandard diets gives rise to still another problem of future health and reproduction. The long-run effects on physical well-being and on the development of apathy and sense of hopelessness are evident but hard to measure. This year's peak of short rationing has simply made us a bit more aware of the implications of undernourishment not only politically but with reference to personal health, the growth of war-born children, and the possibility of long range effects upon physical health and upon future fertility.

On the broader front there is increasing evidence that the small family system of western Europe will continue. In Britain, for instance, the previous differentials between rural and urban birth rates have, with a few regional exceptions, disappeared.⁵

While there has been in Britain a slight upward swing in both marriage and birth rates, it is extremely doubtful if this will continue. The Beveridge Plan, while it may aid in raising living standards, is not necessarily likely to stimulate the birth rate, and even though the marriage rate may remain at about its present level, as Enid

Charles says, "The most that can be hoped from more frequent and earlier marriage is a slowing down of the rate of decline of family size."⁶ It does not seem likely that we shall witness any mass movement toward the practice of large families. And what is true of Britain is probably equally true of France, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia.

Regarding the situation in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union we can only hazard a guess. Surely wherever there was any extensive military action, the disruption of family life—through evacuation, enslavement of workers, and death—must have been striking. Also the large military force of Russia and the shift of production centers undoubtedly altered family life. Assuming a gradual recovery from these effects, there remains the larger problem of future trends in the Russian family life as they relate to population.

The earlier ideological disregard for the bourgeois family, marked by ease of divorce and public dissemination of contraceptives, seems to have disappeared in favor of what looks like a much more puritanic view and practice. Today the solidarity of the family is stressed, divorce is extremely difficult to obtain, and there is obvious encouragement of, and pride in, a high national birth rate. The combination of expanding industry, vast resources, and a need for manpower may well continue for decades. Although in the long decades ahead Soviet Russia and her satellite states may witness a rise in the standards of living and a decline in the birth rate, there seems little evidence of any sharp trend in this direction in the immediate future. As remarked above, there is, as yet, no proof that the emergence of the small family system is inevitable.

This puts the populational relationship of the West vis-a-vis the East in a clear perspective with the latter retaining overwhelming advantages. This fact, in turn, bears on the political and economic relations of these two areas. Those who would plan for a peaceful Europe would do well to remember these bio-social facts. Wishful thinking in terms of pacific ideals may not suffice to offset the sheer weight of population pressures as such.

Mental Health. While the whole topic of any possible causal relation between neuroticism and fertility remains to be determined, there are some

⁵ See Enid Charles, "Population Trends in Britain," a paper read at the fortieth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in Cleveland, March 2, 1946.

⁶ *Ibid.*

hunches that may be explored. Let us note one or two of the more obvious and at least temporary effects of neurotic attitudes to the veterans' personal reconversion to home life.

It is generally agreed among medical men and those who have been concerned with the morale of ex-soldiers in the period of their reabsorption into civilian life, that sexual anxieties loom large in the veterans' thinking. Fear of infidelity on the parts of wives and sweethearts is widespread among men brought up in our culture. While these fears may be, in part, projections of the men's own sense of guilt for their infraction of the sexual taboos, the fact remains that on their return to civil life the persistence of such anxieties may not only cause inter-spousal conflict but may actually make for impotency, temporary or prolonged. It may be that there are class differentials in these reactions though some rather casual acquaintance with the problem leads me to think that the infidelity fears are widespread, both in the ranks and among officers.

There is a special problem for those veterans who have been prisoners of war. Such an experience may induce a variety of neurotic difficulties and in marital matters there is often not only a heightening of fears of the wife's unfaithfulness but the whole sense of guilt and shame associated with having been a prisoner gets entangled in all sorts of familial interactions. The common symptoms are sexual impotency, insomnia, distractability of attention, difficulties in holding a job, and often an escapism, either of schizoid type or in the form of actual desertion. The moral obligation of wives, children, relatives, and friends to help the ex-prisoner of war back to self-assurance and self-acceptance of his normal civilian role as husband, father, and community member may be a clear ideal not often realized in practice.

While this particular difficulty touches only a relatively small fraction of the total population, it is sufficiently important to warrant some investigation. Certainly in France, Germany, Italy, and Russia the total numbers of war prisoners were substantial. The re-establishment of these men as civilians may take some time with the result that family life and reproduction may be negatively affected.

Displaced Persons. Displaced persons, defined to include political and military refugees, more or less voluntary war labor taken into Germany, and the slave labor force, constitute another prob-

lem. Never in modern times have we seen such movements of considerable bodies of people moved about under military duress of one sort or another. The impact of such mobility upon family life, sexual habits, personal ambitions, and skill—to note only the more obvious—may well be considerable.

There is no better but withal gruesome illustration of the atomization of society into individual units than must have occurred under the conditions of enforced labor. True, voluntary groups may have arisen among such workers, even in the face of official efforts to prevent them. Nevertheless the total psychological impact of being uprooted and taken into virtual slavery must have been tremendous. There is some evidence, I believe, that in terms of sense of guilt and shame enforced laborers have something in common with prisoners of war. Even those who went voluntarily to Germany may develop some regrets and guilt at having made such a decision, now that their overlords have been so thoroughly defeated.

We have little scientific data on the psychology of such uprooted people, but from various impressionistic sources we may piece something together. Among other psychological features we may note the loss of family membership, the sense of loss of locality with its various associations of town or country, loss of pride accompanied by guilt and shame at being made a slave, and development of apathy and personal defeatism.

Not only were these years when reproductive opportunities were absent or practically nil, but on return to their native residences these individuals will require some time to re-integrate their lives into those of other family members and the community. Yet, just as most of these persons survived the ordeal of enforced labor, except those unfortunates who under Nazi ideology were earmarked for extinction, so, in time, human adaptability will enable them to take up their old obligations even in the face of sense of aging and personal discouragements.

A smaller, yet sizeable, fraction of the total displaced group are those individuals who do not want or dare to return to their former homes. These are truly people without a country—stateless persons—for whom provision will have to be made. Again we cannot estimate how many will fall into this category, but it is worth noting that at the end of 1938 the Nansen Office for Refugees stated that about 600,000 "persons displaced by

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Also, it is well to note that the end of the war has not seen an end to enforced labor. There is evidence that behind the iron curtain, which runs from the Baltic to the Adriatic, not only are prisoners of war being held to forced work, but considerable numbers of able-bodied persons are being dragooned from the civil population to swell this labor force. The Soviet Union has for years had its quota of slave labor, probably chiefly of the unskilled type, recruited from those who did not conform to the Communist Party program. The collectivization of agriculture is said to have meant the placing of 10 to 12 million peasants under state enforced labor. The practice has remained and under the rationalization of rebuilding and revenge, the system seems to have been extended.

While from the standpoint of modern economy such slave labor is inefficient, under a system of rigid state socialism this fact may not be thought important. It may not be considered necessary to replace such a labor force with the machine so long as the populational reserves permit its use. Though slave labor make up only a small percentage of the vast numbers of eastern Europe, the relation of such people to the birth and death rate situation will be interesting to watch. If permitted to reproduce, such slaves may be viewed as a continuing source of cheap labor. If such a scheme developed, the state would doubtless control both procreation and child rearing. And in a country where the leaders take a hard and realistic view of the applications of science, it is

not impossible that artificial human insemination of enslaved females might be instituted with a view to keeping up the labor supply.

Whether this phase of "A Brave New World"—to use Aldous Huxley's phrase—emerges or not, the drawing of slave labor from Germanic peoples may continue for some time. The net effect of this will be not only to swell the working force of those who control such labor but at the same time it further weakens the population potentials of the Teutonic stock from which the slave labor is drawn. Just as the Hitlerite program of racial decimation liquidated six million Jews and perhaps four million Poles and some two or three million Russians, so we may witness in Soviet Russia a deliberate program of reducing the manpower of the defeated Germans. Such a program would further sharpen the population differentials between the East and the West and would probably serve to keep alive the racialism which lies just under the surface of most European people.

There is also the matter of the psychology of acceptance of slave labor as a national policy. Will the future see the system spread elsewhere? It might easily do so in the Orient whence the Soviet program itself has some of its cultural roots. Its spread westward could only come with a distinctive revolutionary departure from the major values associated with humanitarianism, democracy, and individualism. But it is a thought to ponder in view of the increase in statism and the probable continuation of conflict between the East and the West.

Effects on Class Structure and Leadership. A discussion of the effects of the war on Europe should also take note of those changes which influence the class structure, especially the numbers and role of the intellectual élite who furnish political, economic, scientific, literary, and moral-religious leadership. While the total number of intellectuals is small compared to the great mass of population in any country, it is a commonplace to say that in mass society especially, leadership is a basic need. In western Europe the preservation or adequate recruitment of the intellectual élite has long been considered a high value. The role of such an élite in science, engineering, and management were central to the emergence and continuity of industrialized mass society itself.

Yet the last decade or so has seen, in some European countries, a striking departure from the traditional concern with this élite. A trend in

⁷ George L. Warren, "Interaction of Migration Policies and World Economy," Dept. of State Bulletin, Feb. 10, 1946, vol. 14, pp. 213-16.

some quarters toward liquidating this class has been all too evident. To go back a little into history, one of the first indictments against the Nazi regime was its removal by imprisonment, banishment, or death of those elements in Germany who were thought by the new rulers to be dangerous to the state. This sordid story is too well-known to need any details here. Not only was such a program carried out inside Germany itself but in every country taken over by conquest or collaboration by the Nazis. But what we need to note is that this particular device of getting rid of the intellectuals who do not follow a prescribed line did not disappear with the defeat of the Germans. It has continued in central and eastern Europe wherever persons were found who raised objections or threatened to raise objections to the new regimes, either directly in reference to political, economic, or ideological activities, or indirectly by virtue of known affiliations or points of view. Such persons have been driven out of public life, or out of their native countries, sent to concentration camps, or put out of the way in a more violent fashion.

But some may say, "This is of no importance in relation to population. High intellectual status is not biologically inherited, so what? Other leaders more in line with the times will take the place of these." First, let me say that it is not completely proved that high intellectual capacity is not, at least in part, due to superior genes in given family strains. But even assuming that the intellectual élite is in no way due to biologically inherited differences in mental ability but to cultural heritage entirely, the loss is none the less serious. That is, assuming a complete environmental determinism of intelligence, such measures of liquidation will affect the liberalistic and democratic traditions in a variety of ways. Family and community tradition and education in these matters are likely to be lost. The impact of repressive methods will be felt at home, in the school, and in the community generally. Not only is there a loss in the personnel of leadership, but those who remain become haunted by fear. In time the effects of such a program become cumulative. The enforced accommodation to a rigid regime which tolerates no creative criticism, which insists on individuals following certain predetermined lines of thinking must in time undermine the whole cultural tradition of free thought, free press, and free speech. These affect not only political and economic affairs but influence social

science research and literary and other creative endeavor.

If this program of liquidating the intellectuals in Europe continues it will undermine the western traditions wherever it reaches. A more or less free social selection of leadership will tend to disappear and social dominance will pass to those who accept the rigid predeterminisms of the authoritarian state and party.

This does not mean, of course, that leadership and headship will no longer be important, but rather that they will be channelized into forms congenial to totalitarianism. The present discussions about free speech, free press, and a free radio which agitates those liberals and idealists who are trying to work out a *modus vivendi* between capitalistic, individualistic, and democratic western powers and the authoritarian state socialism of the U.S.S.R. symbolize a growing awareness of the facts just cited. In the meantime the slow and effective disappearance of individuals and groups who hold to the western traditions goes on, and it is this latter connection that the realistic student of population may raise the same issue as it may affect the demographic sources of such leadership.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion it must be said that as far as the statistics of population changes in Europe are known there is nothing in this picture which has not been anticipated in the work of Notestein and his collaborators, of Kulischer and Lorimer.⁸ The sociological and psychological aspects, however, are not always self-evident. On the one hand, we have a virile growing population, united under a powerful police state, correlated with vast natural resources and expanding industrialization. Here the values and ways of life are considerably at variance with those traditionally associated with western Europe. In the latter region we find a number of highly industrialized but competing nations characterized by a declining or stationary population. In the light of current economic trends, moreover, these latter countries face a possible loss of markets with a lowering of industrial production and a depression of the expected standards of living.

⁸ See F. W. Notestein, I. B. Taevber, D. Kirk, et al., *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*, Geneva: League of Nations, 1944; Kulischer, *op. cit.*, and F. Lorimer, *The Population of The Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, 1946.

While war weariness and a certain apathy and hopelessness may in time be alleviated, one may well question whether there will be a revival of national ambition which in turn may lead to an upswing in population. What happens in a nation in which the masses and the leaders alike feel rather hopeless as to their future? One wonders about this with regard to present-day France, Germany, and Great Britain. Will the loss of domestic and foreign trade and a decrease in political power in the world further depress the birth rate? In other words, may we expect to see the will to life go out of these people?

Yet one may ask another question: Will the revival of nationalistic feeling or perhaps the rise

of some socialistic substitute for capitalist nationalism provide a new focus of hope leading to a change in population practice? Or, to mention another possible stimulus, will a growing fear of the Slavic population pressure—disguised in economic and political dress—serve to induce in the name of national survival a higher birth rate in the West?

The answer to such questions rests in the lap of conjecture. But I submit that there may be a psychological component in these situations which should be studied. Of course, it may be that the psychological elements are actually epiphenomena deriving from much deeper biological dynamics of a younger and more virile people on the march. Who knows?

A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE SOUTH*

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INTRODUCTION

THE only justification I can think of for a newcomer to the South to attempt a sociological interpretation of social change in the region is the assumption that a native son might not see the woods for the trees. There can be little doubt that after years of most fruitful fact-finding studies and analyses of particularly pressing problems, we should try to answer the old question of the great sociological thinkers of the past: what does it all mean? Where do we stand? And whither are we going? There is also the professional motivation of giving direction to specialized research and establishing standards for judging the significance of new knowledge.¹

* Read before the ninth annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, May 17, 1946.

This paper and the two immediately following, by Lorin A. Thompson and Arthur Raper were presented in a Section on Impersonal Factors in the Development of the South and are, therefore, included here as a unit.—*Editors*.

¹ Even regional research must necessarily be oriented towards general social theory and receive its direction from such theory if it is to arouse more than regional interest by contributing to the advancement of our understanding of social life in general.

The difficulty of the task lies, paradoxically, in the limitations of the region and of the time span with which we are dealing. The South is, after all, only a relatively small region within the vast domain of Western civilization, and the trends of social change in the South can scarcely be isolated from the trends in that larger area. Furthermore the South is a young region. Its history is, as far as we are concerned with it, merely that of the last ten generations or so of Western man, it falls almost entirely into the period of High Capitalism,² although, in a sense, an economic and technological development from wilderness to metropolis, which took centuries in the old world, has been telescoped into the brief span of three hundred years of southern history. Out of this short span we have to select, in view of the purpose of this discussion, only the most recent decades. This raises the problem of determining which of the

² Werner Sombart, "Capitalism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

³ Alfred Weber, "Fundamentals of Culture-Sociology: Social Process, Civilizational Process and Culture-Movement," in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft u. Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 47 (1920-21); translated by C. H. Weltner and C. F. Hirshman . . . under the auspices of the WPA and the Department of Social Science, Columbia University, New York, 1939 (mimeographed).

changes that have occurred recently are really indicative of long run trends. We will therefore have to relate the observed phenomena to a general theory of social change.

The discussion will be limited to what Alfred Weber³ calls the *social process*. The progress in technology and other aspects of the *civilization* process—in Weber's systematic—will be assumed as known and treated as data. Almost nothing can be said in this paper about new phenomena in the order of *culture*. The creations of the arts and of philosophy are trendless, they seem to come in spurts, and they are subject to evaluations which are quite different from those that lead us to the construction of trends of change in the other two spheres.⁴

Among the *social* changes, we shall select for discussion: first, those phenomena which are characteristic in the development of a rural region, largely dominated by planters, towards a more industrialized state; and second, some of those that are indicative of the much more general and slower movement from Community to Society, in the sense of Tönnies. The South, because of its agrarian economy and relative cultural homogeneity, has retained more traits of "Community" than any other region of the country, but it is assimilating itself to the rest of the country at quite a rapid pace.

PROGRESS OF CIVILIZATION

Before going into the interpretation of social changes, a brief consideration, in very general terms, of the civilizational progress with which they are interrelated is necessary. We are here concerned with man's increasing control over and the advancement of intellectual understanding of his natural and social environment.

It may be said that the first third of this century has been, for the South, a period of decisive improvement in the utilization of its natural resources and in the control of certain diseases characteristic of the region, all of which have helped to save the

⁴ By way of illustration, we may refer to the history of religious movements in the South. To construct any trend of change would be quite hopeless and not even meaningful in this field. Along with a tendency towards secularization of thought we see a very persistent fundamentalism and, at the same time, constantly new forms of emotional religiosity; thus one cannot say that religion in the South is changing in any definite direction.

South from economic collapse and to improve the health and stamina of the people. Now we may be entering upon a period of further great improvements, which for the first time will enable white men to live comfortably and efficiently even in the region's subtropical zone. The experiences gained during the war in the technique of living in the tropics, the new methods of insect control, of food preservation and air conditioning, may bring about a veritable revolution in southern life.

Furthermore, new techniques in manufacturing are already leading to the industrialization of hitherto economically undeveloped sections. Technological progress is also likely to create new uses for certain agricultural and other raw materials of the region.

Wartime labor shortages have resulted in more efficient methods of production in agriculture as well as in manufacturing.⁵ The mobilization of the last manpower reserves had the effect of diffusing industrial skills into populations hitherto quite untouched by modern mechanical technology.⁶

Finally, the more direct experiences of the war and the knowledge of foreign lands acquired through war work or service in the armed forces, have widened the intellectual horizon of many a son and daughter of the South and have aroused intellectual appetites which cannot remain without consequences for the social relations and institutions in the region. For the first time, large masses of mostly young Southerners are in a position to compare conditions at home with those in areas of the world more advanced in *civilization*. The result may be a great deal of social unrest and perhaps organized movements for economic and other reforms in the South.

In any event, the southern mind, which so far has been less tinged with the social standards of a capitalistic society than the American mind in general, is likely to become more like the mind of the more advanced regions. The values and codes of conduct characteristic of pre-industrial and even pre-capitalistic societies which have been so long maintained in the South will be abandoned when and if the South participates more intensively in the technological and intellectual progress.

⁵ Including shifts towards farm products which require less labor than the traditional staple crops, thus leading to greater diversification.

⁶ See Rudolf Heberle, "War-Time Changes in the Labor Force in Louisiana," *Social Forces*, 24 (March 1946), pp. 290-99.

SOCIAL CHANGE

If we now inquire into the nature of changes in the social sphere,⁷ we may very well begin by raising the question whether the South is and will remain a definite social entity, united by common values, common goals, and group consciousness. Extreme scepticism in this respect is warranted in view, among other things, of the disagreement among social scientists, about the proper definition of the South.

If we adopt, for the purpose of this discussion, Howard W. Odum's concept of the southern region we realize that those interests which welded the South together are going to decrease in binding power and that, as new issues arise, new interest groups are being formed within the region which are not characteristic of the South alone and which tend to overshadow the once predominant southern interests.

In particular, the political myth⁸ which has kept the South solidaric as a region—that is, the memory⁹ of the Confederacy—is bound to lose vitality with the passing away of those generations which still had immediate reminiscences of the fighting, the defeat, and the ensuing suffering and humiliation. The generations which are destined to determine the South's fate during the coming century will be dominated by the memory of the second world war and the overwhelming experience of national unity. Furthermore, the differentiations between the various economic zones and subregions within the South are likely to gain importance and so will the differentiations between social classes. It is therefore quite doubtful whether the South will remain much longer the "solid South," in socio-political consciousness.

We shall now discuss the changes in labor relations, in social stratification and in the social structure of local communities; thereafter we shall, very briefly, consider changes in values and norms. These are to be seen, not as mutually exclusive classes of subject matter, but rather as various aspects of the same social phenomena.

Labor relations. The South has, as a region

⁷ In the stricter sense, as indicated above.

⁸ The term "myth" is being used here in the technical sense which does not involve any judgment about the truth or other value aspects of the ideas concerned.

⁹ On "memory" as a psychological foundation of Community, see Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, 8 ed., p. 97 ff.

within the United States, certain socio-economic traits and functions, which would justify our comparing it with Europe east of the Elbe: (1) a vast agricultural region with wide areas in which large scale farming in highly capitalistic form predominates, conducted by a politically powerful class of landlords constantly in need of credit and desirous of subsidies in some form or other, and depending upon a rather thin urban middle class of dealers, bankers and money lenders; (2) a numerous rural proletariat, partly of ethnic stocks other than the landlords; in certain mountainous areas and on soils of low fertility, family farmers¹⁰ who in their culture and level of living represent an older phase of social development; (3) few and not very important cities, many but sparsely scattered small towns; (4) a prevalence of extractive industries—mining and lumber—except for certain districts of iron and textile industries; (5) high fertility and heavy out-migration, low wages and poor living conditions especially among the highly mobile rural proletariat—these are some of the most striking similarities. Both regions are remote from the great centers of consumption and are therefore handicapped in the diversification of agriculture and of manufacturing industries.

Many of the social changes which we observe in the South today, have been effective in Eastern Europe since the middle of the last century.

In the South, as in other world regions of large scale agricultural enterprise, we find technological and managerial progress accompanied by a change in the nature of labor relations from Community to Society, or from patriarchal to associational types.

Just as in the European East the patriarchal relations between landlords and workers, which had persisted after the abolition of serfdom, were gradually destroyed by the mechanization and rationalization of the estates and gave way to contractual relations,¹¹ while at the same time resident labor was largely replaced by seasonal migratory labor, so we observe in the South, since the abolition of slavery, a gradual decline of

¹⁰ It should perhaps be pointed out here, that such "peasant" areas exist throughout the entire East of Europe, including the eastern provinces of Prussia.

¹¹ The classical work is G. Knapp, *Die Bauernbefreiung*. See also Max Weber's articles on the conditions of agricultural workers in Eastern Germany. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tübingen, 1924).

patriarchal¹² labor relations and the replacement of resident plantation workers by transients and seasonal migrants from near-by towns and villages.

The sociological implications of this change are well-known: while the worker gains in freedom he loses the landlord's protection and care, and his economic insecurity increases as he is exposed to the vicissitudes of the labor market. A relationship of Community based on a shared interest in the output, on reciprocal service and protection, and on steady, often intimate, contacts gives way to loose, intermittent, contractual relations based solely on the cash nexus.

Pressure on the workers' wages increases as the region's chief staple crops are coming into fierce and ever fiercer competition with those of more recently developed overseas regions and with new substitute products. The consequences are: heavy out-migration of rural workers and frequent change of ownership of plantations, many of which fall into the hands of urban commercial entrepreneurs. This again tends to destroy the last survivals of communal patriarchal relations of landlords to the actual tillers of the soil.

Consequently, the antagonism of economic interests between landlords and agricultural workers tends towards a condition of unmitigated sharpness. What will be the effect on the workers' economic condition is hard to predict. Certain it is that in the past the development of the cotton plantation into a capitalistic enterprise has resulted in a deterioration at least of the croppers' diet. The future development of wages and other conditions of agricultural labor depends largely on the opening of non-agricultural employment opportunities. Perhaps a smaller, but better paid plantation labor force will emerge from a broad mass of underemployed, casual agricultural workers.¹³ In any event, it may be assumed that labor relations will soon be such as to require regulation by collective agreements and supervision by some kind of government agency. This applies also to tenants' contracts.

¹² Whether this term is really appropriate in view of peonage and other abuses of the landlord's power may be questioned; however paternalism has been and still is "cherished as the ideal relation between whites and Negroes" (Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, I, 459; also William Percy, *Lanterns on the Levee*).

¹³ See Arthur Raper, "The Role of Agricultural Technology in Southern Social Change," in this issue of SOCIAL FORCES pp. 21-30.

As to the family farmers (who are their own employers) in a declining cotton economy, it is likely that subsistence farming will give greater economic security than commercial farming: but there is the danger that, in a competition for land between subsistence farmers, those with the most modest stomachs will win out; in other words, that the general level of living among these farmers may tend to decline unless effective counter measures are taken, foremost among which would have to be public control over new ground settlements (land prices and contracts).¹⁴

Similar tendencies are observable in non-agricultural production and in trade and services, including domestic service.

The secondary industries in the South have until recently been largely limited to the extractive stages, to the first steps of processing of raw materials, and to the production of low-grade consumer goods. Now we are witnessing a new era, an era of expansion in new industries where high wages prevail while labor is only a minor factor of total production costs. In these industries, the older pattern of relations between employers and employees, which was fashioned after the model of the plantation, is disappearing and giving way to more strictly contractual forms. The state of "*anomie*"¹⁵ which in the 'twenties resulted in so much violence is being succeeded by a state of autonomous order based on collective agreements, long since adopted in industrially more advanced regions. The growth of labor unions since the 1920's and the impact of federal labor legislation are important factors in this development.

Furthermore, absentee ownership in manufacturing industries tends to weaken personal relations between employers and employees and brings to the fore a group of intermediate functionaries: managerial officials whose relationship with the workers is bound to be of a more depersonalized and rational, businesslike kind than that of the old-type owner-operator. The result is that even the most tradition-bound workers will feel the need for institutionalization of labor relations and for social security measures.

The same factors which produce these changes in labor relations can scarcely remain without effect on *race relations*. Just as the genuine caste system in India is slowly crumbling under the impact of industrialization, so may the southern pseudo-caste system soon prove incompatible

¹⁴ Max Weber, *op. cit. passim*.

¹⁵ Durkheim, *La Division de Travail*.

with the principles of rational plant organization. These require placement of workers according to ability and technological needs, without consideration of color. The adjustment in caste-relations¹⁶ will be a slow process and not without friction.

Thus we may foresee that on the one hand the old relations of quasi-patriarchal domination and neighborly symbiosis, which still are to be found in many rural communities, are going to disappear, at least from plantation areas, and that on the other hand discrimination against the once enslaved group may become less common in non-agricultural employment. However, one should also realize that urbanization of increasing numbers of Negroes and the trend towards more pronounced ecological segregation in urban communities will inevitably lead to further estrangement of the two groups. Even today, the urban white youth has much less experience of personal, play-group association with Negroes than their fathers and grandfathers used to have.

The Negroes certainly have become a more self-asserting, more vocal, and more minority-conscious group. Viewed against a background of inter-racial differentials of world-population growth, which must lead to a shift in the proportions of white and colored peoples—not in the United States but in the world as a whole—the development of geographically concentrated Negro masses into a group-conscious minority has its serious perspectives. In any case, these tendencies increase the need for institutionalization of inter-racial contacts and relationships (interracial committees, etc.). The old devices of personal patronage and reliance on a generally known (and accepted) "etiquette of race relations" will have to be replaced by new codes of conduct, based upon more formal group agreements and upon legislation.

The local communities. In rural areas, the neighborhood is still the basic local unit in which much of the social life of southern people is comprised. Even in plantation areas it still means a great deal in the social organization of the Negroes. Taking this and the great importance of the larger kinship group into account, it is safe to say that the social structure of rural areas in the region is still more community-like than, e.g. in the

¹⁶ The castes as such are not likely to be abolished, as Myrdal points out in *An American Dilemma*.

Midwest.¹⁷ Gradual changes are brought about by the increasing availability and use of quick transportation, especially in the more prosperous farming areas. Here, the larger village-open-country community is gaining superiority, and with it the "special interest groups." Again, we notice the decline of primary relations and primary group controls and the ensuing need for institutionalized controls.

Turning now to the phenomenon of urbanization, we should distinguish the two aspects of demographic change and of changes in the quality of the social structure of urban communities. Demographically, urbanization in the South means not only an increase in the proportion of urban population, but more specifically an increase of rural-nonfarm population around towns and cities and also an increase of farm population in areas adjacent to such communities.¹⁸ The war had caused a dramatic but temporary concentration of people in a few larger urban centers. For the coming years we predict a piling up of rural surplus population in villages, towns and small cities.¹⁹

Connected with urban growth we find in some communities interesting ecological changes. Towns which were originally oriented towards rivers and railroads are undergoing reorientation towards overland highways and are thus undergoing quite radical dislocations and readjustments in their ecology.

In the sociological interpretation of urbanization we should make a conceptual distinction between small town and big city. The former is more of a "Community," the latter shows all the characteristics of the great "Society."²⁰

Southern urban communities, with few exceptions, corresponded until recently more to the former than to the latter type. Much of the charm of southern life was due to this fact. We are speaking not only of those towns in plantation areas where a declining oligarchy of old families strives to retain status by social exclusiveness,

¹⁷ R. Heberle, "Discussion" of B. Ryan, "The Neighborhood as a Unit of Action in Rural Programs," *Rural Sociology* (March 1944).

¹⁸ See for example, T. Lynn Smith and Homer L. Hitt, "Population Redistribution in Louisiana," *SOCIAL FORCES*, 20 (May 1942), pp. 437-44.

¹⁹ R. Heberle, *The Impact of the War on Population Redistribution in the South* (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1945).

²⁰ We adopt here Tönnies' distinction between "Stadt" and "Grosstadt."

but of the great majority of southern towns where the people on Main Street still know each other personally from school, church or lodge, and where the proverbial cousins are still plentiful.

Today we observe how the social structure of such towns is changing partly because of sheer influx of population, much of which comes from more distant parts of the country than in the past. We notice how special interest groups and such new contact-providing groups as country clubs, dancing clubs, newcomers clubs, and industrial USO's take the place of older informal groupings. Furthermore, the rather well-paid managerial and professional personnel which comes to such cities with the establishment of industrial plants by large absentee corporations, tends to dislodge the old families of local merchants and manufacturers from their dominant status.²¹ Similar changes occur where the old wealth acquired in the cotton trade and in the lumber industry is giving way to the new wealth of the oil men.

From below, the position of the old and new ruling strata is threatened by the ascent to political power of the "small" people: the family farmers, the tenants here and there, and the industrial workers. The former are still largely an amorphous mass, easily rallied around quasi-charismatic leaders or demagogues, as their antagonists call them, the latter have their unions which give them clearer direction and presumably a more rational and responsible leadership.

The quintessence of these changes in social stratification seems to be the evolution of a more clear-cut class society and the disappearance of the last traces of that status-group²² stratification

²¹ The same fact has recently been observed in other parts of the country by Wright C. Mills. "Small business and civic welfare", Report of Smaller Warplants Corporation to Special Committee to study problems of American Small Business. Senate. (Prepared by C. Wright Mills and Melville J. Ulmer) Washington, D. C. S. doc. 135, 1946.

²² The term "Status Group" is used in the sense of the German "Stand" or the English "estate." See Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, I, Ch. III; and also Hans Gerth and Wright C. Mills, from Max Weber, 1946. The American language, developed in a society where status groups did not exist and even the existence of social classes tends to be denied, does not provide adequate popular terms to denote the two actually distinct phenomena of "Stand" and "Klasse"; in such situations a new term has to be invented or a specific meaning assigned to an existing word.

which, although never fully developed, had been characteristic of the ante-bellum South. The two extremes of status-giving conditions—descent from the old planter oligarchy and descent from the slaves with their corresponding differences in honor and all other attributes of "status"—are slowly losing their former significance. It may be suggested in parenthesis that the social type of the poor white may also be on the way to extinction. But it should be noted that the Negro caste is not dissolving, while the upper and lower white status groups are losing their status character.

At the same time we observe in the cities a widening of the distances between classes. Not the categorical distances, which may be very great even in rural society, but the personal social distances are growing. The mitigating effects of frequent contacts and more intimate acquaintance, of neighborly and friendly associations between individuals belonging to different social strata, so typical of the small town, are restrained and reduced by the mere growth of the urban community and by the ecological segregation which usually goes with such growth.

The structure of southern society is in many respects less mature than that of the more industrialized regions. Consequently, the "social awareness" of southern people in all classes tends to be couched in ideas and stereotypes which appear somewhat out-dated in comparison to those current in the more advanced regions. Employers tend to be more conservative, workers less class conscious, middle-class women more late Victorian than in other regions. Or, the values of the Southerner are not yet those of a highly developed capitalistic society. This may be said without romanticizing the love of leisure and related traits often praised by southern intellectuals. Changes in the economic and social structure, if they should come suddenly, are likely to involve conflicts. Whether these will be violent, depends on what may be called the state of "social preparedness."

The South has long been known as a region where certain types of social conflicts and violations of social codes were settled by direct action or extra-legal action rather than in court. The duel, the lynching, the violence in labor conflicts resorted to by both parties, the settling of disputes between croppers by authority of the planter, are some of the more spectacular instances. But there is on the other side also the reliance on oral

agreements, on custom, on personal confidence in landlord-tenant relations, also in other labor relations, and in many minor business transactions.

Changing social relationships, increasing heterogeneity and mobility of population, citification of urban communities, and the changing composition of certain social classes make reliance on such practices more and more impractical. Where spontaneous understanding and concord on the basis of common values and universally accepted custom cannot any longer be expected, formal contracts, statutes and regulations, and institutionalized procedures of enforcement will be needed. At the same time practices of extra-legal self-help, having become superfluous and unjustified, will eventually be suppressed by State and Federal authorities. This would be only a belated instance of the monopolization, by the modern state, of social control functions formerly resting with local communities, kinship groups and other primary groups.

These developments, it may be finally suggested, create a demand for more competent political leadership, for more and better trained administrative experts. Like other rural societies, the South has been relying in these fields largely on locally prominent people, who were not necessarily trained for their tasks, but had common sense and a certain amount of experience in related activities.

As conditions become more complex and more dynamic, more adequate personnel will be required on all levels, from the State government down to the rural deputy sheriff. While this trend raises serious problems for the future of democracy, there seems to be no other choice, and the problem is not peculiar to the South, it is merely indicative of the South's "coming-of-age."²³

²³ For the benefit of such critics as might object to the use of this metaphoric term because it has a connotation of progress, I would like to point out that some people do not like the idea of "growing up" at all.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTHEASTERN STATES*

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I

IN DISCUSSING this problem which is of current interest in all of the southern States, it will be helpful first to review a few of the economic trends between 1929 and 1939, and then to appraise the changes which have occurred since 1940. The States included in the southeastern group discussed in this paper are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. The statistics chosen show the relative changes in the group of Southeastern States to the Nation's total. Where these relative changes appear to obscure the development, figures showing the volume of change have been presented.

Between 1930 and 1940 a number of changes

occurred in the relationship of the Southeastern States and the Nation as a whole.

1. Population increased from 20.8 to 21.5 percent.
2. Workers in manufacturing increased from 12.8 to 14.2 percent.
3. Wages paid in manufacturing increased from 7.8 to 9.7 percent.
4. Income increased from 10.5 to 12.0 percent.
5. Agricultural workers remained at 40 percent (of the Nation's agricultural workers). The total number of agricultural workers in the Nation dropped from 10.8 millions to 8.6 millions; the number in the Southeastern States from 4.27 to 3.43 millions. The declines in agricultural employment reflect the improvement in output per worker in agriculture and the expansion of employment opportunities in other fields.
6. Total employment remained relatively the same (20 and 20.4 percent for 1930 and 1940 respectively).
7. Employment in the production group (agriculture, forestry, and fishing; manufacturing; mining;

* Read before the ninth annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, May 17, 1946.

and construction) decreased from 13.5 to 12.2 percent of the Nation's total. The decline in absolute numbers was from 6,161,000 to 5,529,000 or 632,000.

The internal shift in the pattern of employment in the Southeastern States is of particular importance. The number of workers in agriculture declined by 844,000; the number in manufacturing increased by 158,000; in construction by 42,000; and in mining by 12,000. The number of persons employed in the trade and service group increased from 3,177,000 in 1930 to 3,830,000 in 1940, or 653,000. The change in the pattern of employment indicates that the transition of workers from agriculture to other pursuits has progressed slowly, but in the direction that promises to increase the income level of the people of the Southeast.

No data are at hand to measure precisely the occupational redistribution in the Southeast since 1940. Such measures as are available indicate that the rural population of the Southeast has declined between 1940 and 1945 and that the urban population has increased. During the period from 1940 to 1944 more than \$2.6 billion was invested in manufacturing facilities, tools, and equipment. Of this total sum approximately \$600 million was private money and slightly over \$2 billion public money. These sums do not include the other investments in military camps, housing, utility improvements, and the like.

While it may be observed that the Southeast's share of the Nation's investment in new manufacturing facilities was only 12.4 percent for 21.7 percent of the Nation's people, it nevertheless was a very substantial investment. When consideration is given to the fact that in 1939 the Southeastern States had 12.3 percent of the Nation's manufacturing establishments, it appears that expansion of plant facilities in the Southeastern States during the war years was proportional to the Southeast's share of the Nation's manufacturing plant in 1939.

Viewed in another way the war did not change the direction of the general economic and social trends in evidence during the thirties. If southern agriculture continues to become more efficient and profitable and industrial development continues at a somewhat faster pace, these developments will furnish the economic foundation for further expansion of trade and service occupations. In addition there have been some sharp rises in

total income payments. More purchasing power means more opportunities for manufacturing, construction, trade and service developments. Such developments also furnish the economic base for the needed revenues with which to improve educational and public health services.

A comparison of the statistics on manufacturing establishments, manufacturing employment, wages paid, value of output, and value added by manufacturing show a number of interesting developments.

1. Manufacturing employment in the Southeastern States was 12.4 percent of the Nation's total in 1929, and 14.6 percent in 1939. During the same period the salary and wage payments were 7.8 and 9.7 percent respectively. In absolute numbers both employment and payments declined. Proportionately employment increased by 2.2 percent of the Nation's total while wages increased by 1.9 percent. In 1939 the average wage level in the Southeastern States was about two-thirds of the national average. Two factors were prominent in this difference in wages; first, there is a smaller proportion of high wage industries in the South than in other sections of the Nation; and second, wage differentials have existed between the South and other geographical areas for the same type of industry. The differentials have been narrowing during the past few years.
2. The figures on value of output and value added by manufacture, when related to the number of persons employed and the number of establishments, suggest that the industries in the Southeastern States on the whole are not developed to the same level of technology as those in the more heavily industrialized sections of the Nation. This, however is not true of the newer chemical industries of the South.

Further analysis of the general economic conditions of the Southeastern States shows a number of significant relationships.

1. Low income and standards of living have been associated with (a) a high percentage of total employment in agriculture, (b) high birth rate, and (c) relatively high rate of outward migration.
2. Increased income and improved living standards have been associated with the (a) increase in manufacturing which results in a larger proportion of the population becoming urban; (b) cessation of outward migration; and (c) a lower birth rate.

These latter developments have occurred during the war and will undoubtedly continue. As a

result urbanization will increase, income and standards of living may be expected to improve, and the birth rate will continue to decrease.

If one were to push the foregoing relationships to their logical extreme one would conclude that the way to bring prosperity to the South would be to abandon agriculture in favor of manufacturing, encourage inward migration, and reduce the birth rate to zero. The absurdity of this extreme is apparent. The other extreme which has characterized the South as well as other sections of the country to some extent, is extreme individualism with a pronounced emphasis on self-sufficiency. This notion when carried to its extreme has resulted in an increasing man-land ratio with increasing pressure of people on resources, widespread poverty, and social backwardness.

Demographic research has long emphasized the facts that living standards and the cultural patterns of peoples depend upon the kind and amount of skill which is applied to resources. The sale and shipment of raw materials to which a comparatively small amount of labor is applied does not as a rule result in a high standard of living. On the contrary, when a comparatively large amount of skill and technology is applied to a raw material, the income is usually increased for the producer and additional wages and salaries go to those who process and fabricate the raw materials. The most satisfactory development occurs when the raw materials can be processed to the stage where they are ready for the consumer.

The relatively lower income level of the southern States has been associated with the fact that a comparatively large proportion of the working population has been engaged in the production of such raw materials as agricultural products, timber, and to some extent, minerals. On the whole there has been much less application of skill and technology to the raw materials than has been characteristic of New England or the North Central States. It is not my purpose here to go into the reasons for these developments. It is evident, however, that, even as the South has shifted slowly from an agrarian to a more mixed and diversified economy, it has also obtained an increasing share of the Nation's income. The relatively lower income underlies the comparatively poor showing of the southern States in the development of educational, public health, and welfare services. If the recent economic trends toward diversification continue, the task of financing these services and improvements will be less of a burden.

The economic goals or objectives of the South need to be clearly stated. I shall endeavor to set forth my own views on this matter for whatever they may be worth. In the first place those measures which have brought about more efficient agricultural practices need to be continued. Agriculture will continue to be one of the foundation stones of the southern economy. It is not likely, however, that agriculture will be efficient and profitable if it is obliged to exist on farm subsidies, price fixing, and other measures which tend to unduly manipulate the relationship between supply, demand, and price. It is probable, therefore, that the cotton acreages in the South will need to be reduced, and that those who engage in agriculture will need to shift into more diversified agricultural production. This will also mean that the farms will of necessity need to be larger so that the farm operators can take full advantage of the economies of farm machinery and other technology to reduce costs and increase profits.

In the second place the Southeastern States should encourage the further development of manufacturing of all types. Of particular importance are those types of manufacturing which can use the raw materials grown in the South and which lend themselves to processing and packaging for the consumer market. In some fields substantial progress has been made. The examples with which I am most familiar are chosen from Virginia, namely, the apple processing industries and the poultry and feed co-ops of the Shenandoah Valley. Twenty years ago wastage in the fruit crop from rotting, decay, and inability to transport produce to markets advantageously meant that a substantial part of the orchard crop was lost. The development of processing industries, such as canneries, quick-freezing plants, feed mills, and the like, offers additional employment. In addition auxiliary employment in the trade and service industries expands. It is well to point out, however, that the success of agricultural processing industries depends upon effective distribution channels and market outlets. It seems likely that with the increase in manufacturing in the South and the improved level of income attained since 1940 that the South itself is a considerable market for many new products. Time will tell whether these new markets will be served by southern industries or by competition from producers in other parts of the Nation. On the other hand there are some crops which the South can produce more successfully than other parts of the Nation.

A more careful appraisal of the prospective national demand for southern products should be made.

As pointed out previously in this paper, wages paid in manufacturing in Southern industries in 1939 were about two-thirds of the national average. Developments during the war have undoubtedly changed this situation. In the first place the surplus labor supply to which the South had been accustomed before the war has largely disappeared. This tight labor market has forced up the wages paid to labor in all lines of work. The war industries which located in the South paid wages that were comparable to similar industries in other parts of the Nation. Although detailed data are not available at this time the indications are that wage and salary differentials between the South and other parts of the Nation are much smaller than before the war. This situation is unquestionably not only an economic but a social gain.

In recent years there have been a number of major developments in the Nation on the wage and labor front which will affect not only the Nation's development but that of the South. One of the aims and objectives of the unions has been to reduce the wage differentials between industries, particularly among the workers in the lower wage brackets. The unions have shown no disposition to favor a uniform wage scale for all levels of skill in all industries but they have vigorously espoused a policy which would increase the wage levels of the majority of workers. This has been one of the reasons behind the law which was introduced into Congress to set a \$.65 an hour minimum wage level. Whatever one's views may be with regard to this matter and whatever one's attitude may be toward the unions, as a matter of economic policy, it is distinctly to the advantage of the South and of the Nation not to have large wage differentials.

One of the results of the present wage increases has been to multiply the farmer's difficulties in obtaining farm labor at a price which he feels he can afford to pay. If factory wages and other wages continue at a high level, agricultural wages must be able to compete with them. It seems to me that a prosperous agriculture cannot rest on low wages any more successfully than an efficient industry can be developed with a low wage scale. The producer or worker, whether on a farm or in industry, is also a consumer. The amount he can consume or buy is related to his wage level. This condition, whether one likes it or not, is bound to

influence the future pattern of development in the southern States. The competition for labor between the farm, factory, store, etc., will force all operations to be more efficient and competitive. In the event that the South is unable to absorb and utilize its young men and women we can expect that migration will again be accelerated. A certain amount of migration is to be expected, particularly among younger people. The effects of migration in different parts of the country, however, have varied. During the twenties there was a large migration of people from the South to the North. The reasons were largely the lack of opportunities for the young people of the South in their home territory and the availability of opportunities in the North. Such conditions repeat themselves whenever these conditions are found.

II

The foregoing sketch of the economic developments in the Southeastern States brings us to a consideration of the measures which communities, counties, and States may consider in promoting their own advancement. A reasonable goal for the Southeastern States in the further development of manufacturing is at least 20 percent of the Nation's total. If the characteristics of manufacturing, such as the number of establishments, number of employees, wages and salaries, and value added by manufacture, can also be developed so that they are approximately 20 percent of the Nation's total, the development would raise the economic level of the South at least to the level of the Nation. To achieve such a goal will call for a comparatively faster rate of growth in manufacturing than in New England, the Middle Atlantic, and the North Central States. The next question is, can this be done and if so, how?

Before attempting a discussion of this problem several collateral, yet closely related, matters are pertinent. First, research in southern universities and colleges has on the whole not been as well supported as in other sections of the country. The research in the South has often been of high quality, but there has not been enough of it. Second, research in the fields of physics, chemistry, and biology has lagged. In recent years the establishment of a number of industrial research organizations has made a good beginning in the applications of science and technology to the development of manufacturing and processing of the South's raw materials. Third, too little is known about the

potential markets for products now produced and additional ones which may be manufactured or grown profitably. What one hears on this subject has more of fancy than of fact. Research can point the way to the development showing most promise.

All of these considerations add up to the need for further expansion and development of manufacturing. The answer to this need in the minds of many lies in selling the advantages of a community or State to prospective industrial settlers. To facilitate industrial development many communities have raised promotion funds and States have created industrial development commissions. Such organizations can aid greatly in the matter provided they know what they have to sell and what the advantages of a local area may be with respect to other competing areas. It is to the advantage of both the company and the community for the plant to succeed. A plant cannot succeed if the community cannot furnish the basic requirements which enable the plant to produce profitably in a competitive market. For these and other reasons a new plant should not be *sold* a location, but rather should be encouraged to *buy* its location after it has thoroughly appraised its prospects of success. Most of the better concerns *buy* a location, but are seldom *sold* one.

Next let us examine some of the factors associated with industrial development along with the conditions found in many communities.

Factors often associated with industrial development. Economists, engineers, and others have stressed the relative importance of power, transportation, labor supply, and other physical advantages as factors influencing the location of industry. Often overlooked, but at least of equal importance are the less tangible forces of: (1) individual and community awareness of the opportunities for, and advantages of, industrial development; (2) men with ideas, imagination, and the spirit of adventure.

In the South there are many areas which have excellent potentialities, but unless developed the communities cannot compete for new industries.

Our experience in Virginia has brought forth some interesting observations.

1. Communities wishing industrial expansion often do not know their relative assets and liabilities, nor the ways in which their advantages can be enhanced and their liabilities minimized.

2. Communities are not as a rule informed as to the procedures followed by large corporations in seeking sites for new plants.
3. Communities are often reluctant (and sometimes with good reason) to bond themselves for improvements which would be necessary if a new industry were to be established. In many instances a more complete investigation of the financial and engineering aspects of such improvement would show that in the long run they would be well worth carrying through to completion.
4. There is the prejudice that industries should be financed with local capital, use local raw materials and labor. This belief is justified only so long as there is venture capital, raw materials, and the technical skill available locally to transform raw materials into finished products which can be marketed advantageously.

How can these shortcomings be overcome?

1. Comprehensive information about each community is essential. The development of such data is a technical job which most rural communities feel that they cannot afford. The research talents of colleges and universities, however, can do much to meet this deficiency by orienting research efforts in the several social sciences toward this end. Chambers of commerce, planning commissions, and other research and promotional organizations can aid materially in this venture. Aid can also be obtained from various Federal agencies, most of which are anxious to help. Active, alert work in the States and communities will aid the Federal agencies to better shape their research and statistical programs to meet local needs. Private business concerns can also make significant contributions to this fundamental task of collating and interpreting information.
2. Once the basic data are compiled, the information needs to be directed toward the solution of community or state problems. Otherwise it is but of historical interest. Such data are useful in throwing light on the factors which have been most important in the growth of the community up to any point of time and are essential in appraising future developments. But future developments, unless they are to drift, call for imagination,

the spirit of adventure, skill, energy, and a belief in their ultimate value. For example, congested traffic cannot be solved satisfactorily by adding a few additional parking lots or by preventing people from parking on the streets. These measures temporarily alleviate the congestion, but they are not substitutes for widening narrow streets, or providing for the swift and rapid movement of increasing traffic. If nature is allowed to take its course the congestion increases to a point where it becomes intolerable, and business moves to more ample locations while the older areas gradually decline and decay. This is followed by a decline in property values and tax revenues. The same principle needs to be followed in planning for the economic development of an area. The answer is not to be found merely in more research anymore than the solution of traffic problems can be solved by more frequent and extensive traffic surveys. Such surveys and research serve their real purpose only when they specifically show how the problems can be permanently solved.

3. If capital, skills, or raw materials are lacking, help from the outside may be of distinct advantage to the community. One man with an idea, and the imagination and perseverance to carry it through, may provide jobs for many men and markets for many local products. The standard of living of the citizens is related to the quantity and level of wages. The size of local payrolls is of considerably more importance than the source of original capital.

SUMMARY

The Southeastern States improved their economic balance during the thirties. The same developments have continued since 1940. These changes are: (a) a decline in agricultural employment, but a somewhat better distribution of farm income in 1940 than prevailed in 1930; (2) a slow but steady increase in manufacturing employment;

(3) a substantial increase in employment in trade and service occupations; and (4) in each State of the Southeastern area some improvement in the pattern of balanced employment occurred. For the total area, employment in agriculture declined by 844,000. This was more than offset by a combined increase of 865,000 in other occupational groups. (Balanced employment is defined as a pattern in which the number of persons employed in all trade and service industries equals or exceeds the number employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, manufacturing, mining, and construction).

An increased share of the Nation's income seems most probable if the number of workers in agriculture continues to decline, and the number of workers in manufacturing, trade, and service expands.

Expansion of manufacturing in the Southeast may be facilitated by assembling, in attractive form, the information most needed by prospective industrial settlers. Industrial promotion should be more a matter of counsel and service to prospective industry rather than of selling.

Closer cooperation and coordination of research work in all fields is needed. Colleges and universities have both an opportunity and a responsibility to aid in the development of needed information and in the analysis of economic and business trends.

The future development of the Southeast will be facilitated by encouraging more of the young men and women to remain in the area so that their talents and abilities may be devoted to the development of their native region. Industrial and economic development needs more than resources and masses of people. It requires leadership, knowledge, and the spirit of adventure. This means that our educational institutions will need to direct their efforts more and more to the training of young people who can develop the resources of the South.

Present indications point to the need for an expansion of research in all fields and particularly in the field of marketing. One of the greatest opportunities of the South would seem to be the development of new and larger markets for the products it can grow and manufacture.

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THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY IN SOUTHERN SOCIAL CHANGE*

ARTHUR RAPER

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IN DISCUSSING the role of agricultural technology in Southern social change, we need first of all to recall that cotton and tobacco, the farmers main sources of cash in the South, are two of the least mechanized crops in the Nation. Hand labor plays the major part in both of them. Axes, mattocks, hoes and simple one- and two-horse plows are standard equipment. The typical tobacco farmer uses no implements or tools more complicated than a mercury thermometer and the one-row fertilizer distributor—and much fertilizer is still put in the row by hand. The cotton farmer's implements have been a one-horse seed planter, a one-horse fertilizer distributor, and scales to "weigh up" the cotton at picking time in the fall. Sugar cane, too, has traditionally been planted and harvested by hand operations.

Cotton gins, cotton oil mills, textile mills, tobacco factories, and sugar cane mills have always looked like projections of another kind of world into the southern countryside, and that is exactly what they are. The mechanization of cotton ginning, spinning, and weaving got under way in the early 1800's; the manufacture of sugar from cane juice was already well established; and over half a century ago the manufacture of chewing and smoking tobacco was becoming big business. We need then, first of all, in thinking about the social effects of current technological development in southern agriculture to make certain that we understand our base lines—namely, the production in the field by hand methods of crops which have for many decades now been processed upon leaving the farmer by big machines and mass production methods, which are in harmony with the rest of the national economy.

No farm machinery or techniques are in sight to do more than merely reduce the hand labor in tobacco growing, but the outlook for mechanization in the cotton and sugar cane crops is another matter. The tendency of farmers to produce these crops by the traditional hand methods will be offset

in considerable part by the immediate economic advantages in the use of machines. More tractors are being purchased. The mechanical cotton picker is now in an advanced stage of development, and some of these machines are already in use in the Mississippi Delta. The use of the mechanical cane cutters has been increasing and seems likely to spread further. The gains in mechanization thus promised may go far toward solving some of the South's old economic and social problems. And as a part of the process they would create some very important new problems.

HAND LABOR TRADITIONAL IN COTTON SOUTH

Since cotton is the South's leading crop, and since it is now beginning to be mechanized, let us simplify our discussion by centering our attention on it. The reliance on hand methods of cotton production encouraged the early emergence and spread of plantation farming. Slaves could be used primarily because of the hand processes used in growing cotton. The later use of hired workers and the development of sharecropper farming were adaptations of the basic socio-economic organization that became established before 1860, with these relationships always being modified to meet new conditions as they develop—but nearly always in harmony with what has gone before, with the need for hand labor continuing. Involved in the southern agricultural situation has been the presence of two distinct racial groups, with one of them occupying, from the outset, a definitely lower position than the other. Hand labor provided something of a "natural place" in the economy for the nether group. The lower-income whites also did hand labor, but they could move on to the frontier, or out of the slave area entirely if they liked. The passing of the frontier decades ago and the increasing need for livelihood opportunities within the southern settled areas have increased the number of whites who live primarily by hand-produced cotton until they now outnumber the nonwhites more than two to one.¹

* Read before the ninth annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, May 17, 1946.

¹ In the 690 counties in the Cotton Belt in 1940 there were 1,217,325 white farmers and 563,118 Negro farm-

The great reliance on hand labor early became institutionalized in free housing by the landowners of wage hands and tenant farmers. Since enough resident workers were available for the busiest season, that is picking, the practice of using migrant laborers did not develop, nor was there any practical reason for the landowners to mechanize the other steps of production.

Such are some of the factors responsible for the relatively large number of farm families in the South, and, generally speaking, the small farms they operate, and the relatively low range of skills they have learned. These factors lie back of the poor housing, poor health, and poor nutrition that is found in many rural areas of the region. They explain much as to the political and social institutions here. They are the roots of the old "furnish" system, of the need for production of crops with borrowed money, and of the State crop lien laws that make it possible for farmers without property or credit to obtain supplies to grow a crop.

It is against this complex rural life situation that the coming of farm machinery has meaning. Naturally enough, the first extensive use of farm machinery in the South occurred in the Plains of west Texas and Oklahoma, out where the cotton country fades off into the breezy equalitarianism of the Range-Livestock Areas and the Wheat Areas. This part of the cotton country was settled last, has always had fewest sharecroppers, and has put least value on supervising other people's work and most value on work itself. This is the area of the South that is least characterized by the very characteristics that give the older rural South its distinctive qualities.

The increase of mechanization in southern agriculture will likely result in even greater social changes than it has in the other parts of the country. In the Corn Belt and in the Wheat Areas, for example, the farm tractor speeded up mechanization, but it did not initiate mechanization, for great horse teams were already being used widely to power gang plows, discs, wide drills, binders, headers. In the Southern States, heavier farm machinery has usually been brought in with the tractor, for practically nowhere has the equipment been larger than for two horses.

If the above background analysis is correct, an

ers. White tenant operators numbered 597,912 and Negro tenants 461,982. Tenants accounted for 49.1 percent of all white farmers, and 82.0 percent of all Negro farmers.

increase of farm tractors (and tractors are used as something of an index for all farm machinery) would be expected to be accompanied by an increase in the size of farms, a decrease in the number of farm operators, the greater decrease of tenants than of owners, and a greater decrease of colored farm operators than of white operators.² An increase of livestock farming or the retirement of crop lands from cultivation to timber production would also have something of the same effect in increasing the size of farm units, in reducing the number of farmers, and in raising farm income levels. These things would all operate in the same direction because they would all be starting in reverse the basic forces that have maintained the small hand-operated farming in the South.

INCREASE OF TRACTORS AND DECREASE OF FARM OPERATORS

Now, let us see what changes have already occurred in the number of farms, and the tenure and race of farm operators since 1930 as the number of tractors has increased.³ It will be noted in Table 1 that the percentage of farm

² It is hardly necessary to point out here that this paper does not suggest that all the changes which are occurring in farm tenure and race composition of farm operators in the South are attributable to the increase of mechanization. It is generally known that the crop-control programs since the early 1930's have been dynamically related to tenure changes and therefore not unrelated to the racial composition of the farm operators as a group, and that off-farm work opportunities during the prosperous years and urban relief standards during the depression years attracted many families from cotton farms, and that there are numerous other causal factors involved. It should be recognized, however, that the crop-control programs themselves increased mechanization by affording greater incentives toward efficient operation. The migration of hand workers from cotton farms for whatever reason makes labor relatively more scarce and relatively more expensive and thus operates to speed up the mechanization of cotton production.

³ In view of the many studies already made of the effects of an increased number of tractors in increasing the size of farms and in reducing the number of horses and mules, etc., it seems unnecessary to present details on these points here. Also since other studies discuss the historical development of tractor farming, this statement is limited to the period since 1930. See R. B. Vance, *All These People*, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1945), especially pages 192 to 212; C. Horace Hamilton "The Social Effects on Recent Trends in the Mechanization of Agriculture," *Rural Sociology*, 4,

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operators using tractors in no one of the 13 Southern States came up to the national average in 1945, though Oklahoma and Texas approximated it, while Florida with about half the national average stood next. All three of these States, and especially those parts of them that are most mechanized—central and southern Florida and the Plains areas of Texas and Oklahoma—have least of the plantation background, fewest sharecroppers, fewest Negroes, were latest settled and least involved in the Civil War. On the other hand, the lower Southern States of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina had the smallest incidence of tractors, all of these below one-fifth the national average in 1945, with but slightly higher averages in Louisiana, Arkansas, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

The percentage increase of tractors was greater for the Southern States than for the Nation from 1930 to 1940 and from 1940 to 1945. The greatest increases between 1930 and 1940 occurred in the West South Central States while from 1940 to 1945 the greatest increases occurred in the Old South where tractors came in latest. Eight States had increases of 50 per cent or over, during the five-year period. These high recent increases, however, have not brought the rest of the South anywhere near the tractor average of the Oklahoma and Texas farmers.

Now, over against this increase of tractors by States, let us look at the changes in number, tenure, and race of farm operators. For the 13 Southern States there was a decrease in number of farm operators between 1930 and 1940 of 7.5 per cent, and for the 1940 to 1945 period 3.7 percent, while for the 8 principal cotton States⁴ the losses were

11.8 percent and 4.7 percent respectively. The decrease for the West South Central States was 12.6 percent between 1930 and 1940 and 7.9 percent between 1940 and 1945.

When the decreases are analyzed by tenure for the 1930-1940 decade, the owners showed a distinct gain in every one of the 13 States, the croppers a great loss, with all other tenants showing rather small losses when compared with the losses of croppers. The greatest losses of croppers occurred in Oklahoma and Texas where tractor increases were greatest and where the highest proportion of farmers had tractors.

Reference to the distribution of losses by tenure by race shows that the greatest relative decreases occurred within the Negro group, and that, whereas the losses in the white group occurred among the tenants and especially the sharecropper portion of the tenant group, the losses among the Negroes occurred in all tenure groups, with the relatively greatest losses occurring in the tenant group but with very little difference between the croppers and other tenants.⁵

The number of families displaced per tractor varies with conditions, but all studies indicate that one or more families are replaced by each additional tractor.⁶ Though there are, of course, numerous other considerations involved, the decrease of 337,303 farm operators in the 13 Southern States from 1930 to 1945 looks reasonable when compared

⁴ Unfortunately, the figures for States and counties by tenure and race for 1945 are not yet available. Their use, however, in this connection would be limited somewhat by the increased number of families listed as farm operators by the 1945 census because of its inclusion of all families living on three acres or more of land and of all families having farm products valued at \$250 or more. Both of these definitions brought into the census listing numerous families in many States who were industrial workers living on small rural homesites and commuting to factory employment and also a number of additional families who are essentially nonfarm families but whose victory gardens surpassed the \$250 produce value mark and so placed them in the census farmer group.

⁵ "Technology on the Farm," *ibid.*, p. 64, reports a reduction of two families per tractor on large plantations; Saville, "Trends in Mechanization and Tenure Changes in the Southeast," *The People, the Land and the Church in the Rural South* (Chicago: Farm Foundation, 1941); Paul S. Taylor, "Power Farming and Labor Displacement in the Cotton Belt, 1937," *Monthly Labor Review*, 46, Nos. 3 and 4 (March and April issues, 1938).

⁶ South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma.

with the increase of 133,000 farm tractors during the 15-year period.

Important as have been the changes brought about already by the use of farm machinery in the South, there are many indications that vastly greater changes lie in the near future.⁷

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there want to change their way of farming so much as because it has become imperative that changes be made: (1) because of the imbalance between urban and rural economy growing out of the lack of mechanization on farms; (2) because of the relative decrease in the supply of labor in recent

TABLE 1

PERCENT OF FARM OPERATORS REPORTING TRACTORS ON FARMS IN 1930, 1940, AND 1945,* AND PERCENT INCREASE FROM 1930 TO 1940, AND 1940 TO 1945 FOR SELECTED STATES**

STATE	FARM OPERATORS REPORTING TRACTORS ON FARMS				
	Percent Reporting Tractors			Percent Change	
	1930	1940	1945*	1930-40	1940-45**
United States.....	13.5	23.1	30.5	70	32
13 Southern States.....	3.9	7.8	11.0	90	44
8 Cotton States†.....	3.9	9.3	13.2	112	43
South Atlantic‡.....	3.6	4.8	7.3	30	52
Virginia.....	5.4	6.2	8.4	22	36
North Carolina.....	3.9	4.3	6.4	12	63
South Carolina.....	2.0	3.1	5.4	38	75
Georgia.....	2.1	3.8	5.9	59	57
Florida.....	7.4	10.2	14.4	47	42
East South Central.....	2.1	3.6	5.3	72	50
Kentucky.....	2.8	4.4	6.2	63	41
Tennessee.....	2.7	4.4	6.7	72	53
Alabama.....	1.7	2.9	4.5	64	56
Mississippi.....	1.5	2.7	4.1	91	50
West South Central.....	5.7	14.9	20.9	125	49
Arkansas.....	1.8	4.3	6.6	121	53
Louisiana.....	2.4	4.6	6.9	89	50
Oklahoma.....	11.4	22.9	30.3	75	32
Texas.....	6.4	20.6	29.1	165	42

* Figures for 1930 and 1940 from U. S. Census; Figures for January 1, 1945 are taken from estimates made by Bureau of Agricultural Economics as shown in "Number and Duty of Principal Farm Machines," by A. P. Brodell and M. R. Cooper, F. M. 46, Washington, D. C., November 1944.

** The percentage of farm operators using tractors in January 1945 was arrived at by showing a percentage gain in operators from 1940 to 1945 equal to the percentage gain in number of tractors during the 5-year period.

† South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma.

‡ Excludes Delaware, Maryland, D. C., and West Virginia.

MECHANIZATION OF COTTON PRODUCTION IMMINENT

This mechanization in the older parts of the Cotton Belt is not occurring because the people

⁷ There is a great body of literature, scientific and otherwise, developing around the mechanization of cotton production. For a recent discussion see "Exit King Cotton," Peter F. Drucker, *Harpers Magazine* (May, 1946).

years and the rise in farm wages; and (3) because of the shrinking position of cotton, especially in the Southeast. In 1880, the United States produced nearly four-fifths of the world's cotton, and almost four-fifths of this was from the States east of the Mississippi River. By 1939, the United States was producing only two-fifths of the world supply, and 55 per cent of this was produced west of the Mississippi.

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It is no mystery, or secret, why most cotton farmers have had small incomes and big debts. They have been using the money earned in a hand economy to buy consumer goods in a machine economy, and enough has not been earned to satisfy increasing wants. Work as hard as he may, a man with a mule cannot win when he is living

cheaper on machines to offset the cotton farmer's rising wants on the one hand and his continuing low income on the other.

At present, with farm workers relatively more scarce and higher paid than usual, there is considerable pressure toward mechanization. But quite aside from these immediate considerations,

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN FARM OPERATORS BY TENURE, 1930 TO 1940, AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF TOTAL FARM OPERATORS 1940 TO 1945*

STATE	PER-CENT-AGE CHANGE IN TOTAL FARM OPERA-TORS 1940-45†	PERCENTAGE CHANGE BY TENURE AND RACE 1930-1940											
		White and Nonwhite				White				Nonwhite			
		Total	Owner	Cropper	Other Tenants	Total	Owner	Cropper	Other Tenants	Total	Owner	Cropper	Other Tenants
United States.....	-3.6	-3.1	3.1	-30.3	-3.6	0.8	4.2	-36.8	2.7	-25.7	-15.6	-23.9	-34.6
13 Southern States..	-3.7	-7.5	8.8	-30.3	-11.5	-1.4	10.9	-37.0	-2.3	-22.9	-4.7	-23.9	-32.3
8 Cotton States**...	-4.7	-11.8	9.2	-34.5	-14.0	-5.7	11.4	-46.9	-4.4	-23.7	-2.3	-24.3	-32.8
South Atlantic‡.....	3.3	-5.8	7.3	-27.7	-8.2	2.0	9.9	-24.0	3.0	-22.7	-5.0	-31.1	-26.4
Virginia.....	-1.0	2.5	4.2	-5.9	0.5	6.8	7.5	-1.1	7.1	-11.6	-9.1	-13.2	-17.3
North Carolina...	3.3	-0.5	8.9	-12.7	-7.8	7.5	11.6	-2.3	3.9	-21.6	-7.4	-23.0	-32.0
South Carolina...	7.0	-12.9	9.4	-31.6	-18.8	-5.3	10.6	-36.2	-8.2	-20.8	6.5	-28.9	-27.0
Georgia.....	5.6	-15.5	6.1	-39.6	-6.3	-7.1	8.7	-38.5	3.8	-31.9	-9.9	-40.7	-24.5
Florida.....	-0.9	5.6	10.3	-29.3	2.9	9.5	12.2	-31.5	14.9	-11.6	-1.9	-23.8	-21.2
East South Central...	-5.6	-3.7	9.1	-17.5	-10.3	2.1	10.5	-27.3	3.8	-17.0	-2.9	-8.9	-33.0
Kentucky.....	-5.6	2.6	7.0	-22.2	3.6	4.2	7.8	-18.8	5.4	-39.1	-24.3	-51.6	-51.6
Tennessee.....	-4.8	0.8	11.9	-17.5	-7.9	4.3	13.5	-18.2	-2.8	-20.4	-12.3	-16.2	-32.7
Alabama.....	-1.8	-10.0	5.0	-36.5	-6.4	-3.2	6.4	-41.3	10.9	-21.8	-1.5	-29.2	-23.8
Mississippi.....	-9.4	-6.9	12.9	-7.3	-25.5	1.4	16.3	-27.6	0.7	-12.8	3.3	-0.9	-40.6
West South Central...	-7.9	-12.6	10.0	-47.3	-14.1	-7.1	12.3	-58.0	-8.0	-30.3	-6.1	-35.4	-37.1
Arkansas.....	-8.0	-10.6	12.9	-36.5	-12.7	-1.9	16.0	-50.8	-1.0	-28.4	-7.9	-27.1	-41.1
Louisiana.....	-13.4	-7.1	12.9	-19.8	-14.8	3.1	14.5	-29.8	5.8	-19.2	6.1	-14.5	-32.8
Oklahoma.....	-6.7	-11.9	4.2	-76.5	-10.9	-8.2	8.0	-76.1	-8.4	-40.8	-27.2	-77.9	-35.3
Texas.....	-6.5	-15.6	10.2	-62.1	-16.2	-10.8	11.7	-63.8	-12.3	-38.7	-2.8	-59.0	-39.0

—, Minus sign means decrease.

* U. S. Census 1930 and 1940, and preliminary returns of Agricultural Census of 1945.

† Figures for States by tenure and race are not yet available for 1945 Agricultural Census.

** South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma.

‡ Excludes Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, and West Virginia.

in an economy where most other men use machines. Families with low incomes cannot pay the current costs for adequate medical and dental care, they cannot live in very good houses, and they cannot afford many modern conveniences. Goods can of course be made on machines cheaper than by hand, but thus far they have not been made enough

and perhaps more important, is the fact that Southern cotton needs to free itself from the shackles of high cost operations, so as to be produced on a basis more nearly comparable with production in the rest of our economy. Lower costs of production can increase the earnings of farmers, and enable cotton to compete on better terms at

home and abroad. Cotton cannot be produced cheaper by hand methods without further lowering the level of living of the families that grow it. The only way to produce cheaper cotton is to increase the mechanization of cotton production.

A few mechanical cotton pickers have been used successfully for the last few seasons. Others will be used as soon as available, particularly in the more level and more fertile cotton areas. Another mechanical development of importance is the already commonly used two-row harvester stripped in the Plains areas of Texas and Oklahoma. Another stripper is being developed for Delta cotton, and some planters expect it to be used widely in a few years, particularly after the first picking has been taken care of by hand labor or mechanical pickers. Recent improvements in ginning equipment make more feasible the expanded use of mechanical pickers and strippers. Other current developments include the practice of cross-cultivating the growing cotton, which eliminates much of the chopping expense, and the experimentation of weeding by flame throwers, designed to eliminate the need for practically all hoeing and plowing.

I have seen whole big fields of good cotton grown without the use of a hoe, a mule, or a hand picker. The growers were pleased with the results and expected to expand their mechanized operations.

On experimental plots at the Mississippi Experiment Station at Stoneville, cotton was planted in hills, and the weeds and grass were kept down with a flame hot enough to kill them but not hot enough to harm the cotton stalks. A cotton stalk is tough, and science can take advantage of that fact. The outcome of this experiment at Stoneville in which no plow or hoe was used—only the flame thrower—was that cotton was grown at the rate of 2,033 pounds of seed cotton per acre as compared with a rate of 2,141 pounds per acre on the plots that were plowed and chopped. Fifteen to twenty-five acres can be flamed in one day by a two-row machine, at a fuel cost of \$3.50 to \$5.00 per day. Two men operated the machine, but anticipated improvements will permit its operation by one man.⁸

⁸ Adapted from "Control of Weeds and Grasses in Cotton by Flaming," Mississippi State College Agricultural Experiment Station, Circular #118 (March, 1944). See also Bill Tipton, "Mechanical Cultivation and Picking of Cotton, Dream of Industry Comes True," *Acco Press*, XXII, No. 11; (Houston, Texas, Nov. 1944) and *Newsweek* Feb. 18, 1946, pp. 65-66.

To get ready for picking by the mechanical picker, the green leaves are usually disposed of by the application of a fine spray of calcium cyanamide which causes the leaves to shrivel up and fall off. For large fields this can be applied by airplane for around \$1.75 per acre. This defoliation more than pays for itself, even if the cotton is picked by hand, for the cotton bolls open up better when the leaves are off so the sun can get to them.

Indications are that much cotton may soon be harvested by mechanical pickers cheaper than it could be picked by hand. The detailed figures vary somewhat, but it now at last seems to be agreed that the mechanical picker is a practical reality.⁹ The groundwork has already begun for a giant plant at Memphis where one mechanical picker will be manufactured by mass production methods. Two other pickers, too, may go into mass production soon.

Last October I was told by the operator of a plantation using 15 mechanical pickers that these pickers get about 95 percent of all the open cotton, that they do not injure the unopened cotton, that the grade of mechanically picked cotton was then about the same as that of hired local pickers—not quite so good as when the farm family picks its own cotton, but better than when hired outside workers pick it. The cost for picking with machines was as low as cotton had ever been picked on that plantation by hand, that is, less than half of the \$2.10 per cwt. being paid hand pickers last fall. Almost any first-class tractor driver, he said, can soon learn to operate the picking machine. It moves along the row at two miles an hour, and picks about six acres a day. In bale-an-acre cotton, it can do the work of 40 or more ordinary hand pickers.¹⁰

It is significant that new gin equipment which has been developed recently offsets most of the earlier loss of grade from mechanical picking. Recent reports show that the fiber quality of mechanically picked cotton is superior to that of

⁹ Frank J. Welch and D. Troy Miley, "Mechanization of the Cotton Harvest," Mississippi State College Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 420 (June 1945); also *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXIII, No. 4 (Nov. 1945), pp. 928-946, for an article of the same title by authors Welch and Miley. See also, Tipton's article in *Acco Press*, cited above.

¹⁰ For a recent newspaper report on the use of mechanical pickers see Agnes E. Meyer's "Machines, Migration, Factory Methods Reach Farm," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1946.

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hand picked cotton,¹¹ and also that cotton harvested by mechanical pickers at night has better fiber strength than day picked cotton. One of the greatest handicaps of the mechanical picker is that it cannot be used when the ground is excessively wet, but thus far mechanized plantations have been able to harvest all or most of their cotton ahead of fields getting too wet. The mechanical one- and two-row boll strippers used in Texas and Oklahoma Plains also have demonstrated clear savings over old hand methods of stripping or picking.¹² Still greater savings are effected when four-row equipment is used for planting and cultivating.¹³

LARGER FARM UNITS AND FEWER FARM OPERATORS

The greater mechanization of cotton production which now appears within reach means that the amount of cotton grown per family will increase, and that the cotton-growing families who use machinery can afford better houses, more home conveniences, more adequate medical care, and that the organizations and agencies which farm families maintain can be more adequately financed. The other side of this picture is that fewer farm families will be needed in the best land areas as mechanization replaces the old methods of hand production. The number of cotton farmers who will be displaced each year will depend on the rate at which farm machinery is put into operation, on whether effective ways are worked out to assist erstwhile cotton farmers to shift to other types of farming, whether there is full industrial employment and ready markets for farm products, whether the national income remains high, whether there is an expansion of industry in the South, and so on.

Be these unknowns as they may, it is estimated that the labor needed to produce the cotton in the

"W. M. Garrard, Manager of the Staple Cotton Cooperative Association of Greenwood, Mississippi, is quoted in the *Memphis Commercial Appeal* of Oct. 27, 1944, as saying that cotton mills were seeking more machine picked cotton because the fiber of the machine picked cotton is superior to that picked by hand.

¹² "Harvesting Cotton in the High Plains Area of Texas," Bureau of Agricultural Economics and Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, Progress Report No. 952 (August 1945), pp. 17-19.

¹² "Agricultural Production, Texas, 1950," prepared by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and Texas Agricultural Experiment Station Cooperating (Jan. 1945), p. 13.

Plains of Texas and Oklahoma will be reduced 59 per cent by 1950 by the further use of the mechanical trippers.¹⁴ The reduction of farm families in the Mississippi Delta and in the scattered better cotton areas of the Southeast will be great, too. Welch and Miley of the Mississippi State College Agricultural Experiment Station mention 55 to 65 per cent displacement of farm families in the 10 all-Delta counties of the Yazoo-Mississippi area as a conservative estimate if there is a widespread adoption of the picker.¹⁵ In Georgia a group of agricultural experts estimated that 2,500 mechanical pickers would be needed in the State by 1950.¹⁶

The mechanization of cotton production on the fertile level lands will also affect the farmers in the hills who grow cotton—not so much because the picking machines will at first be used there as because the hill farmers will sell their hand-produced cotton in competition with the machine-produced cotton. So, if machine-produced cotton means cheaper cotton, it thereby also means that the level of living of the cotton farmer in the hills will be further lowered. Seemingly one of the best alternatives for the hill farmer is to develop livestock enterprises, but this, too, will require more land per family. Here will be another group of dislocated families in need of nonfarm employment.

An over-all estimate by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics indicates that with full employment opening up nonfarm job opportunities and a concerted effort to help some farm families to enter other occupations, the number of people working on southern farms would likely shrink from 4,400,000 persons in 1940 to around 2,800,000 in 1956, a drop of 1,600,000 in the 16-year period. Some of this shrinkage would occur in the sugar cane and rice areas and in the tobacco and subsistence counties, but most of it would be in the extensive cotton portions of the South, and especially the better farming areas of the Old South that are still least mechanized.

When thinking of the alternative employment opportunities for the people who leave southern farms, it is well to remember that most of these families, especially those from the plantation areas, have had little experience which prepares them for

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, Miss. State College Bulletin, p. 22.

¹⁶ "Post-war Adjustment in Agricultural Production in Georgia," a mimeographed report of the State Agricultural Production Capacity Committee (Dec. 1, 1944), p. 10.

industrial employment. Most of them have been sharecroppers and wage hands and as such have secured but little education, know practically no skills other than hoeing and picking, and have had but little experience in making decisions for themselves. Heretofore when people have been attracted out of the plantation areas by industrial work, as during World Wars I and II, it has been the more unattached younger men and women, usually the better educated ones, who have migrated. But, as mechanization of cotton production develops, there will be local work only for those who know best how to operate tractors and repair machinery, and who can most readily read and understand instructions. The group that will not be needed on the mechanized cotton farms will be the very group that is least qualified by training and experience to fit immediately into industrial employment.

MECHANIZATION OF COTTON PRODUCTION AS A PHASE OF GENERAL TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT

Some may look at this whole cotton situation and say it is wrong for people to be pushed off the land, and that therefore the mechanization of cotton production should not be permitted. But there is no more reason to put restraints on the mechanization of cotton production now than there was to have stopped the use of machinery in factories, or of steam locomotives on the railroads, years ago. No one, I think, would argue that shoes should be produced by hand, that wheat on the Plains should be cut with a cradle, or that automobiles should be made in a blacksmith's shop by one or two mechanics. Cotton is simply one of the last great enterprises to be mechanized.

There are, of course, serious human problems involved in the mechanization of cotton production—farmers pushed off the land, the closing out of some local schools and churches, the migration of families to new areas, and the painful business of learning to live in a strange environment. Then there is the likelihood that, as the mechanization of cotton production pushes families off the land, some local and distant employers may take advantage of the plight of these displaced people by offering work at very low wages. These are real problems, but we should not overlook the equally important fact that great human problems have been involved in the very lack of mechanization of cotton production—small farms, low incomes, child labor, irregular school attendance, poor housing, credit farming, excessive soil depletion, inadequate

medical care for a great proportion of the lower-income families.

It stands to reason, however, that, since the mechanization of cotton production will increase only if cotton can be grown more cheaply with machines than by hand methods, society as a whole will be not less able but rather more able to take care of the displaced cotton workers by using the effective machines than if less effective hand methods were continued. The real problem involved here is that of securing a wider spread of the social and economic benefits of modern machinery and technology.

This basic problem of our civilization is thrown into sharp relief when the new machines (representing tomorrow) are posed against a backdrop of great cotton fields in which are scattered weather-beaten sharecropper cabins (representing yesterday). Stand there between yesterday and tomorrow at the edge of the cotton fields and look at a half-dozen mechanical cotton pickers mounted on tractors moving up and down the rows, each operated by one man, and each doing the work of about a half a hundred people. There at the end of the rows is a mechanic, just in case one of the pickers gets out of order. But most of the time he is idle. Each big red sputter-bug as it moves down the row gathers up its half-bale load on its back, empties it with a hydraulic lift, turns around and is off on a new row. So it is all day long, and at evening the six men on the six machines have picked more cotton than would have been gathered by 250 to 300 hand pickers. Night picking would double that amount. Today a few of the occupants of tenant cabins are standing there looking as the machines go down their first rows. Most of them know little or nothing about the mechanical picker, but the talk is spreading.

Some of the sharecroppers and wage hands who have heard about it dispose of the matter with, "Well, we always have got along, and guess we always will." Others, with alarm in their faces, say, "You know, the way that thing picks cotton, we'll not be needed for long, will we?" They wonder what will happen to them then. A few, usually the better educated and those who have been to other parts of the country, look upon these mechanical pickers and other farm machinery as providing an opportunity for a second emancipation for propertyless plantation workers. They point out, often with a real understanding of local conditions, that most of the tenants, sharecroppers, and wage hands have never had an adequate level

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The real question we face when we look at the mechanization of cotton production is the same question we are up against in the general use of our machines and technologies, namely, how can we make modern machines and technologies serve human needs more effectively?

Looked at in one way, the most tragic thing I know about our civilization is that the only two times since I can remember when the labor of all our people has been needed were during World War I and World War II. We were all needed then, and we all knew it, and we were glad to work long and hard. During most of the rest of the time, there has been need for more consumers than producers. A few months ago I heard a national figure say four factory workers are now producing as much goods as five were when the war broke out, and that by the beginning of 1947 three will be doing the work of the four. The technological advancement that is just reaching the cotton fields still moves rapidly ahead in the areas longest mechanized.

Looked at in another way, this fact that in recent years the labor of all of us has been needed only during wars constitutes our greatest hope. It demonstrates that we as a people no longer need to be at hard labor all the time. We can now, thanks to modern machines and technologies, create through moderate work enough goods and services for our needs, and have the time and energy and resources for our own personal growth and for the development of more adequate community services than we have ever known. We have plenty of time now to stop our gullies and restore our soil, arrange for comfortable housing, maintain adequate educational and health facilities, and organize recreational activities in which we can all participate, if we like. Such are the possibilities within our reach. The harnessing of atomic energy for peacetime uses may open up much greater uncharted areas. But when our ability to create goods and services outruns the ability of our people to buy them, many low income families suffer and our whole economy flounders.

DISPLACED COTTON WORKERS NEED TRAINING FOR OFF-FARM WORK

In thinking of possible experiments and general approaches in preparing displaced workers for nonfarm employment, it is well that the manner of

the displacement of workers be anticipated. Displacements will occur farm by farm, much as has been the case up until now as the number of farm tractors has increased. Each mechanical picker will, however, displace more workers at one time than the tractor, and will displace them more completely, especially since cotton picking is the one remaining big hand process in cotton production. Hand workers will commonly be thought of as surplus labor only after a mechanical picker has been put into operation on a particular farm. Other nearby planters may continue with traditional hand methods of operations for another year or two, while some few growers may continue hand methods of production because of the ease with which they can secure from among the families already displaced by mechanized farms the very kind of workers they like to use. The point here is that the workers will be displaced farm by farm, year by year, and that those operators still relying on hand methods of production will remain as dependent as ever upon the availability of workers. In short, hand workers on any given cotton plantation are indispensable as workers right up to the time that they are displaced by machine pickers when most of them will not be needed at all.

In the light of these practical considerations, it appears that dependent hand workers can be prepared for nonfarm employment (1) through special training arranged in the local community for those who have been pushed off the mechanized farms and who are not wanted by other local operators; (2) through the recruitment and placement by the employment agencies of such persons in nonfarm work, wherever it is available; and (3) through such indirect and long-time means as better schools, more vocational training (for children and adults), expanded public health services, wider social coverage, and the like. Concrete practicable activities need to be gotten under way now to help displaced families to go through the transition with as little frustration and hurt as possible.

THE RELATION OF THE PEOPLE TO THE LAND AND TO ONE ANOTHER

Then there is the question of what relationship to the land the people who do the work on these newly mechanized farms of the South will hold. The increased mechanization may result in the further concentration of the better lands into larger holdings, with most of the people who

operate the farm machinery occupying the status of hired workers. Certainly up until now the benefits of mechanized cotton production have gone largely to the big operators. On the other hand, as time passes a more widespread use of cotton producing machinery may result in a relative increase in the proportion of the farm work that is done in the Cotton South by the farm operators themselves. That's just what happened as mechanization increased in the Corn and Wheat Belts of this country. Improved farm machinery in each of these areas increased the proportion of all farm work that was done by the labor of the farm family. Before the coming of the combine, for example, great hoards of transient harvest workers were used in the wheat harvest each year. Now the number is much smaller, and a larger proportion of those who are used are expert tractor drivers, combine operators, and machinists. In many instances the farm family itself can take care at harvest time of its entire acreage. Similarly the expanding use of the corn harvester is making it possible for more farm families to do their own work, and not have to depend on either local or imported hired workers. On dairy farms, too, improved machinery has resulted in the opportunity of the operator family to do more of the work and to raise their own level of living.

In those areas of the South where there are many small independent farmers, perhaps ways can be found for most of them to stay on the land and to benefit by a moderate use of farm machinery. Small operators can be served by their neighbor's machinery when custom work is done at equitable rates. Also a group of small farmers can own and operate machinery jointly. Cooperatives might prove helpful to the small independent farmer in securing the advantage of machinery without being saddled with uneconomic equipment and without losing most of his neighbors in developing

a satisfactorily large farm unit for himself. It is not implied here that the present farms in the poor land areas are large enough if properly managed, but it is important to remember that the increase of the size of the farm is but one of the ways to develop an adequate farm unit.

Part-time off-farm work will be helpful in many areas in stabilizing the small independent farm families on the land. Another important alternative is the increased production of foodstuffs for the farm family itself, and also for the southern urban market into which now great quantities of meat, dairy and poultry products, and vegetables are shipped from the outside. But small farmers can take advantage of this market only by arranging to produce standardized products and to work out group arrangements for marketing them.

There is a great need for constructive concerted group action in the local community. How can adequate educational and health facilities be provided for children and adults, landowners, tenants, and hired farm workers? What new activities should be launched by the vocational agricultural people, the Agricultural Extension Service, the Farmers' Home Administration and other agricultural agencies, the churches, and the farmers organization to help as many families as practicable to make a good living on farms, and to help those who leave the farms to get ready to do something else?

At its worst the role of agricultural technology in southern social change will be that of pushing the hand workers out of the low-income niches they now occupy in our economy and leaving them helpless and inarticulate wards of society. At its best, agricultural technology will arrange opportunities to prepare those who leave cotton farms for life elsewhere and provide the means to restore the soil and to improve the living conditions of those families who remain on the land.

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NOTES ON A DEFINITION OF THE FOLK FOR FOLK-REGIONAL SOCIOLOGY*

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THE concept folk, as variously and casually used, has drifted into a half-world of indistinctness. This is far worse than falling into disrepute. For even in a state of disrepute there are often to be found precision and meaning.

Most people make a small bow to the word somewhere along the great length of its many meanings. These meanings range from the specialized study of folklore and of circumscribed primitive societies to the recognition of the strength and power that lies in the sheer mass of the peoples of the world. In Reuter's *Handbook of Sociology* the folk are defined as "The simpler, uneducated and less sophisticated members of a population, the masses of a population who by sheer weight of numbers determine the character of the group and preserve and perpetuate its culture traits; also a tribe or a kindred group of people."¹ Manifestly, any parts of the population who "determine the character of the group and preserve and perpetuate its culture traits" deserve more precision of definition than is had when the definition trails off into "also a tribe or a kindred group of people." In a descriptive and specific way, Redfield characterizes the folk society as being isolated, small, homogeneous, nonsecular, integrated, and internally consistent, in addition to a number of other similarly limiting characteristics.² Such a specialized definition includes much that is valuable in specific studies of the folk, but it excludes many broader deposits that are revealed by even a perfunctory survey of definitions.

This great range and variety of meanings, as illustrated by these samples, indicates a loose term

* This paper grew out of a seminar on folk sociology at the University of North Carolina under Howard W. Odum. As such, it represents the author's grasp of a vast body of material, and many contributions, rather than an individual contribution.

¹ E. B. Reuter, *Handbook of Sociology* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1941, p. 118.

² Robert Redfield, "Rural Sociology and the Folk Society" in "Notes," *Rural Sociology*, 8 (March, 1943), pp. 69-71.

that should be pinned down. The glints of richness and of comprehension that show up in the many uses of the concept indicate the necessity of closer examination and definition. Further need is added by the fact that, though the term folkways is used almost universally, seldom, if ever, is it accompanied by an adequate definition of the folk.

For its uses, the developing folk-regional sociology is evolving a clearer, more precise definition of the folk.

The folk are the universal, constant, surviving raw material of society and societies. This raw material is not unpatterned mass and bulk. Nor is it individuals, culture, or disembodied ideas. It is characterized by the definitive and generic process of primary, personal, valuational, selective, and realistic relationships that persevere and have meaning specifically in an areal-historical setting. This constitutes one side of the reality of the folk, the long historical and inevitable survival of mankind as written by the survival of peoples and their cultures through unique and specific ways in unique and specific settings. Again, at its broadest reach of meaning, this comprehends the importance of time and of intensity, of primary and personal participation in patterned social behavior as opposed to any straight-line interpretation of survival as the product of pure mass persistence. On the other hand, the folk, at any given time, are the essence and the mode of what is expectable, usable, translatable, and possible in terms of a specific areal-historical setting, and of the dynamic force and depth of loyalties, emotions, and judgments in that setting. This twofold definition is a joining together of product and process. This corresponds to the dichotomy of the folk and of folk society. Both sides of the dichotomy are necessary for analysis and understanding, just as chemical principles and the specific performance of chemical interactions in a unique setting are necessary for a complete chemical system.

The folk are universal in the sense that every where and at all times societal phenomena have surviving strength only as they are adopted into primary processes and structures. These primary

processes and structures must have an original or developed consistency in the culture pattern. They must have roots in both personalized and idealized backgrounds and traditions. They must be able to join with or to claim the sense of participation and the willingness to make minute and hour and day exertions in heat and cold that overrides the feeling of insignificance and futility. Again, the folk are universal alongside the universality of cultural patterns and weaves. The folk are universal in that all mental, spiritual, and physical phenomena have meaning and significance only in terms of time, place, and social context. The folk are universal in that nowhere is there a record of the complete dying and end of human social life.

The folk constitute the central core of survival. We must be precise here. We are talking about two types of survival. First is survival of the folk. The folk in this sense are the differentiated, patterned mass, or bulk, of society. Here they are survival as mere size, as the essential base upon which any societal organization is built. But this is merely a first surface matter. Deeper than this, as the way and specific colors of survival, are the rich, personal, primary, valuational relationships and patterns which form the process of motivated persistence and reorientation leading to survival. Threading and coloring this process are the many rich conditioning factors of tradition and of cultural evolution, the many factors of personal experience in primary relationships, and the many powerful explicit and implicit valuations. This leads to the second type of survival, for within the structure and process of these primary relationships are contained the articulation and the selection of those social structures, processes, aspirations, and judgments which, on the whole, have survival value for and in terms of the folk group. Insofar as formal structures, over-all purposes and innovations have some understood relation with the folk culture and in terms of the processes and valuations of that culture, then these things have survival value and carrying power. This is survival, not of the folk, but through the folk.

Turner, in his two volumes *The Great Cultural Traditions*, puts such a concept into broad historical terms:

Stability and change in the basic routines of mass life should be recognized as decisive factors in cultural development. As long as these routines remain stable, cultural development occurs mainly as the elaboration

of the elements of the persisting tradition and moves in a direction set by the basic routines, as they affect the rejecting and accepting of innovations. However, when the basic routines of mass life are altered, the fundamental orientation of the culture is disturbed and, as a result, every element of the culture undergoes change. This phenomenon occurs because the human species evolved in the social process, selection always taking place in terms of an integration of individuals to the environment. For individuals the integration with the group and adjustment to the environment through the cultural tradition constitute a total orientation which has its objective forms in the basic routines of mass life. It follows, therefore, that the disturbance of these routines must involve the reorganization of individual behavior at the level of selection that governs the survival of the group, and no individual can escape completely such a reorganization.³

In another aspect, the primary, personal folk process is at the heart of survival. Neither societies nor individuals can sustain a process or interest solely in formal, purposive, or intellectual terms. The capacities of physical and spiritual endurance, the cycles of depressions and enthusiasms, the long run of days and years, the distractions of fatigues and details—all these require a sustaining background and power of cultural tradition and, in part, of sanction.

Always and everywhere at some level there is a folk morale that maintains survival. In a well-balanced folk society this morale pervades the whole structure and sustains understood and rationalized changes. Where the needs of the folk are not met, where their capacity to adapt and rationalize is exceeded or negated by physical, intellectual or spiritual means, or where imbalance and distortion develop, then the folk society may perish, but the folk process of selective reorientation persists toward the evolution of a new folk society.

Folk morale and the realism of the folk are supplementary, conjunctive forces. Folk morale consists in the poise, purpose, and emotionalized judgements of right and wrong developed in the primary, personal, familial, historically conditioned relationships that lend significance and achievement value to the everyday, day long rigors and pleasures of living. Realism begins with the small thorough detail and ends with the abstraction of sound principles.

³ Ralph Turner. *The Great Cultural Traditions* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1941, pp. 1322-23).

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The folk, as distinguished from the specific colors and ramifications that appear in either a descriptive catalogue or functional analysis of a particular folk society, create an essence that has reality on two levels.

One essence is that of the over-all folk process. This is, as yet, unmeasured except in terms of history and analogies. A great many frames of reference add to the possibilities of measurement. For instance, Tönnies' concept of *gemeinschaft* offers one approach to a powerful mode in social relations that appears to be largely characteristic of the folk process. Heberle lists certain symptoms that would indicate the presence of *gemeinschaft* in rural communities: kinship and intermarriage, lack of choice of trade areas, proximity of farmsteads; common and cooperative use of resources; use of farm as homestead and family center; mutual aid without direct compensation; cultural homogeneity; minimum of contractual relationships; long family association with farm; personal sympathy in intra-community groupings.⁴ In general, the broad outlines that indicate the direction of measurement are something like this: (1) the relation of a particular folk society to Nature in terms of use, integration, ratio of importance and a realization of the ruthless processes of Nature; (2) the amount and intensity of primary, traditional, patterned relationships; (3) the speed of change and the experienced integration of innovations; (4) the poise and morale of basic, primary relationships and the degree to which these relationships are felt to be part of the broader and more articulate structures, ideals, and purposes; (5) the amount of personal realization, esteem and satisfaction normally desired and normally attainable.

The other essence contains the reality of a particular folk society. This essence would reflect a measure of what is assimilable and understandable by that folk society. It would reflect deep currents of emotions and loyalties underneath formal statements, ideals, and seeming inconsistencies. It would reflect inadequacies and imbalances, both in terms of the folk society itself and in terms of whatever larger or more particular standard is used.

In the definition of the folk the word valuational

has been used. As with the other words in the definition, it is descriptive in part, it overlaps, and it has a somewhat specific meaning in relation to the folk. In whatever particular society that approaches the status of a folk society, there is always a strong, pervading sense of what is right and wrong in terms of the definitions and everyday processes of that society. The word valuational denotes this. Further, the word as used here has overtones of emotions and loyalties. The conceptions of right and wrong in a folk society are not philosophical or intellectual or religious abstractions. They are held in relation to their integration within the folk society, in relation to their functioning and working in terms of family, of home, of locality and of tradition. They are firmly bedded in emotion. They define and delineate, in great measure, the direction and depth of loyalties. They form a good measure of the extent of rationalization of the formal ideals and structures into the process of the folk society.

Since we are not talking about morals, we may consider valuation in a folk society as basic to the selective process of the folk.

The first concreteness of the folk is discoverable in the areal-historical base. The concept of the folk is an abstraction until it finds reality in distinctive, historically evolved areal patterns. There appear to be adequate reasons for saying that regional patterns have always characterized societal development. Regionalism is essentially a science of planning for action. For the definition and description of the folk, however, the incidence of areal-historical patterns has both active and analytical worth. The realism of the folk dictates their attention to and mastery over the small details of living. On the other hand, the sound principles that inhere in realism have an analogical counterpart in the size and weight of effective, persisting cultural evolution. That is, an areal coercive totality of culture emerges from the many personal, primary, familial structures and processes. Now this areal-historical culture corresponds to the folk insofar as it contains the great portion of both large and small processes of folk evolution; insofar as it is the framework of folk-cultural evolution and defines the area and limits within which changes, balances, and reorientations have decisive and surviving effect; and insofar as it contains almost all of the pertinent factors of folk analysis. The areal-historical folk culture is the unit that is not too large to reflect the essence

⁴ Rudolf Heberle, "The Application of Fundamental Concepts in Rural Community Studies," *Rural Sociology*, 6 (September 1941), pp. 212-15.

of the folk, nor is it so small as not to present a basis for a study of the fundamental folk process as colored and distinguished by the unique elements of time and place.

Thus it is said that the folk-regional society is the definitive unit in the study and analysis of society, and in planning and in the implementation of planning.

In the sense that anything survives, it survives through the support of the folk. The folk, as has been indicated, survive by means of reorientation and reintegration in terms of their traditions, culture patterns, and pressing needs. Folk societies, as described in cross-section at any particular time, change or perish. We speak of the folk-regional society as the definitive and generic unit insofar as area and totality of process are concerned. With these things in mind, we can speak of smaller, more specialized folk societies that are measurable both by our basic measures and of the folk process and by their incidence in the folk-regional society. We can delimit urban folk societies. Similarly we can delineate folk societies of a more or less horizontal type. Also, we can delineate limited, but more rounded, folk societies. There is nothing in the concept and reality of the folk that precludes either diversity or change. The folk process, of course, is rigorously selective, and certainly to the extent that it is rigorous it is conservative. But diversity and change also inhere in it, it is a creation of patterns and interactions.

Perhaps it would be well here to attempt to clear up some common difficulties that arise in the use and understanding of the concepts of the folk and of folk society. Both concepts are required for complete analysis.

On the face of it the concept of the folk appears to be a statement of an amorphous and self-liquidating truth. This comes from a tendency to confuse survival, universality and reorientation with some particular societal ideal or set of values. The folk have a reality aside from any considerations of Utopia. The point is that insofar as there ever has been stability, integration, orderly change

and survival, they have appeared through the operation of what is here called the folk process. Further, insofar as can be discovered, this process continues to be basic in the modern world.

Again, the temptation is to assume that the folk-regional society, once developed, should survive against all changes and innovations. The point there is that, while the folk-regional society is basic and generic, it has no wall around it. It probably does have the seeds of persistence, survival, and orderly change in it. But these seeds operate in terms of the definition or prevailing capacity for change of that particular folk-regional society. When the capacity for change is exceeded, there is disorganization and a reorientation toward new modes and patterns.

The aim of this paper has been to speak in specific rather than in analogical and comparative terms. In the final analysis, the reality of the folk and its specific descriptive definition do not depend upon analogies to animals and plants, or to such concepts as the natural society or to primitive societies. These things come, and perhaps cloud the issue prematurely, because we study them in our attempt to obtain a functional definition of the folk containing specific measures and amounts of the various elements and processes. Similarly, we study folk groups such as the Jews, the Negroes, the Quakers and others for specific and measurable hints in connection with modern society.

The definition of the folk is not primarily a dictionary affair. The folk are either a dream and phantasy, or they offer the basic medium of sociological analysis. They are either the definitive unit in sociological survival, or their attributes—peculiar attributes—are comprehended adequately in other terms such as society, mass, primitive, and so on. Hence any definition of the folk at this time is a preliminary arrangement of hypotheses and meanings which form a framework for the ordering and interpretation of social phenomena. As set forth here, this framework has described the folk on two levels. One level is that of universal power and incidence. The other level is that of the essence and mode of a particular folk society.

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TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

JOINT STUDIES AMONG AGENCIES AND STATES

WILLIAM J. McGLOTHLIN

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AGENCIES and institutions conducting studies and research in the South are increasingly crossing jurisdictional and State lines to devote joint effort to projects. In so doing, they are able to call upon wider abilities and greater diversity of skills than any single agency can command. The studies that result may achieve, therefore, a higher level of significance than a single agency could reach. Furthermore, joint studies stimulate joint action, so that progress toward ends defined by research tends to move on a broad base. Participation in studies often leads on to participation in action.

There are advantages, but there are also difficulties. Under joint studies, sharp questions of coordination arise. The project will be executed by various administratively or even politically disparate institutions and agencies. Each participating agency will retain its autonomy, except in as far as it is willing to merge its efforts with those of others. Each agency has its established directions and procedures, its modes of thought, its program ends, its varied personnel—all the complex of factors that go to make up its flavor. Coordination within a single agency is difficult enough, but there it can depend upon administrative controls, if need be. When studies cross agency lines, coordination must depend on voluntary confederation—a much more difficult task. Because of the difficulties various factors must be watched to assure success in joint studies. They cannot be undertaken blindly.

Ideally, of course, coordination would not be needed. Through some social magic, joint interests could merge into joint efforts without conflict or differences in direction. This ideal can hardly be approached, but it can come closer to realization as widespread agreement is reached on what our major ends are. The initial problem,

therefore, is to define carefully what ends the studies are designed to serve. Those ends will have additional strength and significance if they are moving in the direction of goals generally agreed upon as socially desirable. In the South, studies on discrimination in freight rates take on added meaning from the South's resolve to increase its industrial capacity. As a region, it is concerned with surmounting the barriers which stand between it and a more balanced economy. Efforts of an individual agency to prosecute studies on a subject like freight rates can be more easily merged with those of other agencies because their relationship to a major goal is clear. And that major goal has been set after wide discussion and after wide agreement.

This suggests, of course, that joint studies may be most successfully undertaken in those areas where regional goals have been crystallized. Constant public definition and redefinition of the problems and opportunities of the southern region and of that region's place in the nation and the world should guide the development of joint studies. Sound industrialization will depend upon many kinds of studies—of the kinds of industry most suited to the natural resources of the region, of the adequacy of transportation, warehousing, and other facilities, of unskilled and skilled personnel available at present and in the future, of training and education services at hand, and many others. Such a variety of subjects will call for a variety of specialists to treat them competently. If all such specialists have recognized and accepted the general regional agreement on industrialization as a desirable end, this fact will minimize the difficulties inherent in coordination of joint studies. Conflicts will be submerged in reaching the identified end.

Since ends can be identified by States as well as by region and nation, the basis of collaboration will often begin by States. The planning commissions of the various States are bringing together many agencies and institutions to contribute to State-wide studies. Georgia, through its Agricultural and Industrial Development Board, has been undertaking a great variety of State-wide studies, calling upon many different agencies and institutions to participate. Planning Commissions of other States have issued bulletins on opportunities for increased industrialization, with information compiled from many efforts. In these activities, differing viewpoints within the States have been reconciled, and the studies coordinated into useful and sound guides to State action.

Joint studies are also being undertaken on a subject matter rather than a State basis. Here, too, general agreement on ends tends to minimize problems of coordination. The ends may be the South-wide development of a relatively new industry—such as frozen foods—whose markets will be both State and regional, even national, and whose raw materials may come from just as wide an area. A study of such a development may therefore call upon agencies and institutions in different States, using their special knowledge and competence to prepare a regionally based study on a single topic. Many educators have participated in a study of higher education through the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Although sharp differences in viewpoint remain, agreement on the defined end of improvement of higher education in the South made it possible to continue the study during a several year period and to arrive at a synthesis of views and results in the summer of 1946. Without agreement on the end to be served, such progress as this could hardly have been attained. Many of the problems of the South need joint study crossing State lines. As we reach agreement on ends, we satisfy the first requisite for undertaking joint studies.

But coordination of joint studies, however well grounded upon accepted ends, does not occur without the work of some coordinative influence. Agencies and institutions have their own momentum which tends to continue them in the straight lines of satisfying their own defined constituencies. Their programs must respond to those demands if they serve the purposes for which they were established. Agencies and institutions were established to further special interests and to

achieve special ends. Their success will be determined by how well they can show progress toward those defined objectives. Problems may not be as neatly divided, however, and full success will depend in part upon the agency's ability and willingness to join others in finding solutions. The first impulse may be to go it alone. It will require some earnest effort to merge the separate urges into a common drive.

The needed coordinative influence may take any number of forms. It can sometimes be a single agency or institution which recognizes the value of collaboration on a study, and draws into joint effort other agencies and institutions with similar or related interests. The University of Tennessee, partly because of its proximity to Oak Ridge, has undertaken to establish a region-wide institute of southern universities in using or in guiding the use of the research laboratories on atomic power of the plants near Clinton, Tennessee. These are studies to which many institutions can contribute. Sometimes a State agency, in planning, or conservation, or health will provide the coordinative influence for joint studies. Sometimes it will be a commission or association, sometimes a regional agency, sometimes an *ad hoc* committee, or an individual. In every successful joint study, however, a mechanism for coordination will be present.

Over the past year, a joint study affecting six States has been under way. Under the leadership of the University of Alabama, the State universities of South Carolina, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, and TVA joined in a study of the State administration of resources. Each university studied the administration of resources in its State, working along the general outlines of an agreed-upon plan. Each university will publish its study as a report on its State, but the various State studies, because they are done within a general pattern, will be used also as the basis of a regional report, to be prepared by TVA with the help of the participating universities. Representatives of the universities and of TVA formed a committee to guide the study. Major questions of scope and direction were hammered out here. Each university then guided its work by the decisions of the committee.

The point of the illustration is that this effective collaboration, covering six universities and a regional agency, could not have been begun without the effort of a single university and could not have been successfully continued without a coordi-

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nating mechanism or influence, which in this instance was a committee composed of the participants themselves.

So much is fairly obvious. A third factor may be a little less so. If joint studies are to be successfully coordinated, the agencies and institutions which participate must be certain, *in their own minds*, of the significance of what they plan to do. Coordination itself is never the end of joint effort. Its purpose is to release the drives, the forces, the impulses, which are already present into joint effort which gives even greater force, drive, and impulse. An organization may think a particular job needs doing with the collaboration of many participants, but it cannot expect active and vibrant effort unless the agencies themselves are convinced of the significance of the job to them. The point is—and this needs emphasis—that the coordinative influence, the association, society, regional agency or what not, cannot go faster or farther than the agencies and institutions upon which it depends are willing to move. This fact may require that a particular study suffer long periods of frustrating postponement until the agencies come to the conclusion that the study has meaning and significance for them. Unless this point is reached, however, the study had better not be undertaken.

Furthermore, the participation of agencies has to be more than merely resigned acceptance of a strongly pushed proposal. Ideally, the project should grow out of ideas and urges of the agencies themselves and then be caught up into the joint activity. If the studies do not develop from a ground swell of interest, but represent an extension of an agency's interest, that agency must always be alert and willing to overcome its own impatience to act prematurely. It must be sure that joint study will be actively undertaken by the other agencies and institutions upon whose support the study will rest. Without that, a study which starts in a blaze of apparent interest may come to a somewhat less than enthusiastic close.

The Tennessee Valley Library Council, a group composed of school, university, and public library representatives from the seven States touched by the Tennessee Valley, has identified needs for a joint study of library service in each State. It discussed a proposed procedure with care, calling upon expert consultant advice to aid its thinking. Each State would survey its own facilities and program, within a general framework to guide the collection of comparable data. Although those

present were convinced of the study's usefulness, they withheld final approval until the proposal could be discussed more fully in the various States. The proposal was therefore discussed and voted on by the library associations in each State. Only after the returns were in did the Council proceed. It had to be sure of interest and of willingness to participate actively before the study could get under way.

A fourth factor affecting the success of joint studies is the amount and kind of professional competence which can be made available in the agencies and institutions which are expected to participate. This must be carefully assessed. Clearly, no advantage is gained by joining degrees of incompetence. An essential of joint studies is to build on strengths, even when they are found in a variety of locations. The studies gain strength by calling upon different kinds of competence in the different agencies and localities. But the effort involved will not be worth the candle, unless the competencies are present, in sufficient variety and extent. They must be available for the study itself. Even when the competence is present, the agency must be willing to release sufficient time to make it available. Studies can founder on the rock of competent persons whose agencies or institutions are unwilling to relieve them of sufficient duties to allow effective work on the study. It is all too easy for an institution or agency to expect its competent persons to do just one thing more—on top of an already overloaded schedule.

At best, however, joint studies can focus a variety of competences on a single problem. An experiment in quick-freezing of fruits and vegetables is now being conducted jointly by the Georgia Agricultural Experiment Station and the Georgia Engineering Experiment Station, at the request of TVA. The experiment is to determine whether it is possible and commercially feasible to design and construct equipment which will freeze watery fruits and vegetables without the formation of crystals which will reduce them to mush when unfrozen. The Engineering Experiment Station had competence in physics and biological chemistry. The Agricultural Experiment Station had competence in microscopic analysis of product. Together they are able to do a joint study neither could have done alone.

Another sort of merger of various competences is obtained through regional work-conferences, where participants pool their abilities and experience to

draft plans and procedures. The Southern States Work Conference, meeting annually at Daytona Beach, Florida, draws together representatives of State departments of education and State education associations. During the conferences, participants have dealt with such subjects as school transportation, vocational education, school finance, resource education, instructional materials, and many others. Committees draft reports dealing with various phases of the problems, calling on their professional knowledge and on their knowledge of plans and procedures that work well in their home States. The result has been the development of effective guides to State programs, based on the best practices in the region.

Finally, effectiveness of a joint study will be increased if the results expected affect more than a single community or a single agency or institution. The study will then look forward to joint action as well as joint study, and the study itself will achieve additional meaning from that anticipation. Participating agencies and institutions will compromise irrelevant differences more easily when the goal of joint action transcends the study itself. Because of the similarity of problems and opportunities in a region, action taken at one point can often stimulate action at others, creating a momentum of regional effort.

Over a three year period the Conference on Teacher Education of the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools worked on the thorny problem of certification of teachers. Representatives from State departments of education in all southern States participated, trying to find a common ground on which to build an agreement that any southern State would honor the certificate of a teacher from any other State. If the study could reach that end, every State could adopt the conclusion, and every State would benefit. The study was region-wide; action taken was region-wide. The action to be taken on completion of the study was clear, and that clarity contributed largely to overcoming the difficult coordination problems that arose.

There are undoubtedly other factors which contribute to success or failure of joint studies. The ones mentioned seem to be significant, however. As we gain further experience, we shall isolate and identify others. Efforts toward joint studies seem strong enough to warrant the belief that the South will continue and expand its search —across barriers of distance, subject matter, and agency or institution isolation—to find and use its various competences wherever located.

AN EXPERIMENT IN UNDERGRADUATE INSTRUCTION

An experiment in undergraduate instruction involving the three fields of Psychiatry, Social Work, and Anthropology took place at Duke University during the academic year, 1945-46. The course, which was labeled in the catalogue as "Personality and Culture," was taught with the collaboration of John P. Gillin, then Associate Professor of Anthropology, Richard S. Lyman, head of the Department of Neuropsychiatry, and Mrs. Richard S. Lyman, chief of the Psychiatric Social Service of Duke Hospital. The following features distinguished the course from the usual procedure in such classes:

(1) Lectures and readings on the cross-cultural aspects of personality and the influence of socio-cultural situations upon the individual were supplemented by (2) weekly clinic in the hospital at which patients were shown and discussed. These cases were carefully chosen from the general psychiatric service as being representative of various types of disorders in which social and cultural conflict played an important role. (3) Arrangements were made for each one of the students to have contact with the patient at the hospital and to make a series of investigative trips to the home and neighborhood of each of the cases, and a report on the social and cultural conditions was required. In connection with the visits, all of which involved patients coming from social categories other than those to which the student belonged special field instruction was given in the techniques of ethnological field work and social case work and recordings. In other words, the students were trained to investigate and analyze cultural situations in American society using the same methods employed by ethnologists in other parts of the world. The pedagogical results, even though the students were previously untrained undergraduates, were regarded as successful. And the popularity of the approach is shown by the fact that the registration increased by about 100 percent after the course had been in progress. In fact, so many students now wish to take the course as to tax the facilities.

It is thought probable that even better results could be obtained from future similar experiments if the students involved are required to be of graduate level before engaging in the field work.

J. P. G.

SEX RATIO OF THE SCHOOL POPULATION IN LOUISIANA*

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IN PRESENTING data on school population and on the advancement of pupils from grade to grade, little attention has usually been given to the sex distribution of the students on the basis of their ages. Apparently most educators have assumed that boys and girls of the same ages make the same rate of school progress. An examination of the sex ratio of the school populations of Louisiana in comparison with that of all the children and young people of corresponding ages indicates that such an assumption may not be justified.

The sex ratio, i.e. the number of males in a locality or group for each 100 females, is a helpful device for studying the composition of a population. It has been widely used by demographers in analyzing the population characteristics of an area. There has been a trend in the United States since 1910 toward fewer males in proportion to the number of females in the general population of the country.¹ In 1910 there were 106 males to every 100 females, whereas in 1940 the number of men and boys for each 100 women and girls had dropped to 100.7. The cause for the reduction in the sex ratio has been attributed largely to the curtailment of immigration of this country.² It is also generally known that more male than female children are born, the sex ratio at birth being about 105. However, as a result of the relatively greater vitality of females the number of males for 100 females declines steadily with age. According to the 1940 Census the sex ratio at the age of 20 to 24 had reached 96.6.

Variations in sex distribution are among the most fundamental differentiating characteristics of the population of the primary residential categories. The sex ratio of the urban population in 1940 was 95.5 as compared with 103.7 for the rural-nonfarm population, and 111.7 for the rural-farm

population. Differences in the proportion of men to women have also been noted in different cities of the nation. For example, in 1940 there were 108.3 males in Gary, Indiana and 85.7 males in Atlanta, Georgia for every 100 females. Such differences as these in the sex ratios of urban localities can probably be accounted for in the main by differing industrial patterns of the urban centers.

SEX RATIOS IN LOUISIANA SCHOOL POPULATION

One would expect to find a sex ratio in the school population for corresponding age groups approximating that of the general population. Theoretically all children are equally subject to the compulsory-education laws and the schools are designed to provide for the instruction of all children without regard to sex. However, in Louisiana one finds that there are rather surprising differences between the sex ratio of children six to nine years of age in the general population and that of children in the first three grades of school. The sex ratio of white children six to nine years of age in 1940 was 103.0 whereas the sex ratio of white children in the first three grades of school was 112.1.³ When comparable data for Negro children are examined one finds a similar differential, the sex ratio of all nonwhite children six to nine years of age being 99.2 and that for pupils of the first three grades of school being 108.9. At the intermediate grade level—grades four through seven—one also encounters interesting variations in the sex ratio of the populations. Among all children 10 to 14 years of age there were 102.9 boys of the white and 99.1 boys of the nonwhite children for every 100 girls; in the school population, however, there were 105.0 white boys and 82.5 nonwhite boys for each 100 girls enrolled in grades four through seven. It is to be noted that the number of boys in the upper elementary grades has declined relative to the number of girls. The same trend is to be observed at an accelerated rate in the high school distribution. Among the general white

* This article may be identified as Paper Number 4, Journal Series, Institute of Population Research, Louisiana State University.

¹ Marion B. Smith, *Survey of Social Science* (rev. ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1945), pp. 88-89.

² T. Lynn Smith, Manuscript of book on population analysis in preparation.

³ These data are secured from the *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940*, "Population," Second Series, Louisiana, Table 22, pp. 44-56, and from the files of the State Department of Education of Louisiana.

population of ages 15 through 18 years the sex ratio was 100.0, but there were only 89.7 boys in high school for each 100 girls. Among the non-white population the sex ratio of those 15 through 18 years was 92.2 but among those enrolled in high school there were only 59.4 boys for each 100 girls. In other words, while there had been a gradual decline in the sex ratio of the general population, both white and colored, its decline in the school population had been much more precipitous.

One also notes a rather surprising disparity between the sex ratio of the general population at the different ages and that of the school population

level was 16.6 below the number in the general population at the corresponding age level. At the high school level there were 10.3 fewer white boys and 32.8 fewer colored boys enrolled in school than there were in the general population of ages 15 through 18 years for each 100 girls of the racial group.

SEX DIFFERENCES AND SCHOOL ADVANCEMENT

From the above figures one seems warranted in concluding that there was considerable retardation among the boys which caused them to remain in the lower grades while the girls advanced to the higher educational levels more nearly at the ex-

TABLE 1
SCHOOL PROGRESS OF LOUISIANA CHILDREN ENROLLED IN SCHOOL, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED,
AGE AND SEX*

AGE	WHITE			COLORED		
	Grade completed*	Percent boys	Percent girls	Grade completed	Percent boys	Percent girls
7	First	74.5	78.1	First	66.8	69.4
8	Second	58.7	66.1	Second	33.5	41.6
9	Third	51.3	59.8	Third	22.4	31.2
10	Fourth	44.8	54.1	Fourth	15.0	23.8
11	Fifth	40.7	50.9	Fifth	11.9	19.4
12	Sixth	36.9	47.5	Sixth	8.4	15.0
13	Seventh	36.0	47.8	Seventh	6.9	12.9
14 & 15†						
16	Third year High School	28.0	38.9	Third year High School	3.0	6.1
17	Fourth year High School	19.8	29.2	Fourth year High School	2.5	5.2

* Pupils may be presumed to be attending the grade above the one listed as completed.

† Louisiana had seven year elementary school, some cities have junior high schools; record for ages 14 and 15 confusing and inaccurate.

Source.—*Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, "Population," IV, Louisiana, Table 17.*

at comparable grade levels. In the primary grades there were 9.1 more white boys per 100 white girls enrolled in school than the number of white boys for each 100 white girls in the general population of ages six through nine years; among the nonwhite children there was the same characteristic difference, i.e. 9.7 more boys enrolled in the primary grades for each 100 girls than there were in the nonwhite population of that age level. At the intermediate grade level, fourth through the seventh, the number of white boys was 2.1 more than the number in the general population aged 10 through 14 years for each 100 girls, but the number of colored boys in school at that grade

pected promotion rate. This hypothesis is supported by the evidence of the 1940 Census which shows that a smaller percentage of boys than girls, aged seven through 17 years made the expected advancement by grade from the first through the senior year of high school (Table 1).

One notices that among both the white and the colored school children there are significant differences between the proportions of girls and of boys who had successfully completed the expected grades for their respective ages. It is also apparent that there is a rather consistent increase with each grade advancement in the differences between the percentage of girls and of boys who

had attained the expected educational level for their ages. At the age of seven years the percentage of white girls who had completed the first grade was only 4.8 greater than that of the white boys of that age and the percentage of colored girls was but 3.9 higher than that of the colored boys of that age who had completed the first grade. At the age of 13 years the proportion of white girls who had completed the seventh grade was almost a third (32.8 percent) greater than that of the white boys, and the proportion of colored girls who had completed that grade was 87.7 percent higher than that of the colored boys of that age. At the age of

rural farm, populations as can be seen from Table 2

If we consider the actual retardation of boys and girls one or more grades, we find that the boys are considerably more retarded than the girls. Boys and girls eight years of age who have not yet completed the first grade are regarded as retarded one grade, also children 10 years of age who are not beyond the third grade; 13 year old children who are still in or below the sixth grade; those 17 years of age who have not passed the third year of high school and other students of corresponding ages and grades are regarded as retarded one or more grades.

TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF SCHOOL PROGRESS OF LOUISIANA CHILDREN BY AGE, SEX, AND RESIDENCE

AGE	GRADE COMPLETED	ORLEANS PARISH		URBAN (INCL. N. O.)		RURAL NONFARM		RURAL FARM	
		Percent boys	Percent girls	Percent boys	Percent girls	Percent boys	Percent girls	Percent boys	Percent girls
White Children									
7	First	77.6	82.0	77.1	81.1	72.4	76.8	73.8	76.3
8	Second	64.3	70.6	63.5	70.3	55.6	62.9	56.5	64.9
9	Third	56.8	65.0	57.2	64.6	49.3	56.0	47.0	57.9
10	Fourth	50.2	59.1	52.2	60.1	41.8	50.8	40.3	50.6
11	Fifth	44.3	55.0	56.6	55.4	39.2	48.3	36.0	48.0
12	Sixth	40.1	51.7	43.4	53.5	36.0	44.1	31.1	44.1
13	Seventh	38.5	48.6	42.6	52.7	35.6	47.0	29.9	43.3
Colored Children									
7	First	73.4	77.7	68.6	73.6	66.9	68.6	65.6	66.9
8	Second	47.6	60.5	43.1	53.7	33.4	41.8	27.8	33.7
9	Third	38.4	50.3	32.9	41.9	21.2	30.6	16.2	24.2
10	Fourth	28.6	40.9	23.7	35.1	14.8	23.1	9.9	16.8
11	Fifth	25.6	36.0	20.5	29.9	10.7	19.5	6.4	11.8
12	Sixth	17.3	29.5	14.0	24.5	8.2	14.1	4.8	8.7
13	Seventh	15.9	28.7	13.3	22.7	7.0	11.9	2.8	6.6

16 years the number of white girls who had completed the third year of high school was proportionately 38.9 percent higher than the percentage of white boys of that age who had completed the third year of high school, and the number of 16 year-old colored girls who had reached the expected educational level for their age was proportionately more than double that of the number of colored boys who were enrolled in school. Not only was the school progress of the girls greater than that of the boys for the State of Louisiana, as a whole, but it was likewise true for each residential group, i.e. Orleans Parish, urban including New Orleans, rural-nonfarm and

A study of Table 3 shows that the boys, both white and nonwhite, were considerably more retarded in their school progress than were the girls. At the age of eight years the proportion of white boys who were retarded was 44.7 percent greater than that of the white girls of that age and the number of nonwhite boys was proportionately 26.0 percent greater than that of the nonwhite girls; at the age of nine years the number of white boys who were retarded in school one or more grades was proportionately 50.5 percent greater than that of the white girls of the same age and the proportion of nonwhite boys similarly retarded was 24.6 percent greater than that of the nonwhite girls;

at 11 years of age the number of white boys who were retarded was proportionately 50.5 percent greater and for the nonwhite boys 16.8 percent more than the percentage of retardation of the girls of the respective groups. It is to be noted that the relative degree of retardation of the white boys above that of the white girls increased until the age of 11 years is reached, after that period a slight yearly decrease can be noted until at the age of 17 years the number of retarded white boys is proportionately 34.0 percent greater than that of the white girls. The nonwhite boys at the age of eight years have the highest rate of retardation relative to that of the girls to be found at any age, and from that age on there is a decline in the pro-

TABLE 3
RETARDATION OF ONE OR MORE GRADES IN SCHOOL OF
LOUISIANA BOYS AND GIRLS WHO ARE ENROLLED
IN SCHOOL BY AGE AND RACE

AGE	WHITE		COLORED	
	Percent boys	Percent girls	Percent boys	Percent girls
8	5.5	3.8	18.4	14.6
9	13.7	9.1	45.1	36.2
10	21.5	14.6	61.2	49.0
11	27.4	18.2	70.2	58.3
12	34.5	23.4	76.5	65.5
13	37.4	26.1	81.5	70.9
16	47.7	34.6	91.9	84.4
17	48.5	36.2	90.7	84.7

Source.—*Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940.*

portion of retardation of nonwhite boys as compared with the girls of that race.

When we consider the retardation of boys and girls on the basis of their residential group we note that at every age level and in each residential group for both the white and the nonwhite young people, the boys were more retarded in their school progress than were the girls. For example, the retardation by one or more grades of white urban boys 11 years of age was 21.7 percent as compared with 15.1 percent for the urban white girls; the retardation in school of rural-nonfarm and rural-farm white boys was 28.9 and 32.0 percent respectively, as compared with 19.7 and 20.2 percent for the girls of the same age, race, and residential group. Among the colored boys and girls of 11 years of age the rates of school retardation were as

follows: 55.2, 72.0, and 79.9 for the urban, rural-nonfarm, and rural-farm boys respectively as compared with 44.8, 57.2, and 68.8 for the girls of the particular age, race, and residential group.

SEX DIFFERENCES IN PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOL AGE POPULATION ENROLLED IN SCHOOL

In the above discussion of school progress of boys as compared with that of girls only those actually enrolled in school were considered. The question may arise: What difference, if any, is there in the proportion of boys and girls who are not enrolled in school? At the time the census was taken in 1940

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF LOUISIANA POPULATION OF SCHOOL AGE NOT ATTENDING SCHOOL, BY AGE, SEX
AND RACE

AGE	WHITE		COLORED	
	Percent boys	Percent girls	Percent boys	Percent girls
6	46.0	42.0	47.3	43.5
7	7.6	5.9	21.3	18.6
8	4.4	3.7	15.3	13.1
9	3.4	3.0	11.8	10.7
10	3.4	3.0	11.4	10.0
11	3.4	2.9	10.6	9.6
12	4.4	3.3	12.2	10.0
13	6.0	5.2	14.3	12.3
14	10.4	10.0	20.0	16.7
15	17.9	16.8	31.8	28.4
16	29.1	27.6	49.1	43.9
17	46.5	47.3	68.3	62.1

Source.—*Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940,*
"Population," IV, Louisiana, Table 18.

the Louisiana school attendance laws were very inadequate and little effort was made to require the parents to send their children to school or to compel children to attend school. From Table 4, which shows the percentage of white and nonwhite boys and girls who were not enrolled in school, in 1940, at the various ages, one notes that at every age except 17 years for the white children and at every age for the colored population, the percentage of boys who were not enrolled in school is higher than that of the girls. The exception in the case of white boys and girls 17 years of age can be explained by the fact that at that age 21.6 percent of the girls had graduated from high school while only 11.4 percent of the boys had completed

that stage of their formal education. Among the colored boys and girls of 17 years of age the percentage having completed high school was so low—0.55 percent for boys and 2.2 percent for girls—that it does not alter the general pattern of a larger percentage of males than of females not enrolled in school.

What was true of the State, as a whole, was likewise true in each residential group. A higher percentage of boys than of girls were not enrolled in school.

RESIDENTIAL GROUP DIFFERENCES

The question of the effects of residence on the educational advancement of boys and girls is of considerable interest and importance. Are the urban boys more or less advanced in school in relation to the progress of girls than the rural boys? A study of Table 2 indicates, not only, that the girls generally made better school progress than the boys, but also that the differences between the percentages of girls and of boys who had successfully completed the expected grades for their ages were considerably higher among the white rural-farm group than among the white rural-nonfarm, the urban including New Orleans, or the City of New Orleans alone, at every age level after the age of seven years. For example, in the urban areas, at the age of 10 years the number of white girls who had successfully completed the fourth grade was proportionately 13.1 percent greater than the number of white boys; in the rural-nonfarm and rural-farm areas the corresponding percentages were 17.7 and 20.4 respectively. At 13 years of age the proportion of white girls who had successfully passed the seventh grade exceeded that of the boys by about one-fifth (19.2 percent) in urban areas, by almost one-fourth (24.3 percent) in rural-nonfarm areas, and by almost one-third (30.9 percent) in rural-farm areas.

Among the nonwhite rural-farm young people the school progress of girls exceeded that of the boys of the same age, race, and residential group by a greater percentage than is to be found among the other residential groups. The number of colored girls 10 years of age who had successfully passed the fourth grade exceeded that of the colored boys by 69.7 percent for the rural-farm population, 56.1 percent for the rural-nonfarm members, and 48.1 for the urban group. At 13 years of age the percentages by which the number of colored girls who had successfully passed the seventh grade

exceeded that of the colored boys were 135.7, 70.0, and 70.7 for the rural-farm, the rural-nonfarm, and the urban populations respectively.

One also finds by an examination of the statistics on school retardation that the differences between the percentages of school retardation of white boys and girls were greater among the rural-farm young people than was true of the urban or the rural-nonfarm populations for the ages of nine through 13 years. At 11 years of age the number of white boys who were retarded one or more school grades was proportionately greater than that of the white girls by 43.7 percent for the urban, 46.7 percent for the rural-nonfarm, and 58.4 per cent for the rural-farm residential groups. Thus it appears that although the boys were more retarded in each residential group, the rural-farm white boys were more retarded in comparison with the rate of school progress of the girls of their age, race, and residence group than was true of the boys of the urban or rural-nonfarm group.

Among the colored boys and girls, although the boys were more retarded than the girls in each residential group, the pattern of retardation was different from that observed among the white children. The difference in the retardation of colored rural-farm boys and girls is proportionately less at all ages than that found among the colored rural-nonfarm or urban populations. At the age of nine years the number of retarded boys is relatively greater than the number of retarded girls by 31.8 percent for the urban, 31.5 percent for the rural-nonfarm, and 18.5 percent for the rural-farm groups. At 13 years of age the percentages of differences are 24.9, 13.0, and 10.3 for the urban, the rural-nonfarm, and the rural-farm young people respectively. At 16 years of age the percentage by which the retardation of colored boys exceeded that of the colored girls was 11.8 for the urban, 8.1 for the rural-nonfarm, and 2.5 for the rural-farm groups.

An important factor responsible for the difference in the pattern of retardation found in the residential groups of the colored and the white young people probably is the very inadequate rural schools established for the colored children, consequently the retardation rate of rural-farm colored boys and girls was much higher than that of the rural-white children. Thus relative difference in retardation between the rural-farm colored boys and girls was not so great as it was between the

white boys and girls of the same age and residential group.

Not only were there relatively more boys than girls not enrolled in school for each residential and age group, as is mentioned above, but one notices from Table 5 that differences between the percentages of white boys and girls who were not enrolled in school was proportionally greatest for

COMPARISON OF THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE DIFFERENT SEXES AMONG CHILDREN NOT ENROLLED IN SCHOOL AND AMONG ADULTS

Since there is considerable difference in the rate of school advancement of boys and girls enrolled in school one would expect to find similar differences in the grade attainment of boys and girls who have

TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF LOUISIANA POPULATION OF SCHOOL AGE NOT ENROLLED IN SCHOOL, BY AGE, SEX, AND RESIDENCE

AGE	URBAN (INCL. NEW ORLEANS)		NEW ORLEANS		RURAL NONFARM		RURAL FARM	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
White								
6	28.0	25.0	13.2	10.8	51.0	48.4	57.4	51.7
7	4.9	3.9	4.0	3.3	7.7	6.5	11.6	7.3
8	2.9	2.5	2.9	2.1	5.2	4.2	5.1	3.9
9	2.4	2.0	2.1	1.4	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.2
10	2.4	2.4	2.6	1.7	3.6	3.8	4.3	3.1
11	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.9	3.6	3.5	4.2	3.2
12	2.7	2.3	2.2	1.7	5.0	3.9	5.5	3.8
13	3.1	3.2	2.2	2.2	6.3	6.1	8.6	6.7
14	5.4	5.7	4.7	4.2	11.0	12.2	14.8	12.8
15	10.8	10.6	10.4	9.8	17.2	19.5	25.7	21.8
16	22.0	25.0	24.9	21.3	26.8	29.1	38.0	33.7
17	38.9	40.6	43.3	44.8	45.3	48.0	55.2	52.0
Nonwhite								
6	33.2	30.0	25.6	22.2	44.7	39.1	55.5	51.6
7	12.0	10.4	10.8	7.7	19.2	16.4	27.1	23.8
8	8.0	5.8	5.8	4.9	12.1	11.8	20.1	17.6
9	5.4	4.7	3.8	3.3	10.3	9.5	15.9	14.7
10	5.2	4.4	4.2	2.9	9.6	8.3	15.3	13.7
11	4.5	4.4	2.8	3.5	9.9	8.2	14.5	13.6
12	5.9	5.1	4.1	2.8	10.1	8.0	16.5	13.8
13	7.1	7.8	3.9	6.0	12.8	11.3	18.7	15.4
14	13.2	11.2	9.8	8.0	17.0	17.3	25.2	20.3
15	24.1	23.1	19.6	19.7	28.6	31.4	37.6	31.2
16	42.3	36.9	39.6	33.4	49.7	46.6	53.2	47.9
17	62.0	57.0	61.1	54.8	67.2	65.6	72.6	64.7

the white boys in the rural-farm group and least for the white boys in the urban population at all age levels. Among the colored children of school age the relative number of rural-farm boys who were not enrolled in school was at most ages less in proportion to the nonschool colored girls of the same age and residential group than was true in the rural-nonfarm or the urban populations.

dropped out of school and of the men and women in the adult population. Table 6 shows the median years of school completed by young people from the ages 10 to 20 years inclusive who were not enrolled in school and for the adult population over 20 years of age. From this table one can see that the women had an average of about 0.5 of a school year more formal training than the men for the

rural-nonfarm and rural-farm population for both the white and nonwhite races and for the urban nonwhite group. There is only a slight difference of 0.1 school year in favor of the women in the white urban group.

One notes with interest that the differences between the grades boys and girls attained at the time of leaving school tended to be somewhat

years as compared with 0.4 for the rural-nonfarm colored women and 1.0 school year as compared with 0.7 for the rural-farm colored women. The fact that the school grade attainment of adult women is not so much greater than the men of their respective groups as is true in the case of the boys and girls under 20 years of age who were no longer enrolled in school may be explained by the

TABLE 6

MEDIAN YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY PERSONS 10 TO 20 YEARS OF AGE NOT IN SCHOOL AND OF ADULTS 20 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, BY SEX, RACE, URBAN, RURAL NONFARM AND RURAL FARM

	10 YEARS OLD	11 YEARS OLD	12 YEARS OLD	13 YEARS OLD	14 YEARS OLD	15 YEARS OLD	16 YEARS OLD	17 YEARS OLD	18 YEARS OLD	19 YEARS OLD	20 YEARS OLD	20 YEARS AND ABOVE
White												
Urban												
Male.....	2.8	3.5	4.3	4.5	5.3	6.2	6.8	7.5	8.2	8.9	9.4	8.2
Female.....	3.4	4.1	4.7	5.1	6.1	6.8	7.5	8.6	9.8	10.6	10.4	8.3
Rural non-farm												
Male.....	1.5	1.9	2.6	3.3	4.1	4.8	5.4	6.1	6.8	7.4	7.5	6.6
Female.....	1.8	2.4	3.7	4.0	5.0	6.0	6.5	7.2	7.8	8.5	8.2	7.1
Rural Farm												
Male.....	1.2	1.7	2.2	2.9	3.7	4.3	4.8	5.3	5.7	5.9	5.9	4.7
Female.....	1.6	2.1	2.7	3.5	4.6	5.3	5.8	6.4	6.7	6.9	6.6	5.3
Colored												
Urban												
Male.....	2.4	2.7	3.3	3.8	4.6	5.5	6.1	6.4	6.7	6.9	6.9	5.3
Female.....	2.4	3.2	4.0	4.6	5.2	6.1	6.7	7.3	7.7	7.9	7.7	5.8
Rural non-farm												
Male.....	1.4	1.5	2.1	2.4	3.4	4.1	4.5	4.8	5.1	5.1	5.1	3.8
Female.....		2.1	3.2	3.5	4.3	5.1	5.7	6.2	6.2	6.5	6.2	4.4
Rural farm												
Male.....	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.3	2.9	3.4	3.7	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.1
Female.....	1.4	1.9	2.4	2.8	3.7	4.3	4.7	5.1	5.2	5.4	5.2	3.8

Source.—Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, "Population," IV, Part 2: Alabama-Louisiana, Tables 22 and 23, pp. 338-339.

greater for those under 20 years of age than for the adult group. For instance, at the age of 16 years there was 0.7 of a school year in favor of the urban white girls as compared with 0.1 school year for their adult sisters; 1.1 school years as compared with 0.5 for the rural-nonfarm white women; 1.0 school year as compared with 0.6 for the rural-farm white women; 0.6 school year as compared with 0.5 for the urban colored females; 1.2 school

fact that the adult group included that portion of the population which completed high school and college as well as those who dropped out in the lower grades.

CONCLUSIONS

From this study one is forced to conclude that the girls in Louisiana succeed in school to a higher degree than is true of the boys; that retardation

of boys in school is considerably greater than is true of girls; that a larger percentage of the girls at all ages are enrolled in school than is true of the boys; that the rural-farm white boys fail to equal the educational progress of the rural-farm white girls by a greater degree than is true of the boys of any other white residential group; and that similar differences in the formal educational attainment is to be found in the adult population of the State.

Since the government in all its branches, and the various economic, religious and educational institutions of the State are directed and managed largely by men, one would expect that the education of boys would be regarded as of greater im-

portance than that of the girls. However, from the data of this study one seems justified in concluding either that families in Louisiana, both the white and the colored, place more importance on the education of girls than of boys, and parents are more inclined to require the girls to attend school more regularly than the boys, or that the schools of the State do not meet the felt needs of boys so well as they do of the girls.⁴

⁴ Since the 1940 Census the Louisiana State Legislature has passed an effective compulsory education law and most of the parishes of the State are making an effort to place all children in school.

THE LONGEVITY OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS*

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THE basic data for this paper were taken from a recent study of 11,900 eminent people who were distributed over several continents, many centuries, and 24 occupations. One of these professional groups, hereafter referred to as social scientists, was made up of anthropologists, archeologists, economists, political scientists, and sociologists.

Eminent educators (167 of them) had the longest mean longevity (72.56 years), and they were followed by 270 lawyers (72.39), 168 engineers (71.10), 281 naturalists (71.09); then came the 219 social scientists with a mean of 71.01. Others who have exceeded the "three-score-and-ten" years are 209 philologists (70.85), 116 astronomers (70.35), 343 historians (70.12), and 141 inventors (70.09). The social scientists are fifth in the list of 24, and their standard deviation was found to be 11.85 years.

In addition to those given above were 772 painters (67.12), 1245 prose writers (66.64), 162 actors (66.05), and 684 poets (61.94). Their mean standard deviation is 14.40 years.

The preceding information shows that the social scientists stand near the top of a group of eminent persons who have exceeded their seventh decade, and their sigma range is shorter than the others

excepting lawyers (11.38), chemists (11.52), and historians (11.80). This low measure of deviation indicates that the social scientists who have attained the degree of prominence accorded to the 219 persons listed in the biographical data used in this study have not reached their high standing early in life.

Since the total number of social scientists who have reached places of considerable importance in their professional fields is much greater than these 219, it must be assumed that the selection of this small group was quite rigid. It may also be taken for granted that the quality of scholarship which they exhibited was quite superior for that seems to be one of the bases on which their international reputation was judged.

Certain professional groups such as explorers and inventors may become famous by the commission of a single act such as the discovery of a new land or the creation of an ingenious machine. This could hardly be true, however, for social scientists, with the single exception of archeologists, for their work builds up more slowly to a place of recognized excellence. One might add that the lawyers and educators appear also to have passed through a long period in which they have made many contributions to the culture base, quite similar to the social scientists, before they were given such lofty recognition.

In contrast to this slow accumulation one may

* This is the fifth of a series of articles dealing with the correlation between longevity and intelligence.

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recall how certain musicians have left a great heritage in melody, or how a few painters have been classed among the immortals because of their masterpieces. At the same time one should call to mind that those engaged in the arts (such as poets, actors, painters, musicians) probably make use of a much narrower range of capabilities than social scientists. That is, the creative ability of artists appears to rest on a more distinct innate talent. This indicates that artists might master their professions at an earlier age than social scientists and, therefore, enter into a period of creativeness earlier in life. Evidence that this happens is shown by the fact that their standard deviation (14.40), as mentioned previously, is quite a bit longer than that of social scientists.

The author wishes to suggest, without taking the space necessary to advance the evidence available at present, that there seems to be a definite positive correlation between longevity and intelligence. The former readily yields to measurement whenever authentic dates can be found, but the latter is more difficult to treat statistically since intelligence scores were not used before the opening of this century. Without these numerical data one cannot directly find a factor of correlation. As a consequence of this one must rely largely on the rigid selection done by those who make up the select biographies as an index of the intellectual abilities of those who are included in the data.

There are several other avenues open for the consideration of the positive correlation between intelligence and longevity, and some of them provide mathematical materials which make a statistical analysis possible. Since intelligence is held to be innate, the first of these avenues links intelligence and longevity on a biological level in that they are both natural gifts. This view necessitates taking the position that longevity is very largely determined before birth, or as some would state it, longevity runs in families.¹ If this biological differential is not admitted, then we must assume that all persons have the same chances to live long, and that is obviously not true since those who fall at the lower end of the I.Q. scale do not have an average length of life as great as the general population.

If we accept the view for a moment that those who live longer than others do so by pure chance we then recall that chance favors a median posi-

tion, and in this the longevity of the whole population would come to resemble a normal curve, but factual data show that it does not. The conclusion is being suggested that the more successful struggle for existence by the intelligent tips the scales, forming a negative skew, and consequently those who make the most use of their superior native endowment are to be found at the upper end of the longevity curve. Since, as mentioned previously, intelligence is considered to be innate, those who gravitate to the upper end of this curve would be gifted with greater mental ability.

One should not assume that this comes about simply as a natural process, governed solely by biological direction, for there is not enough evidence to support that view. Whatever is transmitted biologically, parent to offspring, apparently comes through the genes, and so far we have been unable to explain the gradual lengthening of the mean length of life of the general population by changes in the chromosomes. Somewhere there must be given thought to the influence of culture on longevity. We do not yet know whether culture has disturbed the differential distribution of nature with respect to lengths of life, but it seems evident that the mean advances as culture becomes more complex. At least that is the normal way. However, culture may pull down the average when its destructive elements, such as war, begin to dominate the pattern of social interaction.

We may state, without much apparent opposition, that the use of human intelligence is directly associated with cultural advance, whether it be in making independent inventions or discoveries, or the acceptance of culture traits through the channels of diffusion, and this links longevity to social factors. Ultimately these lead to a longer mean life for the population whose culture is growing. This will work to the greatest advantage of those who make the most use of their native intellectual abilities, and least to those who do not possess the mental ability necessary to see and accept the benefits of those traits in culture which would enable them to live better, hence longer, or who are not aided by others in applying such knowledge.

It may, consequently, be appropriate to point out that the selection of those parts of culture which are most conducive to longevity should be particularly easy for social scientists since they, of all the scientific groups, pay most attention to the

¹ Dublin and Lotka, *Length of Life*, ch. 7.

nature and problems of human society. They observe social trends and engage in the extraction of deductions which best represent natural laws regarding the functioning of social life.

If this is correct then one ought to feel safe in predicting that social scientists will advance their mean age more rapidly than some of the other scientific groups who do not give the same amount of attention to the affective aspects of culture. If the mean of longevity of the social scientists were

to be raised 1 year and 204 days they would top the list.²

² Sources: Biographical section, Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition; The New Encyclopedia of Music and Musicians, ed. by W. S. Pratt (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931); *Length of Life*, by Dublin and Lotka (New York: Ronald Press, 1936); *The Home Book of Verse* (regarding poets) 1580-1920, by Burton Egbert Stevenson (New York: Holt, 1922).

UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CENTERS IN THE SOUTH

A five-year program in which 33 selected universities and colleges will join to "vitalize instruction" has been announced by O. C. Carmichael, president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. The project will be financed by a special grant to the Foundation of \$700,000 from the Carnegie Corporation of New York plus \$200,000 from the cooperating institutions, making available a total of \$900,000.

University Centers have been set up at Atlanta, Nashville, New Orleans, and in North Carolina, each center serving as the focal point for several colleges; in the case of North Carolina, Duke University at Durham and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill will serve jointly. The grouping is as follows:

ATLANTA CENTER: EMORY UNIVERSITY (with the University of Georgia, Georgia School of Technology, Agnes Scott College, Atlanta Art Association, and Columbia Theological Seminary cooperating)—University of Chattanooga, Chattanooga, Tennessee; Huntington College, Montgomery, Alabama; John B. Stetson University, Deland, Florida; Wesleyan College, Macon, Georgia.

NASHVILLE CENTER: VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY (with George Peabody College for Teachers and Scarritt College cooperating)—Birmingham—Southern College, Birmingham, Alabama; Hendrix College, Conway, Arkansas; University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee; Southwestern, Memphis, Tennessee; Transylvania College, Lexington, Kentucky.

NEW ORLEANS CENTER: THE TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA—Centenary College, Shreveport, Louisiana; Louisiana College, Pineville, Louisiana; Loyola University of the South, New Orleans, Louisiana; Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi; Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.

NORTH CAROLINA CENTER: DUKE UNIVERSITY, DURHAM, AND THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL—College of Charleston, Charleston, South Carolina; Davidson College, Davidson, North Carolina; Furman University, Greenville, South Carolina; Wofford and Converse Colleges, Spartanburg, South Carolina (serving as one unit); Wake Forest College, Wake Forest, North Carolina.

The Foundation will provide \$15,000 annually for five years to each of the university centers, and they have agreed to add individually \$5,000 a year. Each of the twenty college units will receive \$4,000 annually, which the college will supplement with \$1,000 a year.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

MORE WORK THAN WORKERS

(A FOOTNOTE TO THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946)

GUY GREER

New York City

TO ASK people nowadays to think much about unemployment is not unlike reminding them of leaky roofs while the sun is shining. Yet, unless we are fools, we do attend to our roofs in fair weather. And since neglecting the problem of unemployment is sure to be incomparably more disastrous than neglecting to get our houses ready for rainy days, we can scarcely avoid giving some thought to it. The danger is that we shall not think about it enough, long and hard enough, while there is still time to lay plans to cope with it.

To be sure, Congress has passed and the President has signed the Employment Act of 1946. With this law on the books, we are tempted to assume that everything needful has been done—that we can now leave the whole tiresome business to “the Government”—that hereafter, apart from occasional shuddering over the menace of the atom and the chances of a new outbreak of war, we can concentrate on the countless other domestic problems that beset us.

What we tend to overlook is the timidly tentative character of the new legislation; also the grim fact that the problem of unemployment is in essence much the same as the long-run problem of avoiding war. Masses of people seeking work and not finding it in the country that dominates the economy of the world would provide the worst possible setting in which to try to maintain the peace of the world. And the Employment Act of 1946, for all its good intentions, provides merely for an approach to the problem rather than for a solution. Out of it may come much or little, depending on what is done next. And this, in

turn, will depend mainly on what we the people want done. To think through to a clear understanding of objectives, therefore, is a task we cannot afford to shirk.

SOME FACTS OF ECONOMIC LIFE

Let us begin by looking at the matter of jobs in perspective, noting first the curious modern habit of coming at it wrong-end-to.

Until a few decades ago, the very idea of millions of people clamoring for work in a world almost everywhere still crude and undeveloped, would have been considered an insult to common sense. Anybody could see that there would always need doing a great deal more work than all available workers could be induced to do. Adam Smith assumed that full employment could be taken for granted. So did the long line of his successors in the classical school of economics; and even to this day there are a few learned survivors of that school who refuse to budge from the traditional assumption. They go on insisting that efforts to meet insatiable human needs will result automatically in work for all who are competent and willing to do it. Widespread unemployment is too preposterous to be viewed by these resolute theorists as anything more than a temporary aberration, sure to disappear shortly because of its self-evident absurdity.

During the Great Depression of the thirties all the common-sense aspects of the classical doctrine were as obvious as ever. But the facts belied the theory. Contemplating the spectacle, many of us were driven almost to a frenzy of frustration.

The war, of course, has demonstrated a monstrous but certain method of getting rid of unem-

ployment without advance planning. And, incidentally, it has convinced most of us—the great majority who will decide future policies by our votes—that there is a way to put everybody to work, even without going to war, if everything else fails.

Now in war's aftermath we expect to go on for a while enjoying boom conditions, whether we plan for them or not. But it is clear to anyone who will face the facts of economic life that the boom will not continue indefinitely under its own steam. Sooner or later we shall have another depression, probably worse than that of the thirties, unless we make and carry out plans to forestall it by measures far more effective than we have ever taken before. The reasons for this dreadful certainty are many and complex. Most of them are to be found in the technical, and often controversial, intricacies of modern political economy. But there are two vitally important reasons that are simple enough to be seen at a passing glance. They lie in two closely related facts:

(1) *Among the various kinds of work making up today's unlimited sum-total, there is a large (and probably increasing) proportion of it that cannot as a practical matter be done by private business enterprise.* While the results of such work are urgently needed by the economy as a whole, much of it cannot be performed at a profit; and without profit, or at any rate the chance of it, private business operations will not take place.

(2) *With the continuing increase in productivity of labor as regards all kinds of tangible goods, more and more workers are and will be available for the performance of services; but again, many of the services cannot be rendered by ordinary business enterprise because they cannot be rendered at a profit.*

For example, a great extension and improvement of public education is an urgent need of our own country, not to mention the rest of the world. So are better arrangements for medical care and public health. These needs, in the main, can be met only through an increase in the public rather than the private use of productive resources. Besides such obvious cases, there are many more, and still others that will become obvious as time goes on—if we really *are* to enjoy the degree of well-being for everybody that our material and human endowment makes possible.

It has been demonstrated by experience that the potentialities of a great river system such as that of the Tennessee Valley can be fully realized only

through initial public investment, even though afterwards the major portion of the regional development is the result of private initiative. And we know that there are a number of still greater river systems and many smaller ones that require a like sequence of public and private action.

The outmoded patterns of our cities and towns require profound changes to adapt them merely to the automobile, to say nothing of air traffic or the use (or misuse) of atomic power. And while most of the actual redevelopment of each urban center can probably be carried out by private enterprise, the costly framework of ampler roads and streets, more open space to relieve congestion and provide for healthier living, better cultural and recreational facilities, improved sanitary arrangements, and so on, will have to be provided at public expense.

A truly coordinated transportation system, instead of a disorderly congeries of competing airways, railways, waterways, highways, pipelines, etc., is another urgent need. How much public enterprise will be involved in meeting it will have to be a matter of careful study; but that some will be necessary there can be no doubt. Similar needs are evident in still other sectors of the economy, often in circumstances such that there is honest doubt as to how much of the work should be done by public enterprise. Only foresight based on unbiased analysis will provide guidance for a sound public policy.

Despite differences of opinion in specific instances, however, it is beyond dispute that there is and will be a great and growing volume of urgently needed work that will have to be done by public enterprise or not at all. And this means, among other things, that in future a much larger proportion than heretofore of the real income of the people will have to take the form of public services, or enjoyment of the results of public investment, paid for through taxes rather than directly out of money income. The traditional notion of taxation as an uncompensated exaction from the taxpayer will have to be superseded by the concept of taxation as payment for benefits received. Probably the bulk of such benefits, especially the services and the city replanning and rebuilding, should be provided by State and local rather than by Federal agencies. This will necessitate a grand overhauling of Federal-State-local fiscal relations; but the overhauling is long overdue, anyhow, and, when it is accomplished, many if not most of the problems of public finance may be expected to disappear.

THE COMMON-SENSE APPROACH

Why not, then, welcome the obvious solution to the problem of unemployment? Why not, at the appropriate levels of government, organize and carry on continuously—though in varying volume—the different kinds of public enterprise that are most urgently needed, up to the point where all available workers are employed and our productive resources are at all times fully utilized?

Something like that might come, ultimately, out of the Employment Act of 1946. The legislation does, to be sure, place chief reliance for jobs on measures to stimulate and encourage private enterprise. But it nevertheless puts upon government the responsibility of maintaining the conditions necessary for high-level employment and, by implication at least, provides for the use of public enterprise to take up any slack that may develop.

Why is this Act not more widely hailed as what we are after? One reason for lack of universal acclaim, indeed for vehement opposition, appears to consist of refusal to face the facts. To those taking this position there is little to be said—except perhaps to remind them that when another severe depression comes along they are sure to be in a hopeless minority, just as they were during the thirties, and that the *ad hoc* action then forced upon the economy will make them wish that some advance planning had been done. Certainly they should remember that planners in the U. S. A. are likely to be much more conservative than politicians under stress.

But there is another kind of opposition that is much better grounded. It is based on the fear—all too often the conviction buttressed by catchwords from a book called *The Road to Serfdom* by an Austrian professor by the name of Hayek—that action of the kind implied in the recent legislation would lead to the end of all economic freedom, and ultimately to the end of all political freedom as well. More specifically, the fear is that once the government (whether at the Federal, State, or local level) began to engage in economic activities beyond the accepted ones of operating the Post Office, providing the traditional types of public works, etc., there would be no practicable way to stop encroachment on the field of private enterprise until in effect there was none left. If "confidence" should be destroyed, in the sense that no enterpriser could ever be sure that he would not some day be put out of business by government competition, private enterprise might gradually become a

thing of the past. Corollary fears are of bureaucratic controls that would amount to totalitarianism, and of a centralization of power in the Federal Government that would destroy democracy at its roots in State and local government.

Such misgivings as these are not to be dismissed lightly, especially since the Employment Act of 1946 is vague in its provisions for the kind of planning required. There is every reason to expect, however, that the risks involved in a very considerable expansion of the field of public enterprise will have to be taken anyhow. Quite apart from the problem of unemployment, there is so much indispensable work to be done that we shall be always having to make up our minds collectively whether we can afford to wait any longer to get it done. Then, when it must be done at once, and private enterprise cannot be counted on to do it in a satisfactory manner, public enterprise will have to undertake it.

IN QUEST OF GUIDEPOSTS

Will there be anything to guide us in making these sometimes very difficult decisions? Or must we, willy-nilly, proceed blindly along a path that might indeed turn out to be the road to serfdom? Lack of sufficient foresight, drifting into an emergency instead of planning how to forestall it, is the gravest danger likely to confront us. That is why the Employment Act of 1946 should be supplemented as soon as possible with principles and machinery for planning.

As to machinery, no doubt the Advisory Board called for by the Act can develop what is required. It can create a much more effectual agency than the National Resources Planning Board which was abolished in 1943. For this time, fortunately (as was not the case before), a workable arrangement has been made for Congressional participation through a joint committee of the House and Senate. Experience with the former NRPB, both good and bad, gives assurance that adequate planning machinery can be set up. It can operate as a two-way collaboration between trained technicians and the spokesmen of the people at large. The technicians will have to inform the people of their studies, so that the full implications of the resulting plans can be understood; but the people, through their elected representatives, will then have to decide upon the action to be taken. The procedure, though more elaborate than any we

have tried before, will involve nothing really new or unduly difficult.

Planning principles are a different matter. We shall be embarking, so to speak, on an uncharted sea of new policies wherein there is reason to suspect the presence of dangerous rocks and shoals. We ought therefore at least to know as much as possible about the conditions of the voyage and the nature of the problems of navigation likely to be encountered.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE—THE MAINSTAY

Our economy, as everyone who has thought about it knows, is made up of three main sectors. First is the field of genuine free enterprise, governed only by the market and the ordinary laws of honesty and decency. Then comes a great area of private (but not entirely free) enterprise which, because of monopoly or near-monopoly, must be subject to some degree of public regulation. And finally, there is the public sector, wherein ownership and operation are by one or another level of government. (In Sweden and other European countries there has long been a highly successful "mixed" sector, wherein monopolistic industries are controlled jointly by private and public agencies, through stock ownership—an arrangement worth thinking about in connection with some of our own future problems.)

There are no sharp dividing lines, but only shaded zones, between the sectors; and these zones are bound to be zones of controversy. Whether this or that kind of work should be done publicly or privately; whether this or the other sort should be subject to public regulation (and what kind and how much); whether public ownership and operation are preferable to regulation—in all except the most obvious cases these are matters that will, and certainly should, be warmly debated whenever any substantial change in the existing set-up is proposed. But the need for guideposts is urgent.

It would be impossible, of course, to formulate and obtain general acceptance of a set of criteria comprehensive enough for final answers to all the questions that will arise. About the most we could hope for would be something like a frame of reference within which to judge each specific case. But even this might be better than no guiding principles at all. Suppose, for example, that the following conditions were universally accepted as those determining that a particular enterprise or

industry should be left to the free sector of the economy:

1. There is genuine competition as to both the quality and the prices of the goods and services offered for sale.
2. Private enterprise can and will develop or produce, within the limits of our resources, as many of the particular kinds of projects or of goods and services as the country needs; and it will do so at least as well in the public interest as would public enterprise.
3. There is not involved the danger of wasteful or unwise depletion of natural resources.

With respect to any particular economic activity not obviously qualifying for the free sector of the economy on all three counts, there would be wide differences of opinion as to the application of one or more of these principles. For example, what is genuine competition? Does the aluminum industry have it? Or the steel industry? What about the business of producing and selling or renting houses? There are many who doubt that it could qualify under No. 2 (providing as many dwellings of *the right kinds* as needed). And what of the building of dams for power production, from the point of view of the best interests of the whole community? Many such questions might be raised to show that in the borderline cases each will have to be decided on its merits. But a set of thumb-rules like the foregoing might serve at least to confine argument to the relevant issues.

THE INDISPENSABLE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Suppose now that in a given instance these conditions are not met—that some kind of governmental initiative is found necessary. What kind shall it be? Continued attempts (not very successful hitherto), such as those of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, to combat monopoly or unfair trade practices? Regulation such as that of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the various public utility commissions of the States? Government construction and operation as exemplified by the Tennessee Valley Authority?

Trying to solve all such problems is beyond the scope of this discussion. It would satisfy present requirements, however, if we had a formula for determining just when some agency of government ought to undertake a developmental project

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or to operate an industry or a service, either in its entirety or in competition with private enterprise. Suppose everybody could agree that when the following conditions prevail, governmental action is justified (perhaps sometimes with "mixed" ownership after the Scandinavian model):

1. The work produces something truly needed; it is never undertaken merely to provide employment.
2. Private enterprise either cannot or will not do it equally well from the point of view of the general welfare.
3. It is chosen by the particular level of government after due consideration, both of the order of importance of the needs of the community concerned and of the productive resources (actual or potential) of that community.

These principles are of necessity general, and moral judgments are involved. But they are enough to show that the amount of urgently needed work that must be undertaken by government, if it is to be done at all, is enormous. It is so great that we could scarcely hope to get it fully done, with all the workers we shall be likely to have available, within several generations.

We can start planning and organizing this immense amount of public enterprise at once. We can do so, moreover, with assurance that the plans

can be carried out, over the years, without damage to the really valuable part of our private enterprise system. But we cannot afford to wait for a major depression to force us into an improvised program of public spending. To do that would be to invite not only bigger and more wasteful boondoggles than those of the thirties, but such indiscriminate plunging into public enterprise as to provide ample justification for the fears inspired by the Employment Act of 1946.

Assuming successful accomplishment of the purposes of that Act, what can we expect as the future pattern of our economy? In all probability the amount of productive resources used in public enterprise will be at all times so large that there will be a constant problem as to how much can be left at the disposal of private enterprise. The proportions will have to be worked out for consideration by Congress and by the State and local governments, as matters of common sense. When private enterprise really ought, in the general interest, to have more labor and materials available to it, public projects not needed immediately can be postponed. Conversely, when private enterprise slows down, public enterprise can take advantage of the opportunity to catch up. And never again, for as far into the future as we need try to imagine, shall we have to think of the quest for jobs as a great national problem.

WELFARE ORGANIZATION IN THE LUFTWAFFE*

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THE general purpose of welfare work in the German Armed Forces was to strengthen and support the fighting spirit of the troops. "To do this," it was stated, "welfare work must produce stimulus for personal improvement, ensure

close contact between service life and the home, and provide for the best use of off-duty hours."¹ This paper is limited to a discussion of the welfare organization within the *Luftwaffe* itself, and does not treat the work of the German Red Cross and similar external agencies.

* This paper is based upon the author's study entitled "Propaganda in the *Luftwaffe*," a paper written under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Headquarters United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England, as one of a series of post-hostilities studies on the German *Luftwaffe*. This material has been declassified by Headquarters Army Air Forces and has been cleared for publication by the War Department, Bureau of Public Relations.

¹ AI-12, No. TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in the G.A.F., A Handbook for Officers" (Translation of AI-12, No. 135A, *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942); AI-12, E 172, "Richtlinien für die Wehrbetreuung" (issued by Kommando Flughafenbereich 8/XII, Laval, II/Wb, Ic, 6 April 1943); AI-12, 135, *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe* (Luftwaffenführungsstab, Ic, VIII, June 1941), p. 7.

In World War I the welfare program was conducted by the Army itself and at first was not concerned with political propaganda. In 1917, however, General Erich von Ludendorff, in order to combat declining morale among the troops, instituted regular hours of "Political Instruction" under special "*Aufklärungsoffiziere*." Under the Weimar Republic there was an extensive educational program, but nothing was done toward political indoctrination. The higher officers at that time would not have favored "republican" indoctrination and the government made no effort in that direction.²

The National Socialists, of course, took the view that the welfare organization should promote Nazi ideas and especially the leadership principle. Orders issued by the Supreme Command emphasized "that the psychological basis of leadership in the German Army is the Nazi view of life."³ Leaders of military units were thus made responsible for welfare work, exemplifying what was called "*wehrgeistige Führung*" before the troops. Formerly, so it was stated, soldiers had usually been hirelings, fighting only for the interests of a chieftain. The modern German soldier, however, fought in a national army for the interests of the people and along with the whole people for the common cause.⁴ Therefore, the officer in charge of troop welfare was intimately concerned with fostering and directing this new spirit among the troops. This was accomplished through (a) military indoctrination, and (b) organization of off-duty functions.⁵ As the military situation grew more unfavorable for the Germans the tendency was to stress the former at the expense of the latter.⁶ Welfare work was also conducted among civilians who were attached to *Luftwaffe* units and installations, and these were put on the same status as soldiers in this respect. Civilians so attached included clerks, signal service workers (*Nachrichtenheflerinnen*), and laborers.⁷

The supervision of welfare work in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) was not

² MIRS/OCC-CI/25/44, 27 Oct. 1944, "National Socialist Indoctrination Officer," pp. 3-4.

³ AMWIS, No. 219, 13 Nov. 1943, "Education in Nazi Principles in the German Armed Forces," p. 21.

⁴ AI-12, E 172, *op. cit.*

⁵ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 19.

⁶ AI-12, E 172, *op. cit.*, indicates this by stressing the dangers of the situation after Stalingrad, the effect of the English bombings, etc.

⁷ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, June 1941, p. 13.

clear-cut and simple. Several departments were concerned with it, some of these having been inherited from the *Reichswehr Ministerium* of the Republic. The former *Abteilung Inland* was responsible for educational pamphlets and for certain instruction in the *Wehrmacht*. It conducted the Song Leader's Course in the *Wehrmacht* as late as June 1944. Other departments concerned were the Division for Armed Forces Propaganda and the Inspectorate for Welfare and Pension Officers. Similar departments operated in OKH, OKM, and OKL.⁸ In addition, there was the Inspectorate for Education and General Knowledge, which appears to have had a counterpart in OKH. In general the *Abteilung Inland* was concerned with publications such as the monthly *Soldatenblätter* (soldiers pamphlets) and the *Tornisterschriften* (knapsack pamphlets). *Abteilung Inland* was also concerned with theatres, concerts, and entertainments. The *Wehrmachts-propagandaamt* (Armed Forces Propaganda Office) directed all information to the troops and had something to do with films and weekly shows. It also issued publications such as *Die Wehrmacht*. Also mentioned is an Educational Department of the High Command in the Field, which was a sub-department of the General Staff. This organization issued various publications and was concerned in some way with lectures. An Inspectorate for Education and General Knowledge in the Army (Home Command) was responsible for vocational schools and general education.⁹ OKW also had divisions dealing with Public Liaison and Propaganda, though little is known of these. Evidently wireless commentators such as Ludwig Sertorius belonged to Public Liaison.¹⁰

In the *Luftwaffe*, welfare activities were carried out under a division of the *Zentralamt* (Central Office), the direction of higher policy being in *Abteilung 5* of the General Staff, Ic (Intelligence, Section VIII).¹¹ At command levels the Intelli-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4. The abbreviations OKH, OKM and OKL are standard German usage for Supreme Command of the Army, Supreme Command of the Navy, and Supreme Command of the *Luftwaffe*, respectively.

⁹ See *Germany: Handbook*, Annexe VI, E, pp. 650-651; *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, June 1941, p. 36.

¹⁰ *Germany: Handbook*, Ch XII, p. 306.

¹¹ AI-12, 2 Abt. II/D, "Welfare." The actual administration of the program was the responsibility of Ic, VI. AI-12, Y/7H/39, 7 Apr. 1945, "R.d.L., Zentralamt, Wehrbetreuung." See also, AI-12,

gence Departments were responsible for the welfare program. The organization was based upon the *Luftgau* Commands and Permanent Stations, which distributed materials for installations and units under their jurisdiction as well as for attached units. There were full-time welfare officers on the staffs of the *Luftgau*, the *Luftflotte*,¹² and subordinate headquarters. In the case of the smaller units the welfare officer was on part-time detail.¹³ Little information is available upon the ranks allotted to these officers, but the welfare officers on the *Luftgau* and *Luftflotte* staffs held the rank of captain.¹⁴ In the unit itself the commanding officer was responsible for the welfare of his troops, this including, of course, political education and propaganda.¹⁵ The Commanding Officer usually delegated the responsibility for the welfare program to one of his subordinates. One report from the Eastern Front indicates that some individual commanders who were vigorous leaders sometimes took the view that no welfare officer was needed. Undoubtedly some commanding officers feared encroachment by the welfare officers upon their own authority and prestige. The fear that the welfare officer might be a "political commissar" was also mentioned, this being related to the general resentment on the part of German officers to Party interference in Armed Forces affairs.¹⁶

The welfare officer was generally charged with (a) carrying out all instructions and suggestions on education in Nazi principles and spiritual welfare among the troops, (b) providing the means and materials for educational and welfare work, (c)

making suggestions and arrangements for the comfort and material welfare of the troops, and (d) collaborating with the adjutant to insure uniformity in education and philosophy for the officers of the organization.¹⁷ He also maintained liaison with other welfare officers, advising them relative to transfer and establishment of units and related problems. The welfare officer had the freedom of the unit and was promised continued tenure of office for the promotion of long-term planning.¹⁸ In carrying out his work the welfare officer sought to understand the needs of the men. The question "How can we help you?" was to be his guide. Above all, he was instructed to go among the troops and not to sit behind a desk.¹⁹ The welfare officer made periodic reports on his work, sometimes as often as twice per month. These reports included criticisms and suggestions for the program.²⁰

The welfare officer was provided with an elaborate handbook which served as a guide for his work. This was a service manual in looseleaf form which was constantly revised to include new materials. Monthly supplements were provided.²¹ This *Handbuch der Wehrbetreuung* (Handbook of Welfare) was published by the *Luftwaffenführungsstab* (Ic/VIII) and comprised in final form six volumes. The first four volumes dealt with various materials for use in lectures and as general information. These were as follows:

- Band I(Group A)—*Wehrwille und Wehrerziehung*
- Band II (Groups B, Bb)—*Deutschland und Italien*
- Band III (Groups C,D,E,F,)—*England, Frankreich, Russland, Neutrale Länder*
- Band IV (Groups G,H,J,K)—*Amerika, Naturkunde, Technik und Verkehr*

Volume V dealt with the materials known as "*Bilder der Woche*" ("picture of the week"), which will be discussed below. Volume VI was given over to "*Technik der Wehrbetreuung*" (Technique of Welfare Work) and dealt with methods, bibliographies, lists of aids, and availability of materials.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁸ AI-12, TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in the GAF."

¹⁹ AI-12, E 124, "Richtlinien fuer die Wehrbetreuung" (issued by Luftgaustab, z.b.v. Afrika, Abt. II/Wb., 19 Feb. 1943).

²⁰ AI-12, E 172, *op. cit.*

²¹ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 22.

Y/7H/46, "R.d.L., Chef der Luftfahrt, L W Zentralamt (ZA)."

¹² In the *Luftwaffe* the *Luftgau* or "Air Region" was an administrative command concerned with supply and personnel matters. It was a static command over a geographical region. The *Luftflotte* or "Air Fleet" was a major operational unit.

¹³ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 4-9; AI-12, TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in the GAF."

¹⁴ AI-12, X/3E/17, "Approximate Rank of Chief Officers and Officials in a Luftflotte"; AI-12, 2 Abt., II/D, "Welfare."

¹⁵ Lv. Bl. No. 32, 22 July 1940, figure 904, quoted in *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, June 1941, p. 15; AMWIS, No. 219, 13 Nov. 1943, "Education in Nazi Principles in the German Armed Forces," p. 21.

¹⁶ AMWIS, No. 219, 13 Nov. 1943, "Education in Nazi Principles in the German Armed Forces," p. 22.

Materials were listed in a series M1-M6 according to subject matter.²² This book probably dates from early 1941 since an order from OKL *Führungsstab*, Ic dated 7 March 1941 refers to the fact that it had not at that time been provided for all officers.²³

In addition to the Handbook the welfare officer had at his disposal wireless sets, moving picture apparatus, books, newspapers, magazines, games equipment, musical instruments, and athletic equipment. He was, therefore, in a position to provide or sponsor lectures, concerts, theatricals, films, broadcasts, reading periods, handicrafts, and various competitions in the artistic and cultural fields as well as in sports.²⁴ A *Luftgau* file captured in Tunis listed materials arranged under headings as follows:

- (a) *Decorations for Quarters*—large-scale photographs of Field Marshal Kesselring and Oberst Moelders, the German ace.
- (b) *Reading for Morale*—a complete set of the *Führer's* orders from 11 January 1940, Clausewitz's *Geist und Tat*.
- (c) *Current News*—newspapers, wireless sets, loudspeakers, maps of the Russian Front.
- (d) *Entertainment*—radio, dance music (phonograph records), accordions, mouth organs, guitars, mandolins, party games, cards, chess, table tennis, Halma, Skat.
- (e) *Textbooks*—on commerce, agriculture, and technical trades.
- (f) *Writing Materials*.
- (g) *Outdoor Games*—footballs, medicine balls, punch balls, and boxing gloves.
- (h) *Individual*—one order for an oil painting set.²⁵

In times of emergency, as on the Eastern Front during the winter, special provision was made to minister to the needs of front-line troops. Sponsorships were undertaken by army corps headquarters and other rear echelons, non-combatant troops giving up for the use of front-line men a part of their weekly issue of special rations such as tobacco and liquor; front-line rest centres were set up, providing rest and relaxation without normal

²² AI-12, A 167, 167a, b, c, d, e, *Handbuch der Wehrbetreuung* (issued by LW *Führungsstab* Ic/VIII, undated).

²³ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, June 1941, p. 28.

²⁴ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 3; AI-12, TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in the G.A.F."

²⁵ AMWIS, No. 197, 12 June 1943, "Welfare in GAF," p. 19.

leave wherever this was possible; field hospitals made special efforts to care for the welfare of the men, so that men permanently disabled and leaving the Army would not return home in bad spirit.²⁶

The central supply of materials for welfare work was located at 7 Leipzigerstrasse, Berlin, requisitions for issue being made through channels. When transferred units left behind for the use of their successors such supplies and equipment as were on hand. New units, of course, were supplied afresh. The despatch, storage, and distribution of materials were closely regulated. Materials were held as stock except for expendable items such as newspapers, folders, pictures, brochures, and playing cards. Local materials might be drawn upon in special instances.²⁷ All materials were prorated to units according to the number of men in each. These ratios, however, were subject to change in accordance with the prevailing conditions. Thus the ratio of newspapers to men was ten per unit of 150 men at first, though this was later reduced to six per 150 men. Any additional copies in excess of the allotment were to be procured at the expense of the men themselves. Periodicals were also supplied, though no ratio is mentioned in this case. Reading material in folders was supplied at the ratio of one folder to sixty men. Wireless sets were furnished at the ratio of one to forty men, later one to twenty men. Field libraries were set up on the basis of one to two books per man, and games were provided at the ratio of one game to ten men, not including sets of playing cards. Musical instruments were issued according to the number of musicians in the unit, but always sparingly.²⁸ Motor transport was allotted according to needs and availability.²⁹ Under front line conditions, welfare officers were obliged to work with whatever materials were available. Thus a report from Africa early in 1943 complains of the difficulties in transportation

²⁶ AMWIS, No. 219, 13 Nov. 1943, "Education in Nazi Principles in the GAF," p. 22.

²⁷ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 10-16; AI-12, TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in GAF."

²⁸ AI-12, TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in GAF." See also AI-12, E 172, *op. cit.*; *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 17-18; AI-12, E 124, *op. cit.*

²⁹ See order of OKL *Führungsstab* Ic, B, Nr. 1350/41, (VIII), FS, BKK, No. 61, 4 Feb. 1941, quoted in *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, June 1941, p. 17.

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³² KDF
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and production which have seriously curtailed supplies of materials for welfare work.³⁰

As stated above, the welfare officer divided his work into (a) military indoctrination, and (b) supervision of off-duty hours. A somewhat detailed discussion of the programs offered under each of these heads follows.

Military indoctrination was conducted through (a) the use of published materials, (b) the "comradeship hours" on the wireless, and (c) lectures. Publications used were the Handbook (already discussed above), the *Bilder der Woche* (consisting mostly of propaganda from the home scene), special bulletins (to be passed on when read), various periodicals and magazines, map supplements (*Lesemappe* on the military situation), and pictures for wall decoration (consisting usually of pictures of Hitler, Goering, and the air aces).

The *Bilder der Woche* represented a very special instructional device. They were called "*Wandzeitungen*," or poster pictures, and an entire volume was devoted to this material in the Handbook as has been mentioned above. *Bilder der Woche* usually dealt with informational subjects about the German homeland, not only historical and economic, but also cultural.³¹

The "comradeship hours" were broadcasts over the "*Soldatensender*" (soldier's radio) and consisted of special radio programs of an artistic form. These were especially formed to promote *Cameraderie* among the troops and with friendly civilians. Men were encouraged to listen regularly.

Lectures were provided on political subjects by the "*Frontredner*" (front speakers) of the Party. Military subjects were treated by speakers from the Military Lecture Organization of the Department of Military Policy and Military Science in OKW. The office of Adult Education of KDF³² supplied lectures for light subjects. The *Luftwaffe* had its own lecturers who spoke mostly to civilian employees on national policy. Lectures were especially stressed during winter months. Welfare officers were responsible for making all arrangements and schedules. Officers were obliged to attend lectures along with the troops.³³ The

³⁰ AI-12, E 124, *op. cit.*

³¹ *Handbuch der Wehrbetreuung, Band: Bilder der Woche; Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 23.

³² KDF is the German abbreviation for "Kraft durch Freude," the cultural and recreational organization within the Labor Front.

welfare officer himself gave lectures to the men, these being followed by discussion periods. Typical subjects covered were "Women as representatives in national life," "Vocation and work as the purpose of existence," "The party as representative of a spiritual movement," "Religion and the national philosophy," and the current military situation.³⁴

Military indoctrination was also accomplished through reading matter, such as the special welfare bulletins, books, periodicals, maps, and other printed materials.³⁵ The German Army Library Service was centered in the *Heeresbücherei*, Berlin, a library containing some 400,000 volumes and 250,000 maps. Books were available free of charge to all members of the Armed Forces and were drawn through headquarters. Each *Wehrkreis* (Army district) also had its library, and there were additional army libraries at Prague and Wien. But the welfare program among the troops depended mostly upon the local troop libraries, which were under the immediate jurisdiction of the welfare officers.³⁶ Front libraries and bookshops were provided by the Division for Special Cultural Tasks of the Reich Propaganda Ministry, subject to the approval of the Army. The Red Cross and Labour Front also furnished books.³⁷ The *Zentralamt, Ministerialbüro* of RDL (*Chef der Luftfahrt*) had its own press, which supplied the public press with printed matter on the *Luftwaffe* under the supervision of *LW Führungsstab* Ic (*LW Press*) and later of the *NS Führungsstab*. It published all restricted and certain other

³³ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 33-39; *ibid.*, June 1941, pp. 24-25. *Luftwaffe* lecturers were classified as *Reichsredner* and *Luftgauredner*. The KDF speakers were furnished by the "Reichsamt Deutsche Volksbildungswerk" of the *NS Gemeinschaft "Kraft durch Freude."* The OKW military lecture organization was called "*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften*." Little mention has been made of the NSDAP *Frontredner* after 1942. *Germany: Handbook*, Annex VI, E, pp. 651-652.

³⁴ AMWIS, No. 219, 13 Nov. 1943, "Education in Nazi Principles in the German Armed Forces," p. 22.

³⁵ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 20-53.

³⁶ LFD/INT/I(a)/OMN/127/44, 14 Nov. 1944, "The German Army Library Service" (taken from the *Oertzenscher Taschenkalander*, 1942). There were also a few libraries open to selected groups only, such as for students of medicine.

³⁷ *Germany: Handbook*, Annex VI, E, p. 652.

Luftwaffe orders and controlled the *Feldpost* and Courier Services.³⁸

The Front Libraries were of numerous types, ranging from station unit libraries through the *Luftrat* field libraries (consisting of portable cases of fifty books each, twenty such cases making a complete library unit), *Luftwaffe* field libraries (containing books in packages of thirty each furnished by certain private firms), the *Klein-Reihen* series (light reading), the *Reclam* field book cases (for smaller units, 100 books to the case), and expendable issues of light material (furnished in packages of fifty books each, such as *Lesestoff für Horst und Bunker*). There were also the Field Technical Series (consisting of fifty select books on "work groups") and special editions of the "Airmen's Library," the *Soldatenbücherein*. To these must be added gift books and books obtained through private purchases.³⁹ Library materials were provided for front line soldiers when possible in a "*Frontbuchwagen*," which was a specially equipped motor truck.⁴⁰ The common periodicals supplied were the following: *Illustrierte Beobachter*, *Berliner Illustrierte*, *Kolonie und Heimat*, *Die Woche*, *Koralle*, *Filmwelt*, *Deutsche Wochenschau*, *Die weite Welt*, *Adler*, *Luftwelt*, *Der deutsche Sportflieger*, *Der Wehrmacht*. There were also various specialized journals.

Military indoctrination was also furthered through psychological welfare activities, this work being in the hands of special medical officers. No details concerning this work have been found.⁴¹

Censorship played its part in military indoctrination in a negative way. While the subject of censorship is not treated in this study, it should be mentioned that German censorship was essentially political and was not predicated solely upon military necessity as was the case of the censorship imposed upon the British and American armies. German censorship covered private mail, war reports and articles written by service men, films, military treatises, army libraries, radios, telegraphs and telephones. The chief aim of censorship was

³⁸ AI-12, Y/7H/45, "R.d.L., Chef der Luftfahrt, Zentralamt Ministerialbüro."

³⁹ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 40-53.

⁴⁰ See photograph in *Deutschland im Kampf*, (42 volumes, Verlagsanstalt Otto Stolberg, Berlin, 1939-1944), 105-108, p. 144.

⁴¹ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 92-96.

"the suppression of all subversive matter to and from the forces and the detection of all expressions of disaffection and seditious sentiment both of Germans and non-Germans in the armed forces or auxiliary organizations."⁴² No evidence has been found to illustrate the role of the welfare officer in regard to censorship, though his successor, the *NS-Führungssoffizier* (National Socialist Leadership Officer) was active in this role.⁴³

As director of off-duty hours the welfare officer was in charge of cabaret and theater schedules, group singing and choirs, wireless and musical instruments, films, handicrafts, and sports. Cabaret and theatrical performances were chiefly furnished by the KDF under an arrangement made with OKW in 1938, this organization having been given the task "of providing for the cultural welfare of the troops in the training camps."⁴⁴ Orchestras, musical shows, and dramatic groups visited installations on schedules arranged by the welfare officer.⁴⁵ The troops of course had their own activities along these lines. Singing and choirs were encouraged and the *Luftrat* provided courses of fourteen days duration for the training of song leaders. These courses were under the supervision of the *Zentralamt*, as has been pointed out above.⁴⁶ Musical instruments and the wireless provided additional entertainment for the troops. Wireless sets were rationed carefully and could be used only at definite times. The care and maintenance of sets was the responsibility of the welfare officer. Musical instruments were scarce and evidently not widely distributed.

Film equipment might be owned by the unit itself or by the Reich Propaganda Office, the *Luftwaffe*, PK units, the *Luftrat*, or by other authorities. Welfare officers were responsible for the care of the equipment. Film was supplied by the Film Division of the Reich Propaganda Office, by Operations Staff, Ic/VI, by loan arrangement.

⁴² Germany: *Handbook*, Annexe VI, A, p. 659; *ibid.*, pp. 660-662. For instructions to officers upon this, among other subjects, see AI-12, F 21, "*Offiziersbesprechung*" (Lecture notes for Officers dealing with Morale, Discipline, Security, etc., undated).

⁴³ Late in 1943 and early in 1944 steps were taken to appoint special National Socialist Leadership Officers who gradually took over most welfare functions.

⁴⁴ MIRS/OCC-CI/25/44, "National Socialist Indoctrination Officer," p. 4.

⁴⁵ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, June 1941, p. 40; *ibid.*, Sept. 1942, par. 54-80.

⁴⁶ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, June 1941, p. 45.

ment with film companies, and by purchase. Operations Staff Ic/VI furnished all newsreels. No charge was made for admission to the showings, and civilians attached to the unit and living within the unit area might also attend.

In regard to handicrafts, courses for this work were given under the *Luftgau* Commands, instructors being furnished by the KDF. Little other information is available upon this work. Sports equipment was furnished through the sports officer of the higher command and programs and competitions were arranged. Examples of equipment furnished have been listed above in the case of the *Luftgau* list taken in North Africa. Under special arrangement the welfare officer might purchase additional athletic equipment.⁴⁷

Vocational-educational instruction was mentioned above as having been stressed in the *Wehrmacht* during the days of the Weimar Republic. Under the Nazi regime OKW set up a special organization to promote vocational training called *Berufsförderungswerk der Wehrmacht* which in 1940 began the issue of the "Soldatenbriefe" (Soldier's Letters) and later issued small bound volumes called "*Tornisterschriften*" (knapsack pamphlets). Fifty-six of these had been published by late 1943. Correspondence courses were offered for many trades, examinations and certificates of proficiency being given. Special courses for university students were established in 1943.⁴⁸ The object of vocational training was to further the airman's preparation for a civilian occupation. It was organized within the *Luftgau* commands under superintendents who cooperated with the welfare officers in the lower echelons. "Work groups" were formed within the units. Materials used were the *Soldatenbriefe* (trade pamphlets), technical books (from the front libraries and other libraries, though the individual soldier might

possess his own texts), and various other technical materials from the field libraries.⁴⁹ Special courses are mentioned for noncommissioned officers about to be retired to civilian occupations.⁵⁰

The *Soldatenheime*, also called "Armed Forces Institutes," were special establishments for the convenience of soldiers established in all branches of the *Wehrmacht*. In the *Luftwaffe* they were managed by the *Luftgaukommandos* as a part of the welfare program. They contained recreation and dining halls, game rooms, writing rooms, libraries, sleeping quarters for transients, canteens, and other facilities for the comfort and welfare of troops. The KDF companies also used these facilities when on their tours. Expenses of the *Soldatenheime* were borne by the Reichs Treasury.⁵¹ The connection of the welfare officer with these establishments is not clear.

A word should be added concerning the chaplain in the German Armed Forces. All clergy were under control of OKW and were classified as (a) active *Wehrmachtpfarrer* (permanent army chaplains) and (b) *Kriegspfarrer* (chaplains enlisted for the duration of the war). At the beginning of the war the establishment provided for one Protestant and one Roman Catholic chaplain to each division. Later, however, more recently created divisions such as the *Luftwaffe Felddivisionen* and the *Volgsgrenadierdivisionen* had no establishment for chaplains⁵². According to another source, no chaplains were admitted to the Army after September 1942.⁵³ Chaplains are not mentioned in the *Handbuch der Wehrbetreuung*. Their relation to the welfare officer is obscure.

There is no doubt that the welfare organization offered abundant channels for the Nazification of the *Luftwaffe*. Through the various agencies and facilities as well as through the type of materials

⁴⁷ For general information on these subjects, see *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 54-80; also AI-12, TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in the G.A.F."

⁴⁸ *Germany: Handbook*, Annexe VI, E, pp. 648-649. In 1938 vocational education was given the status of an *Abteilung* in OKW and renamed *Wehrmachtsfachschulwesen*. Dr. Valentine Beyer became head of this *Abteilung* as a major general. He stressed ideological training and published a reader called *Mein Vaterland* as well as various pamphlets called *Bausteine*, which were intended to color the program with political indoctrination. *Ibid.*, p. 648.

⁴⁹ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 81-86; AI-12, TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in the G.A.F."

⁵⁰ AI-12, E 125, "1. Fernbetreuung laengerdienender Uffz." (and) "2. Ueberlieferung mit Unterrichtsmaterial" (Reichsministerium der Luftfahrt, 11 March 1943).

⁵¹ *Die Wehrbetreuung der Luftwaffe*, Sept. 1942, par. 87-91; AI-12, TA 13, "Maintenance of Morale in the G.A.F."

⁵² CSDIC, PW Paper No. 68, 1945.

⁵³ CSDIC, PW Paper No. 60, 1945.

furnished, the Party had a many-sided contact with the soldier. During the winter of 1939-1940 welfare work within the Army was not especially political in outlook, "but as the intensity of the war increased, political indoctrination became more and more important." This development culminated in the appointment of the *NS-Führungs-offiziere* early in 1944. These officials generally

displaced the ordinary welfare officers and gave increasing impetus to political indoctrination.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ A discussion of these trends in relation to the Welfare Organization is found in MIRS/OCC-CI/25/44, "National Socialist Indoctrination Officer" and in *Germany: Handbook*, Annexe VI, E, app. II, p. 655. After October 1941 a course in "National Political Instruction" was regularly given to all company commanders.

NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOUTHERN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The Southern Sociological Society held its Ninth Annual Meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia, on May 17-18. The Society has a membership of 245. One hundred and sixty registered for the meeting, and approximately two-thirds of these came from outside the metropolitan area of Atlanta. No meeting was held in 1945, and it is quite likely that the attendance would have been greater had the meeting not been held so near the end of the school year. This was made necessary because of the difficulty of arranging hotel accommodations.

There were section programs on Sociological Aspects of Housing, Teaching of Sociology, Impersonal Factors in the Development of the South, Social Research, and Southern Attitudes and Aspirations. At the evening session on May 17, papers were given by Howard W. Odum, University of North Carolina, on "The Carrying Capacity of Sociology" and by William F. Ogburn, University of Chicago, on "The Shape of Things to Come." Both are former presidents of The American Sociological Society. It was in the nature of a triumphal return for both since they are native Georgians and were formerly associated with higher institutions of learning in their native State.

The officers for 1945-46 are: T. Lynn Smith, Louisiana State University, President; Gordon W. Blackwell, University of North Carolina, First Vice President; Loula Dunn, Alabama State Department of Public Welfare, Second Vice President; Coyle E. Moore, Florida State College For Women, Secretary-Treasurer; Howard W. Beers, University of Kentucky, Representative on the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society; and Morton B. King, Jr., University of Mississippi, and Lorin A. Thompson, University of Virginia, elected members of the Executive Committee.

C. E. M.

PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY HOLDS FIRST MEETING SINCE 1941 AT SAN JOSE, APRIL 19-20

The first annual meeting of the Pacific Sociological Society since 1941 was held at San Jose, California, on April 19 and 20.

The following papers composed the major part of the program: H. Otto Dahlke, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare, Berkeley, "Wartime Rural Migration, Western Specialty Crop Area"; Olaf F. Larson, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare, Portland, "The Rural Rehabilitation Program as an Instrument of Social Change"; Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington, "The Impact of War on Population Trends in the State of Washington"; V. A. Leonard, State College of Washington, "The Social Significance of University Training for the Police"; Joel V. Berreman, State College of Washington, "An Analysis of Japanese War Propaganda"; Ray E. Baber, Pomona College, "Present Trends in Race Relations"; Charles B. Spaulding, Whittier College, "Housing Problems of Minority Groups in Los Angeles County"; Edwin M. Lemert, University of California, Los Angeles, "The Administration of Justice to Minority Groups in Los Angeles County"; T. H. Kennedy, State College of Washington, "Sources of Racial Tension as Seen in the Inland Empire"; Robert O'Brien, University of Washington, "Contrasting Policies in Handling the Nisei in British Columbia and other Sections of the Pacific Northwest."

The *Proceedings* are being published by the Washington State College Press.



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MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

Contributions to this Department will include original articles, reports of conferences, special investigations and research, and programs relating to marriage and the family.

AGING: A FAMILY PROBLEM*

W. R. STANFORD, M.D.

Durham, North Carolina

ONE thinks of the problem of aging as referring to those individuals who are 45 or over. As a matter of fact, the aging process actually begins when the ovum is fertilized. In order to approach this problem in a basic way, this latter definition will be used, because the problem of aging is dependent upon the things which happen to an individual throughout his whole life span. To digress for a moment: medical science has made more progress in the last 75 years than it has in all time prior to this, and for this reason, there are more people living on into the fifth, sixth, and seventh and eighth decades than ever before. In 1850, the average life expectancy at birth was 40 years. This had risen by 1900 to 47 years. The average span of life now is something over sixty. One can readily see how this one fact alone has increased the problems of therapeutic medicine. Unfortunately these individuals have not gone into the home stretch unscathed by the ravages of disease. Many persons whose lives have been extended into this period show marked disabilities, both mental and physical. So, the mere extension of the life span by the work of the medical profession has not been entirely an unmixed blessing. It has, in fact, carried with it tremendous medical problems. To any logical individual it would seem that the next problem for the medical profession would be that of trying to carry these individuals into this latter period in a healthier condition, for it is only in this way that the problem of the aged will be lessened.

Now to get back to the subject at hand. The

first thing to be mentioned is the science of eugenics. This is a science that all of us hear about, very few of us know very much about, and even fewer of us do anything about as far as the breeding of the human race is concerned. Of course, if one were raising cattle, horses, hogs, or dogs, then one would of necessity have to observe certain fundamental laws of eugenics. The days of "scrub" cattle and "pine-rooter" hogs is rapidly disappearing, yet we continue to raise "scrub" people, and probably will for a long time to come, because the young man of today is not paying much attention to the science of eugenics when he falls in love. The fact that heredity has a lot to do with longevity is something that has been known for many years. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the doctor who discovered the cause of childbed fever, made the following classic statement many years ago: "If you are setting out to achieve three score years and twenty, the first thing to be done is, some years before birth, to advertise for a couple of parents both belonging to long-lived families."

It is doubtful that any doctors of today would recommend that the laws of eugenics be followed meticulously, because all of us know that following these laws too closely would destroy something very fine in human relations, but there would certainly be no objection on the part of the medical profession if the youths of today would be a little more sensible in selecting their mates. There are so many inheritable diseases, and these diseases can be accentuated by improper mating. It might be well at this point to mention a few of the inheritable diseases: the tendency towards high blood pressure; epilepsy; certain neurological conditions such as cerebellar ataxia, certain forms

* Read before the Ninth Conference in Conservation of Marriage, and the Family, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, April 10, 1946.

of amblyopia; diabetes; syphilis; and possibly the tendency towards tuberculosis, though this is a debatable point. These are just some of the diseases that make it important that the human race pay more attention to the science of eugenics.

We next come to the actual treatment of the individual, for the kind of treatment that these individuals get from childhood on definitely affects the aging process. Better prenatal care and better childbirth care has tremendously increased the number of viable babies. By cutting down the prevalence of childbed fever and childbirth accidents, the life span of the mother has been increased. The next specialist to be mentioned in connection with the problem is the pediatrician. He looks after the child from birth to the age of 12. The skill of this specialist has had a lot to do with getting these children through this dangerous period. The pediatrician has not only done a wonderful work from a therapeutic standpoint, but also from a prophylactic standpoint. His prophylactic and therapeutic treatments of infant diarrhea are monuments to his skill. With injections of diphtheria toxoid, he could wipe diphtheria from the face of the globe. Typhoid vaccines have made typhoid almost non-existent. These are just a few of the diseases that prophylactic medicine has conquered; there are many others. In the way of explanation, it is proper to say that neither typhoid nor diphtheria is confined to children, and especially is this true of typhoid; in fact, prophylactic war against typhoid has to be waged throughout the entire span of life, but the pediatrician is the man who starts the waging of this war.

There are many other things that the pediatrician does which have direct bearing upon the aging process. Though some doctors question this, most of us feel that removal of focal infection in children has much to do with the cut-down in some of the diseases of later life. The better care of poliomyelitis, both by the pediatrician and the orthopedist, has greatly lessened the crippling effects of this dread disease. The better feeding of these children by the pediatrician has almost made rickets a rare disease. Scurvy is scarcely ever seen. One could go on and on talking about the work of the modern pediatrician and his co-workers, the obstetrician and the orthopedist, but it would seem that enough has been said to show some of the part that these men play in increasing the life span of the individual.

After the pediatrician finishes with these patients the internist takes over, and it is his problem to carry these individuals through the difficult period known as adolescence. He has some problems in prophylactic medicine, but these problems have usually been greatly lessened by the work of the pediatrician, and his problem is mainly one of psychosomatic medicine. That is, he has to administer therapy for any physical ills that arise, and he should be able to advise these youngsters along psychic lines, or if he is not equipped to do this, then he should refer them to the proper specialist. These youngsters between the ages of 12 and 20 are subject to almost all of the acute infectious diseases, and naturally when these diseases occur they have to be treated; they are also going through a transition period, both physically and mentally, and it is in this period that that dread disease, schizophrenia, often begins to manifest itself. The prophylaxis and therapy of this disease are at present in the main the job of a psychiatrist, and it is important that the internist advise these youngsters properly, and most important of all, put them into the hands of the mental specialist at as early a period as possible. It should not be thought that every adolescent with a mental problem needs to see a psychiatrist; in fact, this might do more harm than good, especially if the youngster is not put into the hands of an understanding psychiatrist; unfortunately, psychiatry as a whole has been in such a state of flux, and there have been so many schools of thought that one should be very careful in selecting a specialist in this field. It is to be hoped that the psychiatrist of tomorrow will have his feet a little more soundly placed on solid ground; but there are many excellent men in this field today, and if one uses discretion, the difficulties I have mentioned can be easily avoided.

The problem of venereal disease often crops up in this period. The dangers of these diseases are still great, and here, too, prophylactic medicine is the best type of medicine; in other words, it is better for young people to avoid venereal disease than to have it. The Federal Government with its treatment centers is doing a tremendous job, and is doing it well. Tuberculosis is another disease of this period, and here, also, prophylactic medicine is playing its part, and the "great white plague" is definitely on the wane. The treatment of this disease is too technical to be discussed here; it suffices to say that rest, good food, and fresh air

are the cornerstones of the therapy of this disease, and one of the most important things is the protection of the rest of the population from these infected individuals. This is accomplished largely by isolation and good personal hygiene.

The 20-30 year period will be passed over, not because it is unimportant, but because it is not possible to discuss all these periods in detail. The 30-50 period will be touched upon only lightly. This might be known as the "storm and stress" period as far as the male of the species is concerned, because it is in this period that he engages in that mad scramble for success or failure in the business or professional world. It is the period of hard work, long hours, and little recreation; and it is in the latter part of this period that the disease known as coronary occlusion really begins to make its appearance. It is a tragic thing to see these individuals flushed with financial success and ready to live, as far as worldly things are concerned, but bankrupt physically. It would seem proper here to mention an example of this type of thing. The individual referred to had been a successful business man; he sold his business, retired, and planned to enjoy life, but while doing some unusually hard physical exercise he had a coronary occlusion; he is now a semi-invalid. The thought to be drawn from this is that all work and no play not only makes Jack a dull boy, it often makes him a sick boy.

There are many things which can be done in this period to make the aging problem less difficult. It is often still not too late to correct certain physical defects that have escaped the vigilant eyes of the doctors in those earlier periods, but a proper mixture of work and play through this period, and a hobby that has nothing to do with the business of the individual are very helpful things. Of course, the female of the species also has her problems during this period: childbirth, business worries, and many of the same things which trouble the male. It might be well to mention here two other diseases which occur in this period: gall-bladder disease which affects both male and female, and benign prostatic hypertrophy which affects the male. We also have the change-of-life period, which affects the male to a lesser degree than the female.

Now we come to the 50 year-on period. This is the period most people recognize as the real aging period. It is from this period on that one is subject to all the diseases that afflict the aged.

Of course, one in this period is still subject to the infectious diseases such as influenza, pneumonia, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, and many others. In this period also there is an increasing amount of cardiovascular disease. One sees coronary occlusions, apoplexy, arteriosclerosis with all its attending disabilities such as gangrene, senile dementia, locomotive disturbances, etc. From this period on one sees more and more cancer, and while the fight against this disease has been hard-fought, it is still not won, for the cure of this disease depends in the large percentage of cases upon its utter destruction, so it has to be attacked in its early stages. Radium and x-ray have played a tremendous part in its therapy, but complete surgical extirpation is still the surest therapeutic measure for many of these growths. There have been certain therapeutic measures devised which tend to slow the growth of some of these malignancies. X-ray and radium have been mentioned; more recently, castration or the use of female hormone therapy has been found to slow the growth of carcinoma of the prostate, and it is thought by some observers that castration of the female by x-ray slows the growth of certain tumors which occur in women. But I repeat that the fight against cancer has not been won, and the most important thing is the early discovery of these growths.

The next disease to be mentioned is diabetes. This disease is likely to occur any time during the whole span of life, and, as said before, it is an inheritable disease. For that reason, no person who has diabetes in his family should marry into another diabetic family. The diabetes of the aged as a rule is much milder than in the younger individual, and with modern methods of diabetic treatment there is no reason why the diabetic of today should not live out his normal span of life. Of course, there are certain accidents to which these individuals are subject and which might make this impossible, but proper diabetic treatment if begun in time will usually obviate such developments.

There are certain other dietary and vitamin deficiency diseases which are prone to occur in the aged, though they, too, may occur any time during life. One has only to call attention to the things which have occurred in the Japanese and German prison camps to realize that this is true. The nutritional and vitamin deficiencies may occur in the aged in two ways. In the first place these

people often get insufficient nourishment and insufficient amounts of vitamins. This may be due to the financial status of the individual but is often due to his finicky and unnatural appetite. It is not at all unusual to have certain individuals who are well able to afford a sufficient diet come in with a story of eating no meat and practically no green vegetables or fruits. The second reason for their failure to get proper diet and vitamins is the inability of the individual to absorb certain essential nutritional and vitamin elements. For this reason one often sees vitamin deficiencies in people who supposedly eat adequate diets. The list of deficiency diseases is fairly long: pernicious anemia, whose etiology has only been discovered in recent years, is due to the failure of the stomach to secrete an intrinsic factor. This factor combines with an extrinsic factor obtained from the food and this in turn is absorbed and stored in the liver. This is the reason why injection of liver extract will restore these people to a fairly normal level. Pellagra, beri-beri, scurvy, and sprue are some of the other well-known deficiency diseases.

The psychological therapy of the aged is one of the most neglected branches of medicine. I am not referring especially to the psychoses which occur in this period, though they have their place and have to be reckoned with. One of the most pathetic members of this group is senile dementia which is a symptom of arteriosclerosis. These tragic individuals get to be little more than vegetables; they live; they eat; they drink; they excrete; in fact, they just exist, and yet the care of these individuals is a tremendous problem both from the physician's standpoint and from the nursing standpoint. All physicians see many of these people, but while the psychotic group is important, it is not the group which will be given most attention here. Instead, the problem of the normal individual will be presented. We think of this individual in a happy, well-rounded home, living from day to day, subject to the little inconveniences that occur in the normal home, and yet with enough pleasure on the credit side of the ledger to make him a happy, contented person. But, there comes a time in the lives of these people when their homes are broken up and their whole routine of life is destroyed. From then on until the end of the row, they remain tragic, lonely, forgotten figures, existing in a world that has nothing in common with them. There is much similarity between these people and the lone pine

left in an open field. They have nothing in common with the people with whom they associate. Of course, these individuals do not have to be left alone in order to be unhappy; for some reason or other some of them are not able to carry on in their business; they become misfits in their family, and for various reasons become very unhappy people.

The doctor who treats this group cannot expect to achieve good results by simply giving these patients a prescription. A doctor skilled in the art of geriatrics knows that he must look into every aspect of this patient's medical history in regard to heredity, environment, and in fact into every nook and corner of this patient's living conditions. He not only has to treat him physically but he has to treat him mentally, and, if he is the kind of doctor he should be, he should treat him spiritually. These people should be told how to eat; how to sleep; how to exercise; and how to rest. Their habits should be thoroughly inventoried. It is important that all these people develop hobbies; things they are interested in but not necessarily things the doctors are interested in. In fact, I think it would be fine if every individual regardless of his age would develop a hobby which would be mild enough to be carried on through the years. In other words, the hobby should not be so strenuous as to make it impossible to carry on when the infirmities of age come to the individual. The personal hygiene of these individuals is important and should not be neglected. It is important to remember that they should not only have physical comfort; they should have contentment of mind. It is up to the medical profession to do everything in its power to accomplish this end. Sir William Osler had a formula which in substance was this: he lived in the present; he did not carry yesterday's troubles over into today; and he did not borrow tomorrow's troubles. This is a difficult thing to carry out, but it is a wonderful thing to live by. It might be wise to mention a few of the things these old people can do: woodcarving, reading, fishing, golf, checkers, chess, and painting are some of the things which appeal to this group.

In conclusion it would seem proper to speak briefly about mental and physical training. Up to now our educational system has paid much more attention to the mental training of the individual. It would not be proper to belittle either phase of this training, in spite of the fact that the poet has said that "where ignorance is

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bliss, 'tis folly to be wise". Most of us believe that education in a well-rounded life offers much more chance of happiness to the individual than he could possibly achieve without it, for it is knowledge that sets one free. However, the human race has definitely reached the point where it is going to have to pay more attention to its physical education than it ever has before, because the health of the body is dependent upon a proper mixture of rest and exercise throughout the whole life span. For this reason we should establish in

the sixth grade of every school in this country a proper physical education program which should be carried on through high school and college, and following college the people who have to do with the health of this nation should outline a program which could be carried on throughout the whole span of life. All these things which have been mentioned so far, and many others, should be done if we expect to carry these aging individuals into the home stretch healthy and mentally alert.

COURTSHIP AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930 TO 1945

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THERE are very few topics in the United States that elicit the interest of the layman more than courtship activities. People not only like to hear about courtship, but they are constantly seeking advice concerning their own or friends' courtship problems. In response to this interest we find volumes of printed pages and speeches—much of it intended to counsel the "courter" or "courted." Very little of this offered advice is based upon scientific observation and study. The sociologists have attempted to study the family scientifically, but have done little in the field of courtship. The possibility of contributing to a better understanding of human interaction in this field and thus making the advice given young people more sound seems reason enough to the writer to justify the social scientists' giving it attention. The opportunities of studying the sociological aspects of human interaction such as social change, social control, and diffusion offer a second reason for studying courtship.

A study of courtship patterns as a social institution makes it possible to reach certain conclusions which can be used in the field of counseling or in the field of pure sociology. Through such an approach we have a frame of reference for comparing courtship patterns with other parts of our culture and for analyzing their functioning. The purpose of this paper is to present some of the results arising out of such a study.

Information for description and analysis of courtship as a social institution was sought in all

available publications, through interviews, and observations. A time period between 1930 and 1945 was arbitrarily chosen. Since many publications about courtship are not scientific and observations and interviews need confirmation through further research, the following conclusions must be tentative and subject to change by further research. They do, however, furnish definite points of departure for work in this field.

A social institution has been defined as "habitual ways of living together which have been sanctioned, systematized, and established by the authority of communities."¹ Social organizations and material equipment are not included in the definition, but it is recognized that most institutions, in fulfilling their necessary functions, operate through a certain number of definite associations or organizations and need certain physical equipment.² Some of the more common characteristics of a social institution around which the following comparison and discussion are organized are: all institutions center about the more basic needs of mankind; they pattern biological, socio-organizational, and psychological activities of human beings, as well as man's reactions to the physical equipment; and they function as units within the cultural system.

¹ Charles A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1936), p. 91.

² Joyce O. Hertzler, *Social Institutions* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1929), ch. III.

The results of the study are as follows: First, courtship patterns appear to be developing into a social institution in response to needs which were formerly but are no longer adequately satisfied through other institutions, especially the home. Since new courtship patterns are an outgrowth of patterns once attached to other institutions, it is logical that some of the old patterns are to be found among and part of the new. The analysis has shown this to be true. The new patterns tend to center about three major needs: first, young people's need of knowing how, when entering courtship, to organize and express their new interest in heterosexual activities; second, the necessity of adapting the drive for sexual stimulation and satisfaction to the changing culture of the United States; third, the need for direction in selecting a mate.

Consistent with the general pattern for social change, the patterns of courtship which are farthest removed from the mores of society have been subjected to the greatest alteration. Evidence of this can be seen in the changes in dating patterns which have taken place during the past several decades. To mention only a few, we note the "blind date," "Dutch date," "pin-up," request for dates by girls, disappearance of the chaperon, and dating in automobiles.

Less independent of the older patterns of courtship once supervised by the home are the new patterns related to the selection of a mate. Although numerous changes have appeared in the selection standards, the influence of the home is still evident. It no longer dictates selection; but many people feel that its approval, though only given implicitly by its failure to object to new in-laws, is necessary. The influence of the church is also still noticeable.

Lagging behind these patterns in change and still overladen with traditional ways of behavior are the patterns centering around sex. The majority of the written advice to youth on sex and closely related problems follows the moral code of the past century. Actual practices, however, are quite different. Most sexual activities (necking, petting, sexual intercourse) are still carried on in a *sub rosa* manner. These patterns of activity have not yet been institutionalized. They seem to be accepted by the younger generation but not by the older.

Courtship patterns not only vary in the degree of their acceptance by society, but also differ in

comparison with other institutions in the amount of patterning done in the various realms of activity and in the use of organizations and equipment.³ We find a number of variations in the activities related to the biological nature of man. There are patterns which define age, sex, and racial makeup of the membership of various groups. There are also directions for biological interaction among the participants. Those related specifically to sex, however, are in a state of transition and are therefore not very effective. Dancing, physical contests, group singing, and similar activities, on the other hand, seem to be relatively well regulated. Patterns concerning health are only indirectly related to courtship through the emphasis given it in the selection standards.

A noticeable omission of patterning of activity motivated by physical changes is the lack of rites of passage directing entrance into courtship.

Courtship differs from most institutions in its socio-organizational aspects in that it has no organizations of its own to promote its goals. Boys and girls belong to many organizations, but these are explicitly organized around other interests such as education and religion. Attainment of courtship values is considered a by-product. The only exceptions are the marriage bureau, which is still stigmatized by scandal and which assumes that its members have failed in courtship, and certain counseling agencies, very few in number, which are interested in aiding young people in their courtship. The new type of date bureau, another possible nucleus for an explicit courtship organization, does not go beyond the function of finding friends.

Courtship patterns provide statuses for the participants. The rights and duties are organized around two major types of statuses: (1) the position of the individual within the courtship process, and (2) sex differences. The statuses of position are designated as "unattached," "going steady," "pinned-up," and "engaged." The rights and duties of the male and female statuses are at present undergoing a change; those of the statuses of position are either changing or just developing.

Since courtship has no widespread organizations of its own, there are very few, if any, patterns related to the statuses of leadership, its titles, and its functions. The values of courtship, however,

³ Comparison is based on an outline by Hornell Hart, Social Organizations and Their Structures (mimeographed, October 30, 1943).

exert influence upon the selection of leaders in organizations through which courtship is made possible. The influence as a whole is uncoordinated and subject to the local situation. The closest approximations to such statuses are marriage counselors, teachers, and lecturers interested in leading young people toward desired goals. Those who fill such positions are not usually courtship participants, and their groups are almost always temporary ones.

Though there are no permanent and explicit organizations to further the goals of courtship, we do find patterns of informal groupings among the young people. The groups have no elected leaders but usually have a rating system to indicate the dating desirability of their members. Those most desirable are often the leaders and exert the greatest influence.

It is in these informal groups that patterns for the formulation of purposes and plans are usually found. Discussions known as "bull sessions" are most influential. Provisions for formulation of policy are also found in more formal organizations sponsored by other institutions. Discussion in these groups seem to be less effective in determining policy than the informal discussions, since they are influenced by the patterns of other institutions.

The use of research in courtship is one of the more recent patterns and is not completely developed or wholly accepted by the people. It is carried out by social scientists, and mainly affects college students. Legislation in courtship is unusual—occasionally other institutions impose rules and regulations upon courtship activities by passing a curfew law or prohibiting attendance of the participants.

There are effective patterns of social control in the institution of courtship. They often tend to enforce activities and attitudes which conflict with those of other institutions. The chief methods of control include rewards and penalties, education and indoctrination. Since the participants of courtship have little or no voice in government, they cannot resort to law as a means of social control. It is unusual to find the policies enforced written down in the form of constitutions or by-laws.

Patterns for dealing with other institutions are not well developed. Local factors often determine to what extent courtship groups are recognized as separate units. The fact that many other institutional interests are involved in young people's

organizations makes it difficult for them to deal concertedly with other units. Some of the methods used, although they are not institutionalized, include strikes, reciprocal agreements, coercion, propaganda, and ostracism. Lobbying, legislation, and attack are rarely, if ever, employed. Other institutions are keenly interested in courtship and often attempt to control a maximum of its activities. Such patterns include almost all possible forms of social control.

Most of the types of patterns included in the psychological aspects of an institution are found in courtship. Mental training is provided for each participant in order that he may learn the ideal-typical behavior. Young people's day-dreams often consist of romantic phantasies. Literature is especially effective in arousing and patterning such phantasies. The effect of these mental patterns is seen in many of the goals of courtship. Psychological values are also patterned, as is evident in courtship fashions, thrills, prestige, standard of living, and the like. Standardized methods of achieving security, praise, and recognition, and of being wanted are likewise present.

Patterns for personality formation are found within the courtship institution. The relatively uniform attitudes expressed in the studies concerning the desirable mate picture the ideal husband and wife in regard to personality. These ideal pictures are used as guides by boys and girls in creating their own personalities.

Symbols are a significant part of courtship. Their recognition and use are widespread throughout the United States. The definite psychological responses to jewels, pictures of cupids and hearts, winking, and other similar tokens almost always assure the individual using such symbols the expected reaction. Ceremonies are not as common in courtship patterns as in many other institutions. There are none so widespread as the wedding or the baptism. There are, however, ceremonies common to local and special-interest groups. Entrance into the "pin-up" status, for example, is marked by a special ceremony. It has also been reported that ceremonies are used by groups when couples separate, when they become engaged, and when they meet future "in-laws."

Courtship as an institution makes use of much material equipment in attaining its goals; but as yet it is dependent upon other institutions to provide the equipment and is, therefore, also

dependent upon such institutions to regulate its use. The automobile is considered an essential to courtship. However, rules governing its use usually originate within and are enforced by the home. Sofas, dating parlors, and the like are also essential, but they, too, are used in accordance with the rules of the institution sponsoring them. Exceptions to this are found in certain cities where the young people have raised the necessary money to build "youth canteens" and have their own groups.

Briefly, then, our second general observation shows that courtship as an institution is similar in make-up to other institutions with the following general exceptions: (1) It does not provide patterns for entrance into courtship. (2) It lacks organizations explicitly intended to further courtship goals. (3) It does not have equal status with other institutions in formulating over-all programs. (4) It lacks ceremonies to supplement its activities. (5) It possesses a relatively small amount of control over its material aspects.

The third major observation concerns courtship as a unit. There are numerous conflicts among the various courtship patterns and with the components of culture with which they deal. To be effective (to be able to satisfy human desires, both cultural and innate) culture patterns should be compatible with the components with which institutions deal and should be consistent with each other.⁴

To be compatible, patterns should be adapted to the following components: (1) the *hominid component*, which is the biological human being; (2) the *social component*, which includes the potentialities for social relations as they are affected by "the number of human beings in the situation, their distribution in space, their ages, their sex, their native ability to interstimulate and interact, the interference of environmental hindrances or helps, and the presence and amount of certain types of cultural equipment";⁵ (3) the *environmental component*, or—"all 'natural' features of the situation except the hominid, the social, the psychological and the artifactual components; it includes topography, physiography, flora, fauna, weather, geology, soil, etc.;"⁶ (4) the *psycholog-*

ical component, defined as the principles involving the acquisition and performance of human customs not adequately explained on purely biological principles; (5) the *artifactual component*, which consists collectively of the material results and adjuncts of human customary activities.⁷

Those patterns of courtship which seem to stand out as major problems of compatibility include: (1) the patterns delaying marriage several years after the human body is capable of reproductive functioning; (2) the inability of courtship patterns to provide young people adequate means for meeting the opposite sex in the present social structure; (3) the rights and duties of each sex in light of the biological and psychological factors discovered in the past several decades; (4) the need for rites of passage compatible with the biological, psychological, and social components; (5) the patterns which make inefficient use of the artifactual components—dating parlors, dance halls, sofas, and the like; (6) the malfunctioning of present selection patterns in directing choice of compatible mates; (7) the inability of courtship patterns to adjust to the social phenomena of war and economic depression.

The problem of consistency in courtship involves: (1) consistency of pattern with pattern; (2) consistency of pattern with goal to which it leads; (3) consistency of pattern train (consecutive series of patterns); (4) consistency between full goals; (5) consistency between full goals and orientations (institutions of which they are a part).⁸

Some of the major inconsistencies in courtship are: (1) the conflict between the pattern of mate selection and the pattern of romance; (2) the conflict between the patterns of dating and rating and the goal of producing happy marriages; (3) the conflict, within the same organization, of courtship patterns with patterns of other institutions (for example, conflict of dating with studying); (4) the lack of consistency between the pattern train leading to biological union and the pattern train (part of marriage) including biological union; (5) the conflict between old and new patterns of courtship; (6) the conflict between the patterns and the goals of engagement.

The dependence of courtship upon other institutions to provide organizations through which it can

⁴ John Gillin, "Cultural Adjustment," *American Anthropologist*, XLVI (October-December, 1944), p. 438.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 435.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 434-36.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 441.

function seems to be a major cause for the inconsistencies and incompatibilities now present within it. This is brought about by the insistence of people in other institutions that patterns favorable to their vested interests be included in courtship in return for support of courtship activities. The general lack of integration of culture in the United States is thus reflected in courtship patterns. Another major cause for inconsistency and incompatibility is that courtship as an institution is still in the process of development and many of its patterns are therefore incomplete, unaccepted by society as a whole, or in a state of transition.

The fourth major observation is that many of the new patterns which are being incorporated into the institution of courtship find their genesis among lower-class people of the United States. This phenomenon, which is in contradiction to Tarde's Laws of Imitation,⁹ probably has influence on the intradiffusion of courtship patterns throughout the culture. The prestige and position of the introducer of new patterns hastens acceptance of

them.¹⁰ The lack of prestige among the originators of many courtship patterns indicates that diffusion has been slow, and compensatory factors are needed if the process is to be hastened.

Of the other major factors influencing intra-societal diffusion (recognition of need for and usefulness of new patterns, presence of other patterns which oppose new ones, presence of patterns which already satisfy the needs, and use of force¹¹), the recognition of need and usefulness seems to have been the most important factor causing the past changes. The presence of other patterns which partially satisfy the needs and oppose changes probably retarded the process.

In view of these circumstances, it seems plausible that new courtship patterns will be accepted more rapidly in the future because of their increased acceptance by the higher classes and because of the decreasing efficiency of old patterns to satisfy and oppose. Further acceleration of this process may also be accomplished by an educational program stressing the needs of the present generation and the usefulness of new patterns.

⁹ Gabriel Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*. Tr. by E. C. Parsons (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1903), p. 213.

¹⁰ John L. Gillin and John P. Gillin, *An Introduction to Sociology* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942), p. 154.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-65.

This issue was already in press when word came of the death on August 29, in Arlington, Massachusetts, of ERNEST R. GROVES, editor of the Department on Marriage and the Family in *SOCIAL FORCES*. In June, Boston University had conferred upon Professor Groves an honorary degree and he had recently been elected to a Kenan Professorship in the University of North Carolina.

A special article entitled "Ernest R. Groves and His Work," by Howard W. Odum, together with a bibliography of his many publications—books and articles—is in press for publication in the December issue of *SOCIAL FORCES*.

* * * * *

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, a past president of the American Sociological Society and emeritus professor of sociology in Duke University died on September 25 in Durham, North Carolina. A tribute by one of his colleagues will appear in a subsequent issue of *SOCIAL FORCES*.

RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ALL-NEGRO SOCIETY IN OKLAHOMA*

MOZELL C. HILL

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THIS paper proposes to examine, comparatively, the social structures of the all-Negro society in Oklahoma. The main effort is directed toward an understanding of the formal and informal groupings by which the all-Negro society regulates the life of its individual members as compared with those groupings typical of Negroes residing in bi-racial societies in the South.

The major hypothesis upon which this discussion rests is that there are differences, not only in the personal motivations of individuals residing in isolation from the direct influence of the dominant white society, but, there are in addition, significant differences among Negroes in social organization in respect to class structure, color motivation, family patterns, political and educational structurings, from those Negroes accustomed to living in societies controlled by the superordinate white race. This hypothesis is based upon the premise that Negroes live at a high level of emotional tension in the United States. This tacit assumption stems from the character of race relations in this country which involves a "white superiority-Negro inferiority" character.

It is proposed, therefore, by a comparative examination of the social organization and institutional structures of the all-Negro society; by a comparative study of the personal characteristics of the members who fulfill institutional offices; and by analyzing the interrelations among them as

* This paper is a portion of a dissertation "The All-Negro Society in Oklahoma," submitted to the Faculty of the Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, March 1946.

well as their interaction with whites, that new points of departure and a more fruitful frame of reference will be suggested for a consideration of race relations in the United States.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND CLASS STRUCTURE

Although the members of the all-Negro society constitute a strongly organized "caste-like" group with social sanctions prohibiting intimate outer-caste relation, this racial society is not a homogeneous one. Within its social organization, there is a class hierarchy which is but a value system for differentiating and classifying its members into social ranks. In fact, the society has not only set up various roles or functions of participating members, but has linked with expected roles, degrees of rights, privileges, duties, and power. Thus, the all-Negro society maintains a status system which extends into a class organization.

The class structure of the all-Negro society can best be represented as a pyramid-like structure (Fig. 1). It is convenient to compare the class structure of the all-Negro society with one presented by Warner for whites in "Yankee City" (Fig. 2); and also, to compare the development of class structuring found when the two castes are living in close association (Fig. 3).¹ Figure 1, which represents the class structure of the all-Negro society, is considerably flattened when compared with those for "Yankee City" and "Old

¹ Warner emphasizes that his diagram is not (and neither is Figure 1) intended to portray quantitative organization and relationships. They only indicate the relative positions in vertical space of the societal structures.



FIG. 1. THE PYRAMID STRUCTURE OF THE CLASS ORGANIZATION OF THE ALL-NEGRO SOCIETY




FIG. 2. THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF A WHITE SOCIETY "YANKEE CITY" AS REPRESENTED BY W. LLOYD WARNER AND ASSOCIATES

See W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 88.




FIG. 3. RELATION BETWEEN THE CASTE SYSTEM AND THE CLASS SYSTEM IN A BI-RACIAL SOUTHERN COMMUNITY, "OLD CITY," AS PRESENTED BY W. LLOYD WARNER IN THE INTRODUCTION TO *Deep South* (CHICAGO: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1941) p. 10.

City." This is due to the fact that within the structure of the all-Negro society, there is an underlying equalitarian ideology. The latter is so strong that on the surface there appears to be no class hierarchy. However, upon closer observa-

tion, social classes are found to be present although less sharply defined than in "Old City" and "Yankee City."

In figure 1, it can be observed that only three classes are represented on the diagram—upper, middle, and lower. Also, the upper class and the lower class occupy only a small portion of the pyramid, while the middle class constitutes by far the largest section of the pyramid.

When figure 1 is compared with the Negro pyramid in figure 3, it becomes apparent that the class structures are quite different. In the first place, there are a greater number of persons in the upper class and fewer in the lower classes. In the second place, the middle class, which probably would be defined in the bi-racial society as an upper lower class, maintains, nevertheless, a middle class consciousness. They retain the same respectability usually associated with upper middle class status. The fact that this group constitutes the greatest space on the social pyramid means that the social structuring is different. Finally, no sharp lines can be drawn between the three classes listed in figure 1, because each group shades imperceptibly into the other. This reveals that the all-Negro class structure has much less vertical extension than the class structure in "Old City." Also, it indicates that there is greater mobility and fluidity within the all-Negro class structures when compared with a class system of Negroes living in association with the white caste.

A comparative analysis of these class structures brings into focus several points of differences between the status systems in bi-racial societies in the South and the all-Negro society in Oklahoma. These dissimilar salient features in class motivations stem from the fact that the all-Negro society is relatively free from the constant social pressure of the dominant white society. Moreover, the all-Negro society is characterized fundamentally by an equalitarian ideology which was taken over from the stereotype suggesting a homogeneous Negro group. This idea that "all Negroes are alike" has been manipulated by the residents in the interest of social cohesion. Such common expressions as: "we're all alike here," "we don't have no classes," and "there ain't no differences among us," tend to maintain and strengthen racial and social solidarity. This is obviously a contrast when compared to the social atmosphere among Negroes living in southern bi-racial societies. The class structure of the latter is characterized by a struggle among

Negroes to stress differentiations rather than similarities among themselves.

Another distinctive feature of the class system of the all-Negro society pertains to the upper or elite class consisting of those who have achieved economic security, political influence, and professional status. This group forms an upper class in a truer sense than could be possible in a racially mixed southern community because they literally "run" the affairs of the society. Gunnar Myrdal points out, for example, that in the southern bi-racial community, the dominant white caste has an obvious interest in promoting to positions of leadership and high status, the accommodating Negro who is willing to assist whites in controlling the Negro masses. He shows that leadership conferred upon a Negro by whites is fundamentally directed toward fostering disintegration rather than cohesiveness among Negroes.²

A further point of distinction is that there is a minimum of lower class frustration in the all-Negro society as evidenced by harmonious relations between the lower and upper classes. This is revealed by the ease of inter- and intra-class communication, the low crime rate, and conventional sex mores among the lower classes. In this connection, Myrdal presents a contrasting analysis of lower class Negroes in bi-racial societies by showing that incentives to personal accomplishments and improvements are not favorable; standards of industry and honesty are generally low; aggression and violence are neither rare nor censored by community disapproval; and, the lower-class Negroes little respect for law and justice.³

Still another difference between the class structures is the relatively small amount of exploitation of lower class members of the all-Negro society by those of the upper class. It is notorious that the system of racial etiquette of the South makes it necessary for upper-class Negroes to exploit the lower classes in order to maintain prestige and status with the white caste.⁴ The members of the upper class in the all-Negro society, on the other hand, must minimize the abuse of lower classes in order not to cut off the basis of their own prestige.

² Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1944) pp. 721-729.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 701.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 721.

An additional and more poignant discriminatory feature of the class systems is the incipient middle class consciousness which permeates the entire all-Negro society. Virtually every person thoroughly imbued with the all-Negro ideology is a social conformist. Unconventional behavior is frowned upon and not tolerated. Those who persist in violating the organizational mores of the society are ostracized and often encouraged, and indeed sometimes forced, to leave the community. This unquestionably is not the case for a large percentage of Negroes residing in bi-racial communities in the South. The crucial point of difference in this instance is the fact that in bi-racial communities, only whites would have the power to drive anyone from the community, while in all-Negro communities, the Negro elite can exercise moral mandates independent of whites. This may account for the middle class ideology which pervades among the residents of these racially homogeneous communities.

Finally, the lowest group in the all-Negro society is aware of its potency in the class structure. However, the members make no attempt to organize and become articulate as a class group. Indeed, it would be difficult to organize this lower group, for there are few dissatisfactions and frustrations among them. Moreover, they tend to develop close identifications with members of the upper groups, and accordingly, are friendly toward them.

COLOR MOTIVATION

In their analysis of the importance of complexion in the social structure of Negroes in "Old City," Allison Davis and Burleigh Gardner emphasized the fact that Negroes having the lightest skin, hair of Caucasian type, and other "Nordic" features are accorded the highest position in the class structure of the Negro caste.⁵ This raises the question of the significance of color in the social structure of the all-Negro society. Since the elements of color and physical features have been observed by many social scientists to be important criteria of social differentiation among Negroes in bi-racial societies, the basic question becomes: Do the same factors operate in the class structure when Negroes are living in relative isolation from the white caste? In other words, how does color

⁵ Allison Davis, Burleigh Gardner, and Mary Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 235.

function in class motivation in the all-Negro society in comparison with that of Negroes in bi-racial societies?

As Davis and Gardner discovered in "Old City," it was likewise observed in the all-Negro society, that one's complexion plays an important part in determining the role and "standing" of the individual. Moreover, it was discovered that color has positive symbolic values inherent in the structure of the society, which is, in turn, internalized by individuals. Thus, color is deeply engrained in the ideology of the all-Negro society. However, in contrast to the high status accorded light skin in bi-racial societies, the color structuring in the all-Negro society is slanted so as to disfavor light complexion and to give the preference to the darker brother.

In response to the categories, "Which color would you like best to be," and "Which color would you like least to be," which were included in a color inventory schedule, 417 youth in all-Negro communities show a strong preference to be neither black nor white. In fact, they show a very strong aversion for "extremes" in skin complexion. There is a noticeable difference, however, in the responses of the boys and of the girls. While both sexes strongly favor brown skin as the "best color to be," the male respondents are much less preoccupied with light skin and have less aversion to black skin than do the female adolescents. For example, although 8.1 percent of these youth adjudge their own color to be of light skin, 35.6 percent of the females and only 18.3 percent of the males would choose light complexion as the "best color to be." As regards the color they would "like least to be," none of the male respondents selected brown skin, and only 1.1 percent of the females have a repugnance for the color. By far the majority of both sex groups selected white as the color they would "like least to be"—61.3 and 46.1 for the boys and girls, respectively.

When the color data obtained from 417 boys and girls residing in all-Negro communities are compared with some of the raw data collected by Charles S. Johnson⁶ in the Negro Youth Study, several significant differences in color motivation

are found between all-Negro youth and those residing in southern bi-racial societies. In the first place, it is noted that youth living in southern bi-racial societies have a tendency to estimate their own color much lighter than those residing in the all-Negro society. For instance, almost 60 percent of Johnson's sample rate themselves to be lighter than brown skin, while less than 10 percent of the all-Negro youth conceptualize themselves as having light skin. Moreover, less than 20 percent of the youth studied by Johnson estimate their color as darker than brown skin, while 45.5 percent of the youth in the all-Negro sample adjudge themselves as darker than brown skin.

A second difference indicated by the color data from the two samples is the strong preference for light skin on the part of Johnson's group, and the forceful selection of brown skin by the all-Negro young people. There is an overwhelming desire for brown skin by the latter group, while those in the bi-racial society are little more than "lukewarm" for brown skin.

A further distinction is suggested from the fact that such a large percentage of the all-Negro Youth—61.3 percent for the boys and 46.1 percent for the girls—choose white as the "worst color to be." The youth in Johnson's sample, on the other hand, who choose white as the least desirable color, constitute about one-half of this percentage for males and females, respectively. Another suggestion which seems relevant at this point is that in both samples and for rural as well as urban youth in Johnson's sample, the male adolescents possess greater antipathy toward being white than do the females. This supports John Dollard's⁷ theory of the caste frustration of Negro men because of what Dollard claims is the Negro male's feeling of a sexual gain by white men. This detestation for white skin appears to be even firmer among all-Negro youth.

Thus, from the foregoing materials and analyses, it becomes apparent that color is an important criterion influencing one's position in the social structures of both bi-racial and all-Negro societies. Not only is one's social status affected by color, but also one's personal characteristics are related and affected by this phenomenon. Thus, color is just as important to Negroes living in racially homogeneous communities as it is to those residing

⁶ Charles S. Johnson, Fisk University, furnished controlled data from his files for this investigation. The above refers to the color preferences of 398 Negro youth residing in a southern bi-racial society, Davidson County, Tennessee.

⁷ John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), ch. 7.

in bi-racial communities. However, color in the all-Negro society has its own functions, values, and symbols which are different from those of the larger culture. Accordingly, individuals with advantageous Caucasian bodily marks in the larger society will not necessarily be assigned high value and prestige in the all-Negro society.

FAMILY PATTERNS

The all-Negro society was established as a "family society." During the promotional stage of the organization of all-Negro communities, the scouts and advertisements sent out by the founders appealed to families to move to the "New Eldorado." This was done by stressing the desirability of purchasing lots and farm units within the area for family settlements. There were very few attractions to entice the adventurer, the prospector, or very many unattached individuals; consequently, people who moved into these new racially homogeneous frontier towns came in family units. In not a few instances, the male head would go before his family, sending for them as soon as the necessary provisions could be made.

What all this means is that the early family movements into the new society involved highly stable patriarchal families. This also indicates that strong family sentiments are deeply embedded in the ideology of the society. So strong, in fact, are these family sentiments that many family patterns found to be common among southern Negro families are, in most instances, not sanctioned by the residents of the all-Negro society. For example, common law marriages have never been approved nor tolerated. On the other hand, Charles Johnson has shown that common law marriages, illegitimacy, and unmarried motherhood are so common among classes of Negroes in the bi-racial societies in the "Black Belt," that they are not even adequate indices of family disorganization.⁸

This sharp difference between the societies in respect to family sentiments is revealed by traditional family mores of the "Black Belt." In these societies, and especially among lower class families, a pattern similar to that of slavery still persists. Extra-martial relations are common, and illegitimate children are no barriers to mar-

riage. There is, moreover, a strong matriarchal pattern, and the dependability of the Negro woman is complemented by the "irresponsibility" in the man. By way of contrast, in the all-Negro society, extra-legal relations are frowned upon. Illegitimacy is not tolerated, and the unmarried mother is stigmatized and in certain instances ostracized. The strongest bourgeois value centers about the imperativeness of a legal marriage before procreation. Social condemnation follows child bearing without benefit of clergy, and husbandless childbearers are banished from the social activities of the society, especially those of the church.

Another sharp difference in family patterns between the societies concerns child development. Negro family patterns in southern bi-racial societies must be structured so as to teach its children the various roles they must assume in their relations with the dominant caste. Children are taught defensive and compensatory behavior, and when and how to strike back. Middle class parents are positively apprehensive for their children lest they fail to learn the proper social behavior. Many parents even fear reprisals which may be taken against them for mistakes made by their children. Accordingly, great care is taken by parents in teaching children to "stay in their places," in order to shield them from the humiliating experiences of the caste system.⁹ In the all-Negro society, on the other hand, parents do not have to circumscribe the behavior of their children. They are given the full run of the community. Many of the experiences reported by individuals in their childhood development in all-Negro communities reveal that they were afforded unlimited freedom to play and participate in community activities. Moreover, some of these experiences recalled by them would have been serious offenses against the white caste in the larger society and the child and family might have been held accountable and punished.

The basic family pattern of the all-Negro society is gradually taking the form followed by Negroes in the larger bi-racial society. Regardless of this fact, however, the society remains fundamentally a "family society" with patriarchal and conventional patterns. The persistence of these strong middle class family sentiments will depend upon the effectiveness of the resistance offered by the

⁸ Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1941), pp. 59-63.

⁹ See Robert E. Sutherland *Color Class and Personality* (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1942) ch. 5.

residents against the secularization of their family institution. One can safely predict that as long as the all-Negro society maintains a high degree of isolation from the outside world, conventional family patterns will be sanctioned, keeping them different from those of the larger bi-racial society.

POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PATTERNS

The political and educational structures of the all-Negro society are so closely related that they can be considered together. The residents are highly sensitive to the subjects of politics and schools. One gets astounding emotional reactions as soon as either topic is brought to their attention. Moreover, it is within politics and schools that numerous informal groups and voluntary associations are to be found. Clique formations are numerous and factions and rivalries are deeply rooted. Outside the family, the persons who interact most frequently, those who go out together, and those who have the greatest number of reciprocal obligations which cement the bonds of intimate association, are most likely to be engaged in political or educational activities.

It is, however, the political structure which is coterminous with the total society. Accordingly, the residents place major emphasis upon political activity. The political structure serves to connect and integrate the segmental substructures, such as family, economic, religious, and educational institutions.

Similar to the governmental structure in the larger culture, the political organization in the all-Negro society is a hierarchy of career politicians. At the top of the heap is usually a political "ring" or clique which has control over the entire governmental structure.

The most distinctive feature of the political organization of the all-Negro society concerns the degree of political participation. The residents of the all-Negro society are more conscious of political problems than those living in bi-racial societies. For example, an average of 71.6 percent of the total population in five all-Negro communities are registered for voting. This percentage score is extremely high and should be considered in the light of the fact that the Election Clerk must keep the names of persons active for voting until they have failed to vote in four consecutive elections. Thus, some names of persons who are deceased or who, for some other reason, no longer reside in the communities, are carried on the books.

When it is remembered, however, that the Negro masses in southern bi-racial communities are generally not interested in voting, the data become vastly important. They indicate, upon a comparative basis, that the residents of the all-Negro society participate more actively in governmental affairs. Moreover, the data suggest differences in the amount as well as in the quality of political participation. It is not unusual to find as low as 20 percent of the Negro population registered for voting in many southern bi-racial communities. In "Old City," for example, there is almost no Negro participation in politics.¹⁰ Bertram W. Doyle, in commenting upon the limited political participation of Negroes in southern bi-racial communities, points out that the Negro masses look to the white man and feel out of place participating in politics. Furthermore, he says that "voting and participation in governmental affairs seem not to be in the mores of the Negro group."¹¹

Thus, it becomes crystal clear that there are significant differences, not only in degree, but also in kinds of political activities of Negroes in the all-Negro society and those residing in bi-racial societies. Although the political structure in the all-Negro society has developed by trial and error, the framework has been created almost entirely by Negroes. This furnishes tremendous ego gratification for the residents and they think of this as "our town," because "we run it." The majority of Negroes living in the larger society do not maintain such identifications. They seldom think with reference to their participation in government in this manner because their participation is likely to be systematically prescribed by the superordinate white caste.

As regards the educational institutions in the all-Negro society, undoubtedly an immense amount of interest is shown by the residents in the local school. In addition, it should be emphasized that the all-Negro society was established during the time that the doctrine of "equality of opportunity" (later to be popularized by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) was being propagated.¹² Most of the pioneer leaders were of the firm conviction that increased educational opportunities were basic to

¹⁰ Davis and Gardner, *op. cit.*, ch. 22.

¹¹ Bertram W. Doyle, *The Etiquette of Race Relations in the South* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 139-40.

¹² Myrdal, *op. cit.*, pp. 797-803.

the improvement of the Negro. Accordingly, it is in the traditional mores of the all-Negro society for the people to be favorable toward education.

The value placed upon education in the all-Negro society can be exhibited through the presentation of a few comparative educational indices. For instance, five all-Negro communities in Oklahoma possess an average of 4.2 and 4.8 elementary and high school teachers, respectively. With an average of 195.6 pupils, the average number of pupils per teacher is 22.1. On the other hand, for five racially mixed communities of comparable size and relative organization, the average number of teachers is only 2.4 and 1.8 for elementary and high schools, respectively. Although the average number of teachers of the latter is approximately one-half that of the former, the average number of pupils is 214, and the average number of pupils per teachers is 54.4, or more than double that of the all-Negro society.

Another conspicuous difference in educational indexes between these two samples is indicated through a comparison of the number of units of instruction approved by the State department of education. The average number of units of instruction for high schools approved by the State for five all-Negro communities is 18.1, while only 8 units are approved for the bi-racial communities.

In reference to teachers salaries, there are no teachers employed in the all-Negro communities receiving less than \$600.00 annually, while more than 2 percent of the teachers in the five bi-racial communities were receiving in 1943-44, less than \$600.00 for their services. The same general picture is revealed in the percentage of teachers receiving less than \$1200.00 annually. The all-Negro communities compensated only 23 percent of their teachers in 1943-44 with less than this amount, while the State of Oklahoma, and the five bi-racial communities paid 52 and 68 percent of their teachers less than \$1200.00, respectively.

The impact of World War II made it mandatory for many States, including Oklahoma, to issue emergency teachers certificates. Generally speaking, it can be assumed that teachers with emergency certificates are inferior to those meeting the standards maintained by the State. During 1943-44, in Oklahoma, 6.4 percent, and in the five racially mixed communities, 20.7 percent of the teachers were holding emergency certificates. By way of contrast, only 1.2 percent of the teachers in the five all-Negro communities held emergency

appointments. There is a multiplicity of factors contributing to these glaring discrepancies. Chief among these conditions, however, is the fact that the all-Negro society maintains in its mores, high value for the educational process. Thus, the establishment of "good" educational institutions becomes one of the basic objectives of the all-Negro society. Actually, many of the older citizens of the society point with pride to the fact that the first accredited high schools for Negroes in the Territory were located in all-Negro communities. These residents say that Negroes from the larger racially mixed communities relied upon their communities for the education of their children.

SUMMARY

A summary statement for this paper necessarily rests upon a re-examination of the controlling hypothesis employed in this analysis. It will be recalled that the basic postulate suggested significant differences in social structurings among Negroes who live in isolation from the direct influence of the dominant white caste, as compared with those Negroes who live accommodated in societies controlled by whites. In the light of the data and analysis presented in this discussion, and in the judgment of the writer, this assumption has been definitively validated. The following points are in substantiation of the hypothesis.

1. The all-Negro society is marked by an underlying equalitarian ideology which tends to make the members stress similarities rather than differentiations among them. This fact strengthens racial and social solidarity among the citizens.
2. There is almost a complete absence of lower-class frustration in the all-Negro society. Inter- and intra-class communication is facilitated by the equalitarian ideology.
3. Exploitation of the lower classes by upper class leaders is, of necessity, kept to the irreducible minimum in the all-Negro society, while in bi-racial societies, this is not the case.
4. There is a relative absence of a conflicting class struggle between upper and lower-class members of the all-Negro society as compared with a continuous struggle between upper and lower class Negroes in the larger society.
5. While bodily marks are important criteria influencing one's social position and prestige in the all-Negro society, they are more likely to be in relation to Negroid features rather than Caucasian characteristics as is the case in the larger society.

6. The all-Negro society is distinguished by the fact that it has highly selected families of the stable patriarchal rather than matriarchal type.
7. The fact that the political and educational structures have developed by trial and error and in

response to meeting specific social and psychic needs of the Negroes themselves, gives them a greater feeling of "belonging." It also furnishes ego gratification for the residents and grants them greater opportunities for full social participation.

THE MORALITY OF RACE MIXING IN PUERTO RICO

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WHAT happens to diverse racial groups that come into more or less close and continuous social contact depends materially upon the culture patterns and the correlative "states of mind" that the parent races bring into the new situation. How new or how unique the newly created situation is, depends on the nature of the old. What happens within and to the new situation depends on the degree of pertinence of the old to it.

Because of this, it is important for the student who is in search of explanations for the bi-racial situation to understand, as adequately as there is pertinent cultural data for it, the cultural patterns of the diverse racial groups prior to their entry into the new racial situation. And, because of the meaning and significance of dominance of one racial group over the other that invariably displays itself sooner or later in the new situation, this explanatory interest should be directed primarily towards that group that immediately possesses, or soon achieves, dominance.

These culture patterns are the only tools or mechanisms of control and definition that are immediately available for use in the new situation. The correlative "states of mind" of the users of these cultural mechanisms determines the degree of facility in defining the new set of interracial relationships. These culture patterns and mental traits react directly on the type, pervasiveness, and intensity—the meaning and significance—of both sub-social and social process. On the sub-social level of race relations, for example, they influence the degree of aptitude in effecting an impersonal, functional, symbiotic, and cooperative adjustment between dominant and subordinate racial groups; on the social level, they materially influence the rate of assimilation; and on the biological level, the rate of amalgamation.

SPANISH DOMINANCE OVER THE NEGRO IN PUERTO RICO

Spanish dominance over the Negro in Puerto Rico was always present with reference to all of the criteria that are indicative of social dominance. He possessed superior military, economic, and political power. Each of these several manifestations of power tended to support and give sanction to the other. Likewise, the Spaniards' highly organized Catholic religion was a powerful acculturating force. This conspicuous display of power over the Negro was supplemented by the subtle fact that Spanish culture itself, especially with reference to its technologies and "arts of living," was competitively more efficient than were the corresponding cultural traits of the Negro.

Because of these factors, Spanish dominance over the Negro was overwhelming. The Negro was uprooted from his African ethnic ties and transplanted to a new and unfamiliar situation. He was scattered in the new world without regard for his original tribal origin. Thus, he was totally deprived of the opportunity to maintain his original moral consensus and tribal ethos. With reference to persons of his own race, he was "de-moralized." His only survival alternative was to accept what the dominant group imposed on him.

The current proof of the strength and pervasiveness of Spanish power is convincing enough: No trace of the Negro's African cultural heritage is present in the white population. And, with the exception of a possible two or three minor folk practices, such as the "drum dance," no African traits are to be found in the predominantly colored communities. Even the origin of these traits is a moot question.

SOME FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF SPANISH
CULTURE

Since Spanish culture was and still is, in many of its phases, functional with reference to the Puerto Rican racial situation, and since African Negro culture may be ignored for reasons previously stated, attention will be given to a brief analysis of a few of the more important operational aspects of Spanish culture, with special emphasis on Spanish sex mores.

1. The symbiotic, cooperative interdependence of the serf and his overlord in the Spanish feudal system, which survived in Spain long after it had disappeared in northern Europe, was analogous to the Negro slave structure established in Puerto Rico. This fact, plus the plantation economy that evolved in Puerto Rico, tended to perpetuate a sharply delineated, closed class system; to minimize competitive process; and to discourage, both before and after emancipation, sharp racial and class struggle for social prerogatives.

2. The Spaniard had direct experience with Negro slavery in his homeland for approximately three-fourths of a century prior to its establishment in his Western empire. Although this was not an extensive experience for him it is safe to assume that it was economically important enough to create at least a mild cultural definition for it.

3. The Moors left a strong cultural imprint in Spain; and, for purposes of this discussion, not the least of these effects was a large-scale contact with an alien ethnic type that racially, especially in pigment, was close to the Negro.

4. There is another Spanish cultural factor that is usually ignored but, nevertheless, seems to have a broad but pertinent bearing on the Puerto Rican racial situation: Spanish culture was thoroughly permeated with Catholic religious values. Catholic leaders were catholic and skillful in their proselytizing activities with alien ethnic groups. Their proselytizing interests extended immediately and actively into the Negro race in Puerto Rico. Although these leaders tended to support the vested economic interests of the ruling classes they never let these considerations interfere with the initiation of the slave into their religious system. Consequently, the Catholic leader in Puerto Rico never, with reference to his church interests, actively sanctioned a chattel status for the Negro, nor segregated him, nor made a religious issue out of his race.

These are some of the more important factors in Spanish culture and Spanish experience that were broadly relevant to their racial experience in Puerto Rico. Combined, they tended to foster an accommodative aptitude and facilitate interracial adjustments of a type that, at the most, rarely, if ever, tended to increase social distance between the Negro and the Spaniard.

In addition to these broad patterns in Spanish culture that tended to facilitate the accommodative process, there existed a moral pattern with characteristics that would tend to draw the Negro socially nearer to the Spanish Puerto Rican thus expediting the assimilative and amalgamative process.

The moral principles relevant to race mixing may be stated thus: Whenever two races or ethnic groups are in more or less close and continuous contact over a relatively long period of time race mixing takes place regardless of the strength of the moral taboos against it. Over and above the sex force which is potent enough to thrust itself through the strongest taboos, the rate of race mixing is, among other factors, affected by the strength of the sanctions against it. If the moral sanctions against cross-race intersexual relationships are weak, the rate of mixing is comparatively rapid; if strong, the rate of mixing tends to be close to the fringes of biological sex tolerance.

SPANISH SEX MORES

The sex mores that the Spaniard, (especially the ruling-class male), brought to Puerto Rico were differentiated rather sharply along class and sex lines. With reference to women in his own class, the moral controls over him were those which both sexes sanctioned for the women. Rules of sex propriety for the upper-class Spanish women were strict. Her decency and chastity were closely guarded before marriage by the practice of chaperonage; and, after marriage, her fidelity to her husband was assured by his strongly jealous and proprietary attitudes. So, regardless of the man's wishes with reference to women of his own class, his sex conduct conformed to the overt sanctions that he prescribed for his women.

But these moral sanctions that operated to control the man's sex conduct in his own class did not extend to his relationships with women who occupied a lower social position. In his own class, it was courtship and a marriage solemnized by ecclesiastical rites; in the cross-class sex advance it

usually was either promiscuity or a concubinary relationship, and more likely the latter.

These cross-class sex advances of the upper-class men did not prejudice his status within his own class. Both sexes in his class shared the same rationalizations for it, the distinction being that the women more frequently gave only tacit approval.

These inter-class sex advances of the upper-class man were among the very few means of bridging the social gap between the sharply defined and highly structuralized class groups. Being one of the few status-advancing outlets for the lower-class woman who was the fortunate recipient of these advances, she was not stigmatized by her own class. Rather, she was envied.

SEX MORES IN PUERTO RICO

Spanish sex mores remained functional in Puerto Rico. In fact, it was morally expedient to accentuate them in the class situation and to extend them to include Negro and Indian women. This was especially true during the first part of the colonial regime:

1. The available Spanish census figures for Puerto Rico indicate that there were approximately twice as many white males as white females in the population for a century after the founding of the colony. This fact, combined with the comparatively free male sex habits previously experienced in the homeland, would tend to create a hypersexual condition.

2. Many of the early Spanish explorers and colonizers were an adventurous type who, being isolated from the moral controls of their homeland, were strongly inclined to make sex advances whenever and wherever opportunity was presented, and regardless of race or color.

The redefinition of the Spanish sex mores to meet the conditions present in the Puerto Rican situation was not one of displacement, but rather one of accentuation and extension to meet the newly created sex exigencies. Puerto Rican sex expediency was merged into the old Spanish moral sentiments. This new definition comprises the present-day sex morality for the interracial situation.

INTERRACIAL SEX MORES IN PUERTO RICO

During the slave era, promiscuity between upper-class men and colored women, both free and slave, was not uncommon. Likewise, a not uncommon

condition was a concubinary relationship between upper-class white men and colored women. Among the more prevalent forms was the maintenance of a de jure white wife in town, and a colored mistress on the plantation. This practice was rationalized somewhat as follows: "Why should my wife complain? I give her everything she needs." "Man is naturally a promiscuous animal, so what can I do?"

The interracial sex pattern of the lower class operated on the basis of a different set of social forces. Since this class became numerically dominant early in the colonial period, it was the key class, as far as race mixing is concerned. This class was conspicuously isolated from the dominant social group. Its relationship with the dominant group was ordered on a non-competitive basis. The same ordering relationship also defined the status and role of lower-class persons in a non-competitive form in their intra-class situations. So, questions of status and the values that produced them were not important controlling factors within this class. These forces likewise tended to equalize the moral practices for both sexes in this class; even though the man remained morally more free than the woman, which was consonant with his generally recognized dominance over women among all classes.

Interracial sex relationships in the lower class were less promiscuous and less concubinary, and more de jure and consensual. (Consensual marriage is the living together of man and woman by mutual consent—without having the union solemnized by civil or ecclesiastical functionaries. It is a poor man's marriage, and is still practiced by between fifteen and twenty percent of the married population.)

The significant fact about these practices is that neither these unions nor the mixed offspring from them were strongly stigmatized. Whether the unions were either promiscuous or de jure, or whether the children were "bastards" or legitimate did not operate seriously to prejudice the persons involved.

This over-all moral attitude tended to produce an optimum condition for race mixing which may be formulated into the following principles: When mixed types are once introduced into the population under morally favorable conditions by the parent racial stocks, the subsequent tendency is to quadruple the chances of mixing. To the original half-breed, coming from the parent racial stocks, is

added three combinations, each one of which will produce mixed types: mulatto plus mulatto; mulatto plus white; mulatto plus Negro.

As this race mixing proceeds from generation to generation, the mulattoes become increasingly differentiated in their anatomic characteristics. For example, increasing numbers become anatomically nearer the white group; and, in the absence of a strong racial bias, socially nearer, too. Consequently, the light mulatto can become racially anonymous without moving out of his own neighborhood and establishing himself where his racial pedigree is unknown. What happens is increasing emphasis placed on visual evidence of race as an anatomic fact; and decreasing emphasis placed on traditional racial bias. If the mulatto looks more like a white person than a Negro he is socially defined as a white person, providing his accomplishments so rate him. Otherwise, he will be given a quasi-racial or pseudo-racial designation, but he will not be defined as a Negro.

This tendency to define light mulattoes as white is borne out by a comparison of the following census figures for the years indicated. The figures are percentages of non-whites in the Puerto Rican population:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1860.....	48.5	1910.....	34.5
1877.....	43.7	1920.....	27.0
1887.....	40.5	1930.....	25.7
1899.....	38.2	1935.....	23.8
		1940.....	23.5

The first three censuses are Spanish, the remainder are Federal censuses. The interesting fact about these censuses is the continuous decline in the non-white population, all but a minute fraction of which is colored, either Negro or mulatto. Note that there was a decline of 14.7 percent since 1899.

This apparent decline in the non-white population flies in the face of all of the theoretical evidence that would suggest at least a relative increase. Since vital statistics on race differentials in birth and death rates furnish no clues, this apparent decline is probably the consequence of changing race conceptions or, more specifically, the social definition as to who is a person of color. In other words, these percentages would suggest that many persons of color are moving into the white race.

The best proof relative to the previously-stated contention that Puerto Rico approaches a morally optimum condition for race mixing would be accurate figures showing a very high ratio of mulattoes

to Negroes in the population. Owing to the absence of these figures and because of a desire to obtain a working estimate of this ratio, a sample census was taken in 1935 in several urban communities covering a thousand persons of color. Preparation for this study required careful familiarization with the several anatomic traits that suggested a combined racial heritage. Computations of data obtained yielded an estimate that eighty-five percent of the persons of color were mixed.

It may be argued that an approximately optimum moral condition for race mixing would have eliminated the Negro race in the four centuries of race contact. In calendar years, this is a comparatively long time; but in terms of generations the time is short. Several Puerto Rican communities around the seacoast have large Negro populations. But the social-economic forces responsible for their more or less concentration and segregation in these areas following emancipation in 1873 also acted to make it socially and economically feasible for these Negroes to remain there and to select their mates within their congenial circle.

If and when persons of color are dispersed among the white population, and especially in those communities inhabited by persons of the lower class whose acts have comparatively slight status significance, morally optimum conditions for race mixing are virtually achieved. Because dispersal is more characteristic than segregation and particularly because approximately eighty percent of the population belongs to the lower class, it is apparent that race mixing is changing the racial character of the Puerto Rican population with comparative rapidity. This, coupled with the tendency to define light mulattoes as white as they move by their achievement up the social scale, produces an over-all moral condition favorable to race mixing.

SAMPLES OF MIXED RACIAL MARRIAGES

The analysis of a few currently typical cases of interracial or cross-color marriages will give further insight into the morality of race mixing.

It is not immoral for a white man of any class to marry a mulatto woman, providing she is not too dark. For him, such a marriage is condoned, but not encouraged. His status is not impaired. For the mulatto girl, this marriage would be a highly moral act because she is marrying a white man whose race still makes him count for more, and

also because her mulatto friends have a "white wish" for themselves, as well as for her. Every successful marriage of this type tends to increase the chance of others doing likewise, and increases the alertness of her mulatto colleagues to the procedures used in achieving this successful marital goal. The inference from such marriages is that the white man is socially nearer the mulatto woman than is the white woman to the mulatto man. The available evidence indicates that three white men marry mulatto women for every white woman who marries a mulatto man.

If an upper-class man marries legally a medium-light or light mulatto he would not be immoral. His male friends would probably say, "That's too bad!" The chief objection would come from his female relatives who, being bound by strong familial sentiments, would tend to impute moral degradation to him in terms of what would happen to them were they to marry a person of color. This imputation would not cast any serious reflection on him with reference to his upper-class male friends. And he would still rate socially in exclusive upper-class situations because he could attend them and leave his colored wife at home.

Suppose a wealthy white man marries a poor but physically attractive light mulatto woman. His racial value is his birth right. His wealth is acquired either by earning it or inheriting it. By this marriage, she gains status, if it is not equal to her husband's, then it is virtually so; and her beauty has status value, too.

Several cases are on record where a comparatively poor white man with a prominent family heritage has married a wealthy light mulatto woman. This is one of the most common types of cross-color marriages for the upper-class man. So, it merits a more extended analysis. In these cases the white man, by this marriage, adds wealth to his "good family" traditions. His race and his family traditions are status-giving values by right of birth. Supplementing this birth right, is the acquisition of wealth by marriage. This marriage did not prejudice his birth right and, added to it, is wealth which increases both his prestige and social mobility.

On the woman's side, this marriage tended to give her the two socially desirable attributes that he brought into the union, namely his race and good family traditions. It is probable, although not impossible, that she would not obtain a social rating on a full parity with a white woman under

the same conditions. But from the point of view of status, one significant fact arises out of this union: Their children will get the "best" that is given by both. The worst is forgotten. So, the general effect on this family group would appear to be socially more salutary than if this man were to have married a poor white girl.

The inferences from this case are that the married pair, in fact the whole family group, tends to assume joint ownership of the desirable values that each brought into the union. Their respective status-giving attributes cease by marriage to be personal and become familial in character. What was originally "his" or "hers" comes by marriage to be defined as "ours" or "theirs."

Quantitatively, "interracial" marriages of the types described are not too important. But quantity and social significance and implication do not necessarily coincide. In the first place, they happen often enough and are conspicuous enough (not *sub rosa*) to indicate that they are socially sanctioned, even though they are not encouraged by the upper class. In the second place, what is done within the bounds of propriety by a few can also be done without shame by others. The broader race-distance patterns of the upper class tend to be based on the concrete acts of the few. In behalf of this class of light mulatto women the formula seems to be this: The mythical conception of success maintained by the many grows out of the fact of success for a few.

Marriages between upper-class men and dark mulatto or Negro women are not in evidence. But concubinage and promiscuous relationships are, as previously stated, not uncommon. So, as far as race mixing is concerned, the net effect is about the same. A comparatively strong moral stigma would be attached to marriages of this type, but there would be comparatively slight stigma attached to nonmarital types of sex unions that produce mixed offspring.

These cases represent examples of some of the least favorable moral conditions for race mixing. The sex mores of the upper-class woman represent the least favorable moral setting for race mixing, but as the lower social levels are approached sex differences become less sharp, and strong social-economic forces increasingly operate to eliminate race as a moral value.

In view of the evidence presented it would seem that race mixing in Puerto Rico proceeds on a basis that approaches a morally optimum condition.

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

LAW AND CUSTOM IN THE ARMY

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THE Army has since 1940 affected more Americans, and affected them more profoundly, than any other agency of government. We ought, then, to try to understand the nature of the essentially cooperative life which the Army imposes upon its men, how such a huge organization manages its business, and how so large a group of Americans have been living under this separate sovereignty existing alongside the civilian government.

I

There are three sources of authority in the Army, each governing a distinct level of behavior. First is the field belonging to the Army Regulations, the body of law (or, rather, decree) which governs the Army in all of its business except its strategical and tactical doctrine. Second is a set of practices in Army administration which grow out of Army Regulations but are not rigidly prescribed by them. Finally there are certain customs and traditions, only remotely related to the Army's body of law, which influence most the conduct of soldiers from day to day, and which have developed out of the hugeness, the hierarchical principle, and the combat mission of the Army. Thus in this government in miniature, formal legal doctrine is only a skeleton around which the living community is built.

The interplay of law and custom is paramount in the Army. By law the Army attempts to regulate conduct in its minutest aspects, in moral as well as administrative matters. Yet it is custom which most directly governs individual behavior. The rigidity of Army rules, so numerous, intricate, and precise, is relaxed by certain customs which

interpret the rules liberally, generally supplement them, and frequently violate them. On the one hand, then, is the Army's formal regulatory system, and on the other is the aggregate of habits, customs, and traditions which soldiers build up in the interstices of Army Regulations.

Only three features of official Army doctrine need be examined here: (1) the principle of the responsibility of the unit commander for all of his command; (2) the hierarchical division of labor in the Army; (3) the passage of duties from higher to lower commands.

The principle of the responsibility of the commander for all the members of his unit illustrates at once the degree of trust lodged in the officer group and the paternalistic nature of the relationship between the leader and the led. While this principle does not mean that the unit commander is *liable* for the indiscretions committed by his troops, it does mean that he is to some extent held accountable for their conduct. Since the Army invests the leader with so much power over his men, he is expected to be able to control them in such a manner as to bring credit to both the unit and himself; and, likewise, if the unit and its individuals act dishonorably, the leader is culpable. The result is that a troop leader is very cautious in giving liberties to his men, for he knows that their excesses will be construed as evidence of a low capacity for leadership. This is one of the sources of the restrictions upon the individual freedom of soldiers.

The principle of the individual leader's responsibility for the group he commands is a curious inversion of the traditional intolerant belief in collective guilt, where the group (usually an out-

standing minority of some kind) is held responsible for every action of its members. It is the Army's hierarchical system which produces this inversion. The enlisted man is hardly considered to be a responsible person, while the officer is represented as a superior being with unquestioned and unfailing ability.

Mention of the Army's hierarchical system brings us to the second fundamental feature of its legal doctrine. The business the Army must accomplish is divided among its members according to rank, much like the system used in a well-run corporation, but carried out with much less flexibility than in the business world.

There are three levels of rank and three types of work in the Army. At the top are the officers, who do no physical work of any kind (except that involved in their training as leaders). They direct the Army's activities on paper, setting broad policy. They bear all the responsibility for their men, for the accomplishment of certain tasks, and for government property. Officers, in carrying out their jobs, have as little contact as possible with enlisted men, since the Army apparently feels that the closer the relations between the two groups the more difficult it will be to maintain the belief in the officers' wisdom and infallibility. For example, even under the most primitive field conditions one of the first jobs of any unit is the construction of separate latrines for officers and enlisted men, since the two classes must not meet in such intimate circumstances. There is even a standing joke in the Army concerning the equality of officers and enlisted men in certain basic physiological functions.

Just below the officers come the noncommissioned officers or N.C.O.'s. They have only intermediate responsibility to certain officers. N.C.O.'s, too, do no physical labor (although this rule has been frequently violated in our wartime Army), but direct the enlisted men and control them at the level of execution of orders and the performance of physical labor. The N.C.O.'s also conduct the training of soldiers under the supervision of officers, who give most of the formal instruction.

At the bottom of the ladder are the enlisted men who do not hold noncommissioned grades. They have few privileges and no responsibilities of a serious nature. They do the Army's physical and menial work.

The third feature we are considering in this section follows naturally from the responsibility of

the unit commander and the hierarchical division of labor. Duties and responsibilities are constantly passed down from the top. Hallowed by more than tradition, this practice is a conscious policy set down by the Army's top leadership. Only in its more extreme form does it become the old Army game of passing the buck. The extent of an officer's financial and administrative responsibility is so great that he must relieve himself of the burden by holding officers junior to him (and N.C.O.'s) responsible to *him* for much of the work or the property for which he still maintains the responsibility to someone else. Army administration thus frequently assumes the aspect of a constant process of "covering" one's self.

II

Out of these explicit principles which we have just discussed has grown a body of doctrine that is not officially sanctioned but which is equally binding and taken for granted among those who conduct the Army's affairs.

It is tacitly agreed by everyone that the Army's requirements are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy. If an officer were to make all the checks and inspections as thoroughly as prescribed, he would have little time left for his principal duty and for himself. The Army's top directors apparently recognize these facts; a complete and intensive check is rarely made upon all the work of officers in the field. Despite the exacting nature of the regulations, designed to insure that the Army's business and training are carried out properly, the requirements are relaxed, for the written rules are executed by officers who have human failings.

This winking at regulations is best illustrated by Army inspections. An officer who inspects the barracks in which his troops live is generally satisfied with the condition of the beds if they are neatly made up and if the blankets are clean and unwrinkled. He seldom goes into enough detail to see whether the linen under the blankets is clean and not torn, yet certainly the condition of the linen is more important to health and comfort than the condition of the blankets.

Another kind of example: In certain infantry units the platoon leaders are required twice weekly to inspect and report the condition of their men's feet and shoes. At the end of a day in the field, however, everyone is glad to get back to the barracks and has much to do, supper is often ready,

and the platoon leader usually has a few things to do. The result is that the participants in the inspection merely go through the motions. The platoon leader hurries through the barracks looking at a few pairs of feet and shoes and makes the proper marks on his report. He knows that if ever a check were made upon his work, his superiors would examine his records to see if they were pencilled properly, but they would not be concerned with how closely he looked at feet and shoes. The Army's top leaders, who set up such requirements, probably reason that if they demand a great deal they may get what they want out of the officers in the field.

1. The Army, as all moviegoers know, considers it unmanly to offer excuses. An attempt to excuse one's error is considered an attempt to avoid the consequences for having committed it. While doubtless deriving from the ancient military virtues of honor and pride, the depreciation of excuses follows naturally from the hierarchical principle upon which the Army is built. To excuse one's self or to explain an error is to criticize, in some degree, the superior for having pointed out the error. To try to reduce one's share of the blame by raising the issue of "extenuating circumstances" is to claim that one's superior has made a charge without first apprising himself of all the facts and the circumstances under which an error was made. Obviously such questioning of authority cannot be tolerated, when it is made so openly, in an organization in which rank is so important.

The expansion of civil rights has of course been felt in the Army, especially since periodically it has been augmented by millions of civilians. Consequently, when a serious enough charge has been made, the accused is permitted to "offer excuses" before a court martial. Yet the tradition of "no excuses" is still strong in daily Army work in the innumerable cases that never reach a court martial. Even in this area, however, the tradition is circumvented by the simple device of viewing a statement as an "explanation" called for by a superior rather than as an "excuse" offered by someone charged with an error.

2. While theoretically not tolerant of errors in official duties, the Army is very tolerant of certain excesses generally believed to be owing to the weakness of the flesh. There is a regulation, for example, against bringing liquor into the barracks, but it is seldom, if ever, enforced. The Army's way is to warn soldiers against certain acts, to try to

prevent them from committing these acts, to make the acts punishable by court martial—and, when the soldier has committed the act, to protect him from its consequences. This is best seen in the Army's campaign against venereal disease. Soldiers are educated against promiscuity. Houses of prostitution are closed, and gathering places for loose women are placed "out of bounds" to soldiers. It is pointed out to soldiers that fornication is evil and dangerous. The soldier is told that the only sure way to avoid venereal disease is to avoid sexual contact with any woman but his wife.

At the same time, however, the Army understands its men in this one respect. It therefore makes prophylactic devices easily available to soldiers and sets up prophylactic stations where they may be readily found. When a soldier enters such a station for treatment, he has usually violated some civil or military law, yet the Army makes no charge against him but is concerned only with protecting him from the consequences of his act.

3. The very hugeness of the Army produces problems of its own. What would be an insignificant matter were it confined to one or only a few individuals becomes a weighty problem for high military minds simply because an army of eight million men has been affected by the slightest regulation. For example, few people would consider it important whether soldiers in training wore their work shirts outside their trousers or tucked inside them. Nor would it seem to matter much if one man prefers the first style and another man the second. Yet when it is realized that at a single camp perhaps fifty thousand work shirts are not being worn uniformly, it becomes a problem for the camp's highest commander, probably a brigadier or major general, to decide upon a single style for the entire command.

It is thus the military fetish of uniformity that elevates the slightest question to the status of one requiring the attention of top commanders, for the authorities cannot permit each soldier to follow his own inclination. For this reason many seemingly foolish decisions are made by high officers. No one can make a decision that will not sound ludicrous if the problem being settled is a seemingly unimportant one which reaches the higher commanders only because so many men are involved, however slight the effect may be upon each one.

4. The use of personal friends to aid one's

advancement ("pull") is frowned upon in the Army as elsewhere, yet it is perhaps most prevalent in the Army. The reasons for its prevalence are not hard to find. Soldiers live more closely together than do civilians and can therefore become faster friends. In addition, one moves about considerably in the Army and can make more friends. Finally, an Army officer, because of the nature of the Army, has more power than civilian heads and can do favors more easily.

In the Army the use of "pull" is always covered by the accepted fiction of "convenience of the government." One may never ask for a personal favor in undisguised form. Even when making requests of close personal friends, one must don the cloak of this protective fiction (or another: "the interest of the service"). Probably the necessity for this device is greater in the Army than elsewhere, because so much is made of the idea of unselfish service to the country that candor in stating a desire for personal gain through any except the normal channels cannot be tolerated.

5. The mere existence of so many regulations in the Army has an effect apart from the force of any specific regulation in itself. Army officers become regulation-minded. They become concerned with complying with the letter of a decree and hardly at all with its purpose. There is, as a result, a great emphasis upon organization and ritual, and little upon gaining cooperation and obedience through the cultivation of the men's good will. Army officers often become wrapped up in organizational problems; they become self-styled efficiency experts and can set up intricate systems for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them, replete with charts and drawings of the "chain of command" and the "flow of authority."

It is interesting, further, that officers who complain of the inordinate amount of regulations and formal orders they receive will in turn issue their own regulations and formal orders to the same inordinate extent. For example, many officers who see the ineffectiveness of regulations attempting to govern their own personal motives and conduct will themselves, nevertheless, become addicted to issuing such regulations to govern the motives and conduct of their own men. Officers cherish (and therefore abuse) the power to regulate other men by decree; and the written regulation has a fascination and a power of attraction entirely distinct from its text.

III

Having discussed the doctrine, both official and unofficial, upon which Army administration is based, we now consider the body of custom and tradition which most closely affect the daily life of soldiers in the Army. Some of the following points refer only to the infantry, the largest combat ground force, but many of them apply to the rest of the Army as well.

It will be seen that these traditions are sustained by the temper of men who are part of a huge organization that is in training for combat. Logic and necessity are not the criteria here, for it is social (and official) approval that governs. Men follow these traditions, then, because they find them congenial in an association trained to fight, and because they immediately understand that the first step toward becoming an "old soldier" and toward acceptance by the group is the absorption of the Army's traditions and those of the special unit of which one happens to be a member.

1. *Uniformity must not be destroyed.*

a. It is considered the sign of a recruit or a slovenly soldier to walk through ranks of men rather than around or behind them.

b. When rifles are "stacked," that is, a standing pyramid is formed of them by engaging the swivels at the muzzle end, it is a cause for shame and ridicule if a soldier knocks a stack down accidentally, or if one particular stack falls down because the soldier did not build it correctly.

2. *Rivalry between units, from the largest to the smallest, is the keynote of the Army.*

a. The Navy is the Army's first target for the spirit of rivalry, which then continues down to other branches in the Army, other divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. In cooperative group life the group loyalties are strong. The Army does not have to instill the competitive spirit into soldiers; they have it in large measure the day they put on the uniform, and the Army uses this spirit extensively in the training of individuals and units.

b. Rivalry among soldiers is not confined to military matters. The most frequent and intense arguments in the barracks are about the relative merits of each State in the Union, or about which of the main regions is truly God's country.

c. The efforts of soldiers to belittle one another have produced certain stereotypes which can be found anywhere in the Army. For example, at induction stations a line of evidently new soldiers

still in civilian clothes draws cries of derision from those veterans who have already been in uniform twenty-four hours. Other stereotypes come later; a popular one is to call a passing formation of men the "sick call" for that morning or afternoon. Accordingly, certain situations always evoke the same stereotyped responses because of the propensity for rivalry.

3. Simulated grimness and toughness are a fiction soldiers accept, for these qualities are traditionally soldierly. The leader, too, is always constrained to show his leadership and he does this (except in combat) mainly by an assumed attitude of hardness and unconcern for regulations.

a. When a soldier is ordered to do something that he thinks is unfair or illegal, he is usually voluble about it. "By God," he says, "they can't make me do that." To which someone invariably answers in the tone of a more experienced soldier who knows the Army better, "No, but they can sure as hell make you wish you had."

b. If a soldier is too fastidious in his desire for privacy and little conveniences in the barracks, or if he objects to being treated with less politeness than he has been accustomed to, he is usually reminded by another soldier, again in a mock tone of superiority: "Look, man, you're in the Army." This reminder becomes the cloak for all kinds of inconsiderateness and rudeness, as though these qualities go naturally with the experience of being in the Army among rough and ready men training for or already in battle.

c. Leaders frequently sense an undertone of ridicule or of opposition to their actions. In such situations it is fashionable for the leader to become even grimmer and call out: "If anyone here thinks he can do a better job, let them come up here and try." This invitation is of course not made out of a sincere desire to improve the leadership of the unit, but merely to bolster the position of the leader, who knows how unlikely it is that anyone will accept his invitation.

d. Occasionally leaders like to have an opportunity to show that they are after all only human and fallible. The Army has lately stressed that a leader who is not sure of the answer to a soldier's question should give none at all, rather than give one that might prove to be incorrect. As a result, leaders about to call for questions from their men will first state: "I'll try to answer your questions the best I can. If I don't know the answer I'll damned sure find someone who does." This

remark is intended to show the leader's humanity and broad-mindedness, while detracting little if anything from his supposed infallibility.

e. One of the most popular ways for a leader to present himself in a favorable light as a man who knows when and how to ignore certain regulations is to speak of "moonlight requisitions," the Army's coy name for stealing equipment from other units. This practice is not as frequent in the Army as are the references leaders make to it, and when actually indulged in it is mainly recreational and athletic equipment that is stolen. Its importance, however, lies not so much in the act itself, which is rare enough to be insignificant, but in the threat of it made by leaders who are asked how certain kinds of equipment are to be obtained since they are not normally issued. "Hell, man," the leader will often reply, "B Company's got some, hasn't it? Well, ever hear of moonlight requisitions?" And he will smile mischievously.

4. The Infantry has some of the Army's strongest and oldest traditions, and one of the most impressive of these is the cult of the rifle.

a. The Infantry soldier is taught, very early in his training, to look upon his rifle as his best friend. He is urged to care for it as he would his most prized possession—which it is, in combat. Soldiers have given many names of endearment to their rifles, and, as for all objects of affection, some terms of severe disapprobation as well. If he cares for his rifle as he would his sweetheart, the soldier also considers it the epitome of all the annoyances of Army life. When, before the end of the war, he could only dream of getting out of the Army, one of the soldier's pet ideas was to take home a rifle and inspect it daily to see how much rust it had acquired, kick it over and look again the next day.

b. Proper handling of the rifle in drill has long been the common hallmark of a good soldier. Similarly it is an unpardonable sin, one that brings on endless ridicule, if a soldier should ever drop his rifle. Besides enduring the shame, the soldier who drops his rifle is likely to get a week-end restriction as well for his clumsiness.

c. On guard duty soldiers are impressed with the importance of never giving up the rifle to an unauthorized officer, no matter how high his rank. One of the stories that always circulates around a post tells of an officer who tried to test a guard's knowledge by asking for his rifle. When the guard refused, the officer tried to seize it, whereupon the

guard, knowing the officer to be unauthorized to demand the rifle, hit him with the rifle in the groin or on the head. The higher commanders, the story always concludes, upheld the private.

d. The cult of the rifle is best illustrated in the method by which officers inspect it in ranks. The formal inspection of troops is of course prescribed in detail, but the method of rifle inspection, part of troop inspection, has grown through custom rather than regulation. The inspector considers the rifle the chief article of the soldier's equipment and the inspection is always concerned with it. The inspector stops in front of the soldier, who immediately brings his rifle to the position of "inspection arms." The inspector seizes it swiftly. The soldier must meanwhile instantly release his hold upon the rifle, otherwise the lower end will hit him in the groin or the stomach. It is again a cause for shame if a soldier is awkward during the performance of this ritual. So strong is this tradition that even the most careless and lackadaisical soldier tries to look well in handling his rifle for an inspection.

The cult extends to the inspecting officer too. He tries to seize the rifle quickly and with a resounding smack of his palm against the wooden stock. In examining the rifle he tries to manipulate it rapidly and gracefully, and to appear to know precisely what he is looking for.

IV

Our concluding observations, derived from the previous analysis, revolve around the main characteristic we have been considering: the dual source of authority in the Army, official decree and tradition.

The Army represents an interesting phenomenon in group life: an undemocratic association in which the cherished rights of free expression and popular control over the leadership are voluntarily relinquished, all within the larger framework of a

democracy. It is a good example of a social organism in which the threat of force is not an ultimate but an immediate influence continually felt by those in it. The unfavorable reactions of men to the Army, even of men who have achieved respectable status in it and the worldly conveniences which accompany such status, is evidence of that independence of spirit which is always to be found in all kinds and classes of man; regardless of how much "conditioning" an association will administer to its members, there will always be exceptions—some individuals who will not be "conditioned," and who by their very existence and despite their small number, constitute a strong threat to arbitrariness and authoritarian government.

Our analysis, especially in Part I, has shown that a government of laws, and not of men, is a delusion. Government is everywhere a body of law administered by men. A profusion of desirable laws conduces to good government, but by no means insures it. If it is expected that a law is to be obeyed strictly, then the law must be reasonable, otherwise allowance must be made for infractions. For not always does a law merely prescribe a standard of conduct to be met; it frequently states an *ideal* of conduct to be reached. It is when a law is of the latter category, as so many regulations are in the Army, that infractions must be expected.

The Army, finally, is extraordinarily similar to the Catholic Church in some respects. Both are hierarchical, paternalistic, and both closely circumscribe the area in which its members have freedom of expression. Both, too, have a commendable understanding of the weaknesses of man and the temptations that beset him, coupled with a willingness to forgive the members of the flock, although the leaders are judged more strictly. And Army administration, like Church administration, shows the need of adjusting law and decree within the association to those forces operating in the larger world outside.

BUREAUCRACY'S OTHER FACE*

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THE APPROACH

THE following remarks are being set down after having just completed almost four years of duty in the organization under discussion. At no time during that tour was there any attempt by the writer to analyze systematically the bureaucratic structure of which he was a part: from a research viewpoint he was at best a participant observer—with the emphasis upon participant. However, a sociologist let loose in an organization such as the United States Navy can not avoid the temptation to "sociologize" his own experiences to some extent, illustrated in this instance by random notes and letters which form the basis of this paper and evidenced more generally by various articles recently published in the sociological journals.

For students of social structure, the sociology of professions and the study of bureaucracy, participation in a military organization is professionally instructive. To be sure, active membership carries with it participation much too intense for purposes of research. But the intensity of participation rarely precludes the mental application of conceptual schema, a rough kind of observational testing of some hypotheses and, on occasion, when the participant "enjoys" an order-issuing position in the social structure, an opportunity to manipulate segments of it and thereby to submit certain hypotheses to a crude pragmatic checking. These form whatever "research" there has been made in support of the generalizations which follow.

The United States Navy as a segment of social organization is an example of rationally organized social structure wherein the officially designated roles are functionally geared to the fulfillment of its prescribed missions. In such structures, Merton has written,

... there is integrated a series of offices, of hierarchized statuses, in which inhere a number of obligations and privileges closely defined by limited and specific rules. Each of these offices contains an area of imputed competence and responsibility. Authority, the power of

control which derives from an acknowledged status, inheres in the office and not in the particular person who performs the official rôle. Official action ordinarily occurs within the framework of preexisting rules of the organization. The system of prescribed relations between the various offices involves a considerable degree of formality and clearly defined social distance between the occupants of these positions. Formality is manifested by means of a more or less complicated social ritual which symbolizes and supports the "pecking order" of the various offices. Such formality, which is integrated with the distribution of authority within the system, serves to minimize friction by largely restricting (official) contact to modes which are previously defined by the rules of the organization. Ready calculability of others' behavior and a stable set of mutual expectations is thus built up. Moreover, formality facilitates the interaction of the occupants of offices despite their (possibly hostile) private attitudes toward one another. In this way, the subordinate is protected from the arbitrary action of his superior, since the actions of both are constrained by a mutually recognized set of rules. Specific procedural devices foster objectivity and restrain the "quick passage of impulse into action."¹

This long quotation ably describes many of the principal structural features of *bureaucracy*, and it is to this sociological category that the Navy (and other military organizations) must be assigned. Each sentence of Merton's statement depicts an aspect of bureaucratic structure of significance to the student of social organization and/or to the participant. Each of his sentences, too, could be used to point up an important feature of the Navy itself: the illustrations suggest themselves.

The approach, then, is one which stems from the functional analysis of social structures. There could be no attempt here, of course, to set down the Navy's total structural profile which such analysis requires. A gigantic contribution could be made to the social sciences, to the Navy and to the nation were this task undertaken. It would involve a thorough and objective study of the roles and established relationships within the Navy, of its goals and the institutionalized instrumentalities for their achievement, of the social pressures of all kinds operating within the structure, of the "occu-

* Read before the fortieth annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, Cleveland, Ohio, March 2, 1946.

¹ R. K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," *Social Forces*, 18 (May 1940), pp. 561-68.

pational psychology" peculiar to it, and, most important, of the functional interrelations among all these. Those particular aspects of the Navy discussed below would form an integral part of the larger analysis. They are also characteristics that struck this student's sociological fancy and, it is maintained, are too frequently overlooked or "taken for granted" by many of the key members of the organization itself.

THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE

The Navy is a bureaucratic structure; more generally it is a large example of a secondary group. As a complex association it therefore is an instrumental organization designed to fulfill specified goals. The latter are established in the law of the land and receive extensive written expression in codes which govern the Navy's operations, down to the most detailed activities. Study of these codes and of the other documents which blueprint the formal institutional structure provides the Navy's neophyte with a knowledge of the rules, the groupings, and the officially sanctioned systems of procedure. He learns, for example, about missions, bureaus, divisions, sections, fleets, task forces, ranks, rates, courts martial, training programs, personnel selection. It is a complex picture and, especially in recent years, a rapidly changing one, but much of it can be gleaned from "the book."

All of this constitutes the *formal structure* of the Navy. A more systematic account of it than currently exists would be, I believe, of real value to both the professional Navy man, the "oldtimer," and to its new or temporary members. And a thorough documentation of the formal structure by a student of social organization would constitute an example of the kind of study of bureaucracy advocated by Max Weber.

However, such a study would fail to include a very significant part of the organization which is vital in any functional analysis. This aspect shall be termed the *informal structure*. Like the formal, it consists of rules, groupings, and sanctioned systems of procedure. They are informal because they are never recorded in the codes or official blueprints and because they are generated and maintained with a degree of spontaneity always lacking in the activities which make up the formal structure. These rules, groupings, and procedures do, nevertheless, form a structure, for, though not officially recognized, they are clearly and semi-permanently established, they are just as "real"

and just as compelling on the membership as the elements of the official structure, and they maintain their existence and social significance throughout many changes of personnel.

The informal structure may be viewed as a part of the "culture" created within the organization. Military organization, like many other social structures of the secondary associational type, develops internal procedures, values, and sanctions peculiar to "institutions for the care of segregated persons," to use Willard Waller's expression. These are shaped, to some extent, as a method of circumventing the formal structure; they form the core of the "inmate culture." The Navy, no less than other organizations of semi-isolation such as colleges, penitentiaries, and political parties, has its own *internal* traditions, its own caucuses, cliques, and pressure-groups, its own status-systems and compelling values, its own routines and "grape-vine" procedures, which are the inmate's very own and which are hidden to the outsider and the fresh newcomer.

The latter, whether an enlisted "boot" or the newly commissioned officer about to experience his sixty-day indoctrination, from the viewpoint of this analysis, has two large segments of Navy organization to learn. The high-pressure instruction of the indoctrination school or boot camp, the Navy teacher and his own study of the documents can reveal the intricacies of the Navy's formal structure. This teaching and learning task can be and usually is accomplished quickly and efficiently. But knowledge of the informal structure, which is at least as necessary for successful participation, must be gained through experience in the group itself. The Navy has its own definition of maturity: its measure is the extent to which the individual becomes hep to the inner culture. The speed with which the individual "learns the ropes" is determined by many factors, including his pre-conceptions of Navy life, the particular niche which he occupies in the service, the sensitivity he displays to the existence and operational significance of the informal structure and, of special importance, his role in the organization as defined by the attitudes and reactions of the other inmates.

The existence and importance of the informal structure of the Navy would hardly be denied by any experienced participant. To be sure, the newly graduated officer of an indoctrination school, having just completed two months training in the most rarefied, formal Navy atmosphere, sometimes

comes smack against the informal structure with a shock of disillusionment. (I have seen this experienced, indeed, by a sociologist-turned-Naval officer, by one whose relative sophistication concerning the nature of social organization would presumably have led him to suspect what he was to encounter.) Nevertheless, the informal structure is shrouded in a group-imposed cloak of semi-mystery: one of its chief features is the sanctity which protects it from exposure to the uninitiated eye. Anyone who ventured to explore and to spell out the intricacies of and the operations within the informal structure of the Navy would very likely be tagged with the kind of "muckraking" label which was attached to Lincoln Steffens' early studies of urban political parties or, on a different level, Freud's explorations of the workings of the human psyche. It is characteristic of the informal structure of bureaucracies, including the Navy's, to resist exposure.

This characteristic is not entirely attributable, by any means, to the fear of the members that unsavory elements will be brought to light. While this fear always plays some role in keeping off the record the "inside picture" of any bureaucracy, it is to one of the features of the informal structure itself that more importance must be assigned. For the informal structure serves the very significant role of providing a *channel of circumvention* of the formally prescribed rules and methods of procedure. No organization feels that it can afford to publicize those methods (by which certain problems are solved, it is important to note) which are antithetical to the officially sanctioned and, in this case, strongly sanctified methods dear to the traditions of the group.

Many pressing problems develop within the Navy *efficient* solutions for which are not possible within the framework of the official institutional structure. Some of these are solved through openly recognized "extra-legal" methods; in so far as such methods prove useful and are not in extreme opposition to the traditional procedures they tend to become codified and thus to become part of the formal structure. A large illustration of this process would be the array of new personnel practices developed during World War II. However, many other problems continue to be solved through the operation of the informal structure. The persistence of these methods (which are "illegal" rather than "extra-legal") derives from the fact that the problems solved thereby demand circum-

ventional treatment and are, in truth, partly caused by the formality and the officially defined requisites of the bureaucratic structure.

Such a problem is the constant and, to the initiated, conspicuous one of official communication between officers. Official communications in most cases must, according to the regulations, be routed through the "chain of command" for whatever endorsements the officers in the chain judge appropriate. This regulation is clearly an essential requirement from the viewpoint of the efficiency demands of military organization. Its absence would render meaningless the role of commanding officer, and it is thus certain that no attempt would be made to eliminate it. Yet very frequently the circumvention of this regulation appears as precisely the solution of a pressing problem. When such a development occurs the individuals involved, if they are sophisticated in the ways of their organization, will operate on the level of the informal structure wherein a solution is usually possible, and will thereby avoid that bureaucratic frustration so frequently felt by those who are strict followers of "the book." Of course, many problems which are solved by circumventing the chain of command on the informal level are of a self-interest nature and the solutions benefit only the initiating individuals, but there are many others the solutions for which utilize the "grapevine" machinery which are of significance to the entire unit or units involved.

Whichever the case, resort to the informal methods is usually denied and almost always condemned, sometimes most hotly by those most adept and experienced in their use. This is not to suggest hypocrisy in any conscious sense, but rather to stress that quality of the bureaucratic structure which requires *public* sanctification of the formal procedures and *private* sanctification of the informal. For no experienced member of the organization, in the realization of his dependence upon both, would seriously advocate the elimination of either.

The informal structure of the Navy extends from bottom to top of the official hierarchy and, horizontally, across all branches of the service. Throughout it is marked by and encourages *spontaneity*. Almost the opposite is the case with the formal. Thus the informal structure circumvents, once more, in that it provides an area of behavior for the membership where the rigid demands of protocol and regulation go by the boards.

This characteristic is broadly illustrated by the status and role configurations which develop in all units on the informal level. Whereas the official status hierarchy is overtly symbolized by rank and rate, the informal pattern is revealed only by examination of the distinctly unofficial and frequently semi-concealed inter-personal attitudes of the membership. Application of the techniques of sociography to a Naval unit would turn up the attraction and repulsion patterns, the "natural leaders" and the "rejected types" which typify the informal structure. Rarely, if ever would this configuration parallel the formal. The latter, to be sure, influences the shaping of the informal status pattern, evidenced, for example, in the fact that the demarcation between enlisted personnel and officers usually (though not always: witness its breakdown in flight crews) is present on both the formal and informal levels; or in the fact that the officially established social isolation of the commanding officer is frequently matched informally. This is only to say, however, that the informal and formal structures affect each other, as do all elements within the organization. An essential function of the informal structure is the provision of a spontaneity area wherein abuse of officialdom is a chief mark.

The need for such a spontaneity area is more keenly felt and its development more extensive and apparent in those locations more separated from the "outer world" than in Naval activities in the United States. This is evidenced in the various land-based units in the Pacific known to the writer. One extreme example, an island air-base whose position and absence of native population guaranteed almost no contact with extra-Navy persons, had experienced a major structural change from the time that it had been based in the United States. In this case the informal structure had almost altogether lost its private sanctification and stood, in large measure, as the officially recognized pattern of this group of temporary island residents. One visiting officer described this as a "breakdown" of the organization. This was clearly not the case, as shown by the high morale and the effective accomplishment of missions. What had "broken down" was a large part of the formal structure, or rather it had been submerged as the informal structure rose into overt recognition and use. Fortunately the "skipper" as well as several other officers and petty officers were "natural leaders": their status and role definitions

were somewhat parallel in the two structures. However, unmistakable indications of the superordination of the informal included the replacement of the social isolation of the commanding officer by his very keen participation in all activities of the unit, the submergence of the rejected types whatever their rank or rate to the informally defined roles, the emergence of the natural leaders to what amounted to official recognition, the abandonment of most of the officially governing protocol (except in the treatment of visitors), and accomplishment of the day-to-day and long-run tasks with efficiency, zeal, and spontaneous initiative not characteristic of official bureaucratic machinery.

This extreme case of the emergence of the "hidden" informal structure illustrates a process which is always present to some degree when a Naval unit moves from an area which provides a surrounding community, say a west-coast city, to one where it must act as its own community, say a small Pacific atoll. An important implication for the member of such an organization who assumes command responsibility or assists in its administration is that he should learn as much as possible about the informal structure of which he is a part as early in the game as possible. Good skippers do.

For the good skipper realizes, whatever the language he might use to describe it, that important changes are due whenever the segment of bureaucratic structure which he directs shifts scene so as to be forced to turn in upon itself in seeking a *community* of living. The Naval unit, ordinarily and essentially an association promoting officially defined secondary interests, to use R. M. MacIver's distinction, becomes as well a temporary primary interest group. The commanding officer adds to his directorship of the means organization the role of participant, and perhaps leader, in an ends group.

This distinction permits a further characterization of the informal structure: it contains the elements which typify the primary group. Within it can be observed the development of friendships and cliques, the interplay of love and hate, award and punishment at intimate face-to-face level and spontaneity of expression. The intense impersonality of the official bureaucracy is frequently matched in degree by the highly personal quality found unofficially within it. The primary nature of the informal structure, which is partially com-

pensatory and is manifested in varying extents when the Naval unit is "stateside," becomes very markedly compensatory and shows itself much more clearly when the organization is semi- or wholly isolated. As the unit becomes (by necessity) its own community, then, the otherwise hidden face of the informal structure appears. Sometimes its emergence is quite upsetting to the green officer, just recently carefully trained in the details of the official structure but untutored in the off-the-record ways of the Navy folk. Incidentally, this educational neglect could be remedied.

The green officer, however, usually learns his organizational ropes rapidly on his island base. And he may learn them, in a sense, too well. For when the unit moves on to a thickly populated area of friendly people, say Manilla or Shanghai, or back to the "States," it moves through a reverse organizational process. As it again gains an adjacent outer world its own community tends to disappear, the informal structure regains its inner sanctity, and formal protocol and regulation take on their original roles. This readjustment and realignment of the elements of the total structure leave some individuals lagging—both officers and enlisted. They are often the executive or personnel officer's toughest problems.

There are a number of other personnel peculiarities of the Navy which are intimately related to the structural features of the organization. The following section points to some of them.

BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND PERSONALITY

Merton, in the article quoted earlier, describes the confusion of ends and means which so frequently occurs in bureaucratic structures. The governing rules of such organizations which prescribe the methods of procedure and officially define the relationships among the parts of the structure, designed as means, often become for the membership, or part of it, ends in themselves. Certainly all established bureaucracies are marked, with varying degrees of emphasis, by the phenomenon of "instrumental values becoming terminal values."

This is outstandingly the case in military organizations, including the Navy. Military organizations must, if they are to fulfill their basic purposes, so carefully define the rules and so engender devotion to them that "reliability of response" is guaranteed. It is clear that the demands of battle, to use the extreme and necessarily the governing

example, require nothing less. Much of the official experience of Naval personnel is "drill" which teaches a devotion to procedures without which a Naval commander would be, for practical purposes, without command. The need for such routinization of response stands behind the traditional use, in both Navy and Army, of close order drill which forms such an imposing and wearying part of the early training of both enlisted and officer personnel. The willing acceptance of close order drill by the newcomers is frequently negated by the drill-master's identification of this *method* of disciplining response with end values.

Close order drill is the most conspicuous example of the routinization of procedure which typifies military life. The detail and precision of definition of, say, the manual of arms are extended to every segment of the Navy's formal structure. Thus there are the officially correct ways of writing letters, greeting fellow personnel, executing air maneuvers, loading weapons, burying the dead, reporting infractions of the rules, fixing the seating for dinners, hailing a ship from a boat, packing one's clothing for travel, *ad infinitum*. The absorption of these various techniques and methods represents the formal side of learning the Navy procedure. It represents also a process which all too frequently sanctifies for the learners the methods themselves, induces a non-logical "pride of craft," and enhances the role and sometimes the prestige of the "bureaucratic virtuosos." The latter are found throughout the official hierarchy. The master of red tape is as likely to be the long-experienced petty officer whose knowledge of the niceties of "the book" frequently awes the recruit as the veteran admiral who discourages his new flag secretary by constant correctness re rule and protocol. Part of the measure of the effectiveness of a member of the organization is, indeed, precisely his mastery of the details of the elaborate mechanisms of correct procedure.

Such mastery, however, when combined with allegiance to the methods reaching the point of sanctification lessens effectiveness. Colonel Blimps are by no means confined to the British Army, and as in the case of that fictitious but realistic arch-type, they are most subject to "exposure" and to "shelving" during times of rapid change in the organizational structure. For sanctification of the methods always induces a defense of those which have been long established, and creates on the level of personality not only re-

sistance to necessary change but an inflexibility which handicaps the organization. In such instances response has become, as it were, too reliable. This situation encourages the sudden elevation to positions of importance of many individuals whose records during the comparative static days of peace were marked by careless observance of traditional methods and by an unseemingly desire to institute change. Witness, for example, the rapid rise of the "flying admirals" and the somewhat reluctant recognition of the achievements of Colonel Carlson and his Marine "Raiders." In similar manner, the wartime requirement of increasing flexibility gives scope to the abilities and initiative of many reserve officers whose personalities are not weighted with a near life-time of tribute to traditional procedures. However great the contribution of the reserve officers to the war effort has been in this respect, it must also be noted that many of them responded so intensely to their indoctrination in the formal ways of the Navy that their keen allegiance to the latter seriously lessened whatever flexibility and initiative traits they otherwise possessed.

This confusion of ends and means, common to all bureaucratic structures, assumes an especially interesting and significant form in the Navy's concept of *tradition*. Usually tradition is taken to mean the set of morale-evoking values associated with the deeds of heroes, the accomplishment of large victories in the past, and the esteemed virtues which should be sought by Naval personnel. These may be termed the *spiritual tradition* of the Navy and form, of course, a segment of that more extensive complex, the spiritual tradition of the nation. Both nation and Navy make effective and necessary use of these traditional values in the stimulation of loyalty, morale, and pride. The Navy as a professional organization could not operate successfully in the absence of this tradition which provides the ultimate judgment of current achievements and therefore performs an essential function. Frequently, however, the values of the spiritual tradition become attached to considerations which are essentially matters of technological or organizational efficiency. The latter problems, such as the question of building more aircraft carriers and fewer battleships or the elimination of the bureau structure in the Navy Department or the methods of selecting officer personnel, demand "cold-blooded" analysis and solution. It is no doubt a sensible as well as a

necessary procedure to evoke the glories of the past to enhance loyalty and pride in present membership. But it is confusing and sometimes harmful to argue the merits of proposed organizational or technological changes on the basis of appeal to traditional practice. Sacred indeed are the grand exploits of John Paul Jones, but there should be no sacred significance attached to the fact that his ships were wooden.

The identification of traditional values with matters of sheer efficacy is an inevitable process in a bureaucratic structure of long standing. This is not to say that all members are unable to see this distinction and to reason quite clearly about even such tradition-loaded problems as the present proposal to combine the two services; but it is to say that bureaucratic structure is constantly exerting a pressure on its membership to mentally attach the symbols of sacred tradition to the secular concerns of current moment. This pressure is felt throughout the membership: by temporary as well as permanent personnel, by sailor and officer both. The degree to which it shapes the thinking, and therefore affects decision-making, however, varies greatly from group to group within the structure.

Least susceptible to non-logical identification of traditional values with instrumental concerns are probably the "one-hitch" sailors of peace-time and the "duration" enlisted personnel of war. The latter are in several senses the "people's Navy": their values reflect to a much greater extent than others their civilian training and experiences. This is somewhat less true of reserve officers who are also "civilians in uniform," but who have usually experienced an especially intense indoctrination which always includes an emphasis upon Navy tradition. The majority of reserve officers "mature" fairly rapidly after indoctrination, but a few, at least, retain almost a reverential awe of all to which the symbols of the traditions of their temporary profession have been attached. This attachment is felt even more keenly by the professional sailor, i.e. the enlisted man who repeatedly "ships over" and makes his career the Navy. It is most apparent among the Annapolis trained U.S.N. officers, the true professionals of naval science and practice. Generalizations concerning personality tendencies of any of these groups are dangerous because of the wide range of temperament and intellectual attainment which exists in each of them.

It may be hypothesized, however, that in the last group, the "regular" officers of the Navy, exist certain attitude and behavior patterns peculiar to the occupation and perpetuated by the character of the bureaucratic structure. Of these, strong in-group loyalty is the most often remarked and most easily discerned. While it is true that the graduates of the United States Naval Academy develop internal cliques and antagonisms, these are generally overshadowed by a strong feeling of common ties with each other and an attitude of dissociation toward all out-groups. This feeling and this attitude are the result, of course, of the common Annapolis training at the start and the subsequent experiences largely confined within an occupational structure of bureaucratic design and marked by compelling values of professional tradition. It is not surprising, however annoying it may be on occasion, that Naval officers feel more "at home" with, say, their British equivalents (in whom may be perceived very similar occupational traits) than with American representatives of other professions such as law or medicine. Nor is it surprising that reserve officers, sometimes finding themselves, so to say, "on the outside," tend to develop counter-attitudes which enhance their own self-view at the expense of the "trade school boys," to use a symptomatic epithet. From the viewpoint of the Annapolis man, the reserve officer is an outsider lacking proper initiation into and maturation within the "culture" of his own world. The demands of war often cause the closest kind of collaboration and of sympathy and understanding between regular and reserve, but as these demands lessen and the Navy approaches the more static stage of the war-peace cycle, the in-group-out-group manifestations reappear.

Identification with the in-group and disassocia-

tive attitudes toward the outsider are interestingly illustrated by the professional Navy man's reaction to the Navy's "client-public." The office-holders of many bureaucratic structures, as they become expert in the skills of their organizations and as they take on the "bureaucratic viewpoint," tend to develop antipathy toward the clients the organizations serve. This is no less, and perhaps more, the case with the Navy than with civilian administrative bureaus of the Federal Government. The client-public of the Navy is the nation itself; it is understandable that this relationship receives strong emphasis in the training of officers and major rank in their professional ethic. All officers would insist that they are indeed the servants of the people. However, there is within the governmental agencies perhaps no professional body which, on the level of attitude, so dissociates itself from its citizen clients and their political representatives. To be sure, this is in part the result of the Naval officer's officially correct insistence to stay "free of politics," but it is also a manifestation of the bureaucratic expert's inevitable antagonism toward the inexpert persons he serves. Occasionally this antagonism reaches the point of revulsion, and almost always it leads to in-group criticism of the member who sometimes strays from the Navy fold into the area of political citizenship. In the best of the tradition going back to Jones himself I am the people's servant, so the Navy mind runs, but keep me free of the plain clothes citizen and the politician who can not tell a tactic from a strategy, a binnacle from a pelican hook. Repeatedly the civilian in or out of uniform resents such an attitude which may appear to him as an unjustifiable ambivalence. The "justification," it has been argued, is to be found in the character of the structure of which the Naval officer is a part.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ANNUAL MEETING

The American Sociological Society will hold its next annual meeting in Chicago, December 28-30, 1946, with headquarters at the Stevens Hotel.

THE VETERAN: PROBLEM AND CHALLENGE

DONALD BECKER

Norfolk, Virginia

IN A little corner of marshy earth close to the battered wall of Manila's Intramuros there stand a few white crosses. I have passed them many times; so have thousands of other Americans stationed in and around Manila. Probably they gave the crosses little thought, for military cemeteries are no novelties in the fought-over places of the world. I did not think about them so much, either, until I came home and tried to buy some white shirts. And then it came to me that in those two white objects—the white crosses of the world's battlefields, the white shirts of an elusive commerce—there is symbolized much of the conflict in which the returned veteran finds himself almost the moment he sets foot on American soil. For no matter how fast he must swim in the new and confusing tide of civilian affairs—even unto the dire search for white shirts—the veteran must always have in the back of his mind the vision of white crosses, sometimes great fields of them and sometimes only little clusters, like the few that stand beside Intramuros.

A great many men have died these past few years. Whatever it was they died for, it was *not* in the interest of the market for white shirts, and the thousand and one similar petty complexities of the modern world. That much, at least, the veteran knows. That much, at least, will color his thinking and shape his desires for the rest of his life.

Two years ago the Editors of **SOCIAL FORCES** asked me this question: "What will the returning veteran want?" I wrote an answer to it once when I sailed westward from San Francisco; I wrote a second answer over a year later as I sailed eastward from Manila; and I am writing the third attempt now, three months after returning to the United States. So this article, in itself, represents a somewhat extended metamorphosis of thought.

I

Initially, I had listed some "preconceived ideas about the future" which I felt the returning veteran would bring back with him. These, I think, are still valid, i.e., no longer "preconceived" but borne out by experience. I felt that the average veteran would feel convinced (and I still think he

does) that he has borne more than the average share of the burdens of war, compared with wartime civilians; that the "big money" of wartime earnings will be history before he gets a crack at it, and that the Nation owes him a fresh start in life, such as offered through the G.I. Bill of Rights; that he deserves a rest—relaxation, understanding, and the satisfaction of a multitude of long-frustrated desires; that he will have to "make up for lost time" in building a home and family, and the economic foundations therefor; that there should be no fundamental changes in American society, but only that we should return to "normal"—whatever that is; that America should maintain a strong armed force, but that he won't be a part of it if he can help it; that the United States should cooperate in any scheme to maintain peace after the war, so long as this country does not sacrifice any important national interests; that, over and above all, he has had a bellyful of regimentation, and that the Constitution's Bill of Rights has grown more dear to his heart than ever.

I wrote in that first version of this article—but I think now the emphasis was wrong—that the problem boils down to "the reabsorption of the soldier, now a mere unit in a regimented total, as a civilian citizen in a democracy, i.e., as an individual with opportunity for growth and self-expression. Tackling this problem involves a reorientation for the veteran; it involves a continuing redefinition of democratic aims themselves by the Nation as a whole; and it involves a sympathetic appreciation on the part of the 'home folks' of the experiences the veteran has undergone. In other words, it seems to me that there will be a tremendous job of education—in the broad sense of the word—for the whole Nation."

The emphasis was wrong in that statement of two years ago. It was magnified as regards the veteran; it will take him little or no time to catch up, in thought, with the rest of the country; but what I think now needs even greater emphasis is the problem of the direction in which the country is going to move, the country as a whole, including the veteran. It is the old problem of making the choice between planning and drifting, between realism and complacency, suddenly grown to tre-

mendous proportions by the splitting of the atom. It is the old problem of deciding to just what degree we really believe in our own democracy. It affects the veteran, but no more than it does any one else.

Unfortunately, the average soldier never was quite convinced that an ideological conflict lay behind our entry in the war. For the purely pragmatic American reason of wanting to get a dirty job over with, his morale was good while the war was in progress. He could think, not merely of winning the war and going home, but of what he would like to find at home when he got there. After the war, he could think only of getting home.

I was in Manila when the physical and psychological let-down following the end of hostilities, disgust with the bungling of demobilization and replacement by Congress and the War Department, stupid leadership in an effort to maintain discipline, and pure and simple loneliness all combined to bring about the mass demonstrations of protest staged by G.I.'s in their eagerness to get home—just to get home—and be done with the Army. It was the same sort of let-down that has brought the postwar disputes between management and labor; that has resulted in a new factionalism within the major political parties; that brings indecision and a half-deaf ear to the cries of the world's starving. The mood is not pretty but it is real, and to be reckoned with. It is the mood in which veterans sail for home. It is how I came to write the second version of this article.

II

This second version, I think, is almost entirely valid today; valid as far as it goes; but it is far less complete than I thought when I first wrote it. It provides, however, the foundation for later views; so I repeat it.

It seemed to me, as I thought of it on the boat en route from Manila, that the only thing the veteran wanted was to get home and get out of the Army. I didn't think he even wanted to be thought of as a veteran; and recalling the question, "What will the returning veteran want?" I felt the answer was a simple:

NOTHING!

That is, nothing *as a veteran per se*. As an individual citizen of the United States of America, I felt that he wanted a lot. I wrote:

To understand this seeming paradox you must understand the state of mind of the men who are

still serving overseas. Above all else, they want to get home and get out of the Army. They suffered a psychological and physical let-down when the tension of war ended. They are restless and homesick. They feel futile. Worst of all, they fancy themselves isolated and forgotten. They want, desperately, to get home and to be civilians again, just plain civilians; they want to forget the Army with its sundry stupidities; they have an intense desire, in reaction to their years of military regimentation, for "independence" (i.e., economic independence) and security; they have no desire to be regimented again as a great group of veterans. The American soldier never was completely regimented, anyway. He lived and fought for the day when he would no longer have to take orders but instead could tell anyone he pleased to go to hell.

This attitude has both its good and its bad implications. On the beneficial side, it means:

1. The veteran will make a quick return to civilian-citizen status.
2. The chance of there developing a sort of veterans' class consciousness will be minimized.
3. In turn, there will be a minimum development of veterans into legislative pressure groups—although there will be plenty of that, at best.
4. The possibility of there developing a militaristic state of mind as a sort of hangover from regimentation also will be minimized.

On the other hand, this desire for a quick return to private pursuits has a few unfortunate implications:

1. Such idealism as was born of the war will be generally smothered in the resurgence of selfish desires.
2. There is at the bottom of the veteran's desires what might be called a status quo attitude: An assumption that the war has not, or at least should not have brought, any fundamental social changes to the United States. It is a strictly "business as usual" attitude with a feeling of annoyance for anything that interferes—such as the veteran's own memory of the white crosses.
3. The veteran is just plain "sore." He doesn't like the Army, the inflation in the war-torn areas he has just left, or the strikes that threaten his "chow" and a quick return home. He has felt isolated from and forgotten by his native land. He has, candidly, suffered a little touch of self-pity. (Treatment? Just let him alone. He'll cool off, become occupied with civilian problems, be quickly

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reabsorbed in his community. He was always more of a civilian than a soldier, anyhow.)

I do not believe that the average veteran has any serious feeling that he and his buddies hold any special lien against the country, despite occasional vague declarations in the course of a gripe session to the effect that "the veterans "ought to run the country." One hears little talk, for example, of a bonus. The sole cry overseas is to get out of the Army and home. Except for the demands for quick discharges, you may be sure that the programs of veterans organizations will be concocted by the enterprising leaders of such organizations and will be imposed from the top instead of springing from the grass roots. The ideas may or may not be applauded by the average veteran; but they will not be the spontaneous outgrowths of any deep-seated desires brought back from the war zones.

The Negro veteran will present a special case, for one reason, because so many Negroes found a better living in the Army than they did before the war as civilians. They are not going to like the return to poverty and discrimination. One has the impression that a relatively large proportion of Negro G.I.'s are reenlisting to avoid such a civilian future. Undoubtedly the Army experience of Negroes will speed up the growth of restlessness that was already on the increase among black Americans before the war. The problem of race relations in the great cities of the North as well as the southern States will be no different fundamentally than before the war but will be intensified by the return of the Negro veteran who experienced in the Army a much closer approximation to equal opportunity than is ever known by the Negro civilian anywhere in the United States.

These were the thoughts I had as we bounced across the Pacific toward home. They are still valid. They explain the mood in which veterans arrive in the United States. They mark the psychological point from which the change back to civilian life begins.

III

After the first glow at sighting America again, after the first feeling of relief at stepping upon her shores, the return to civilian life starts with disappointment and restlessness for the veteran. Therein, coincidentally, lies a challenge to both the veteran and the social scientist.

I think there are at least four major causes of veteran disappointment:

1. Like an over-advertised movie, home became so dear to the soldier that he came to expect too much—more than he had a right to expect. The reaction to reality naturally has been some degree of disappointment. To be back in the United States is good, very good; but not quite as good as it seemed to a soldier just back from overseas that it ought to be.

2. Homecoming lacked an element of drama that I think most veterans had anticipated. It was good to see loved ones and a friendly face in the street; it was good to drink fresh milk and to eat Long Island duck roasted with oranges; it was good to sleep in a bed with springs; it was good to walk in cities that were whole, untouched by the mad destructiveness of man at war; it was good just to know you were in America again. All that was good, but it wasn't dramatic. Neither was the transition from soldier to civilian dramatic. It progressed almost unnoticed. Perhaps this is because so many changes are gradual and subtle. Perhaps it is because, as one friend put it, most men in uniform weren't real soldiers, anyway, and therefore almost automatically became civilians again, without feeling very different.

3. There are disappointment and impatience in the myriad petty pursuits that preoccupy the average civilian, and which demand growing attention from the veteran also. In two ways, the Army has bred disdain for the petty: first, there was so much dull routine and quibbling in the Army that the veteran wants no more of it; second, despite the Army's pettiness, the soldier knew that the goals were concrete and tremendous, that they were being achieved, and that he was part of the effort. Along that line, one friend, also a veteran, writes that "I have been feeling for the past six months a restlessness and intransigence that makes any job at all a burden. And it's not, curiously enough, because you don't want to work. On the contrary, I wish I could get buried in something that worked me night and day. In an indirect way I think we miss the over-riding purpose that was always present in however tenuated a form during the war—the purpose of winning the war. . . . Now of course there ain't no purpose and the letdown will probably haunt us all for some months to come."

The veteran has been a part of something big and fundamental; the white crosses remind him of that;

he does not like to be spending a disproportionate amount of energy now in a hunt for white shirts, or in any of the other inconsequential perplexities of civilian life symbolized by a scarcity of white shirts. He does not like to see Congress worry more about Election Day than our foreign policy and a sound—and fair—program of military strength to bolster it. He does not like the perpetual bickering over profits in a world men have just bled for. He does not like the hemming and hawing over what to do about people who are starving to death while the average American housewife complains that conditions are certainly terrible, I wanted a steak for tonight and all I could get was a leg of lamb. He does not like the management of big industries when it tries to break the unions; nor does he like the leadership of big unions when it tries to impose unreasonable demands upon management, to the public's hurt. He does not like the old American preoccupation with things material—and he dislikes even more the fact that circumstances force him to plunge in and swim with the tide, if he would have food, clothing, and shelter to a reasonable degree of comfort.

4. All these elements combine to produce another disappointing feeling, that American life lacks direction. The veteran wants no more regimentation; he had too much of it in the Army; but he would like more evidence that Washington has a social program and plans for achieving it. The country appears to drift, and the individual develops a sense of instability. As one newly returned veteran (with a good job) confessed to me, "I've been taking a beating, one hell of a beating." He wouldn't, or couldn't, elucidate; but it is my guess that he has merely twisted and turned so fast in a life of flux that he is dizzy and confused. He has economic security but still no feeling of stability; demonstrating, perhaps again, that man does not live by bread alone.

This, of course, is not a new problem to America. It came with the industrial revolution and it was recognized recently and most poignantly in the period between the two World Wars. But it packs a new shock for the veteran who had forgotten civilian foibles and had blithely thought that only the Army got confused. And while it has become trite to say it, it is true that all this feeling of instability is underscored by the invention of the atomic bomb. There was bitterness as well as dry humor in the scientist who left a bull

session on the subject with the observation: Well, it's been a nice world . . ."

In these four major causes of veteran disappointment—over-anticipation, the gradualness of change, the pettiness of so much of civilian life, and the country's lack of direction—lie the conflicts that must be resolved by the veteran. In them, also, is the genesis of new social forces challenging the social scientist to put them to work—constructive work. Of this, a bit more later.

There can be on the part of an individual three reactions to conflict: (1) a studied effort toward readjustment; (2) drift, which may be toward either adjustment or maladjustment; and (3) a violent and almost deliberate plunge into maladjustment.

It has been suggested that "readjustment, perhaps, requires two or three things. The first of these would be the ability to rationalize the adjustment without becoming cynical, bitter or deadened to hope. Another would be high motivation and the ability to dip deep and find the values." To the veteran, this means making a frank analysis of the causes of disappointment and conflict and a revision of his personal desires in the light of what he has found civilian reality to be. It also means that he must maintain his heightened social conscience—the memory of the little white crosses—and apply it in every day life. It means, bluntly, what six years of war *should* have taught the whole world, but obviously hasn't: that man cannot compromise with his ideals.

The veteran can either revise his desires in the light of reality and preserve his ideals, or he can disregard these necessities—he can drift. If he drifts, he may still make the adjustment by accident; or he may fail to do so and continue to take "one hell of a beating" from life.

Finally, the veteran can simply refuse to become reconciled to the facts of his particular situation and become "maladjusted," a social problem. It would be my guess that veteran maladjustment in most instances will have its roots in prewar, depression-born disappointments. Whatever the causes, the social scientist would do well not to try to stereotype the "veteran problem." Veterans are still individuals; they managed to retain their individuality to a remarkable degree, and in the best American tradition, even while they were in uniform.

It is impossible to stress this point too much, for the individual veteran will heartily resent—and

rightly so—any attempt to view him as a tailor-made problem ripe for dissection. He doesn't want to be stereotyped and then "rehabilitated" (a hateful word!) *en masse*. And he's right. The veteran's problems are really America's problems, with only slight variations. Solve the problems that produce instability for all Americans (all peoples all over the world, for that matter) and you can forget about the veterans—excepting, of course, the disabled.

I do not think that the average veteran wants a bonus for having assumed the obligations of citizenship, or even to have a fuss made over him. He just wants what every American always has wanted and what our Declaration of Independence has so succinctly phrased: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. But he knows now, better than anyone else in the country, that life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are not presented free, on a silver platter, to the slothful and indifferent. He *knows* they must be earned. In that simple realization lie vast new social forces waiting to be tapped, channelized, put to use; and in the presence of vast new social energies lies a challenge to the social scientist.

IV

To let those forces lie dormant would be a pity; to have them agitated and directed toward self-

aggrandizement by possible neo-totalitarian interests could be catastrophic; but to seek their aid through social planning in the achievement of goals interpretive of the American Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution might carry the blossoming of the American ideal through a great stage of development.

If the veteran individually has his problems, collectively the veterans offer a serious challenge to the social scientist: not so much in the sense of helping to resolve individual conflicts as in making constructive use of the new social forces developed by those conflicts and the veteran's memory of the white crosses of the world's battlefields.

For the veteran has walked where other men have died to preserve our American ideals. This he knows in his heart, even if for the nonce he seems more interested in persuading some haberdasher to slip a white shirt from under the counter.

Can, or will, the social scientist reach the veteran? Can, or will, the social scientist reawaken the warborn ideals? Can, or will, the social scientist point out a road toward a fuller and more stable life for Americans; in manner and language the average veteran can understand and appreciate?

There is the social scientist's challenge—and opportunity. Problem or challenge? The veteran is both; and most especially, a challenge.

INSTITUTE ON BUILDING FOR SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIVING

The first annual Institute on Building for Successful Marriage and Family Living sponsored by Morehouse College in cooperation with the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Incorporated, closed its two and a half day session on Saturday, April 13, 1946, after a series of lively meetings in which more than 300 participated. In summarizing the Institute, Mrs. Marie Keys, a consultant with the Planned Parenthood Federation, stated that students had made an invaluable contribution to the Institute through their participation in discussions; the different points of view made it possible for hearers to evaluate and use material as it would fit into their own needs; faculty members had opportunity to know what students were thinking; and future courses might be planned to meet more adequately the needs of students in regard to family life and sexual adjustment.

Among the needs made clear at the Institute were (1) for parents and schools to get together in planning adequate sex education programs (2) for better family planning by young people, and (3) for the church to become awakened to community problems.

"Counselling as Related to Successful Marriage and Family Living" was the general theme of the Institute. Among the topics discussed were Factors in Marital Happiness, Problems of the Marriage Counsellor, Courtship and Engagement, Sexual Adjustment in Marriage, Adjusting of Physical and Mental Personalities, Marriage Problems of the Post-War Soldier, Sex Education, Juvenile Delinquency, and the Minister and Marriage Counselling.

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HYPNOANALYSIS. By Lewis R. Wolberg, M.D. New
York: Grune and Stratton, 1945. 355 pp. \$4.00.
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD. Edited
by Otto Fenichel, Anna Freud, and others. New
York: International Universities Press, 1945. 423
pp. \$6.00.

The Human Mind. This is the third edition
of a book that has been deservedly popular.
Changes have been made to bring the material up

to date. The author has not retreated from his fundamental position that although heredity is determining so far as structure is concerned, structure does not constitute behavior and controls behavior only within very wide limits (pages 23-24). He insists that at present we have no convincing scientific evidence that insanity or any generally prevalent form of mental disease likely to result in insanity is definitely transmitted by heredity. There are one or two degenerative conditions of the nerve tissue which appear to run in families, but they are very rare. The trend is toward believing epilepsy is not inherited, and we now know that even feeble-mindedness in the great majority of cases is not transmitted. It is the effect of environmental conditions on the organism that is chiefly responsible for mental diseases. In his last preface the author points out that in the preceding edition he stated in 1937 that the next war would center about the emotional attitudes of those who assumed a fatalistic atti-

tude toward the power of heredity and those believing in the overwhelming significance of environment.

The book is clearly and dramatically written and undoubtedly has brought help to a multitude of readers. The human spirit of the book, its constant expression of interest in individuals as persons in considerable measure explains the large reading it has had. Its optimism is also impressive. "No greater illusion prevails than that mental disease is usually hopeless or has at best a bad outlook. Precisely the reverse is true. Most of the victims recover. Most maladjustments can be corrected" (pages 4, 6).

Group Psychotherapy. One thing is certain in the field of mental disease. Very different attacks on the problem bring results. Absolutely different theories are held by specialists with impressive records for helping people suffering from mental disability. It was one of the many extraordinary qualities of the late Dr. William A. White that he was always catholic-minded and tolerant in welcoming new approaches in mental therapeutics. This volume is another testimony to this too rare attitude of mind among psychiatric specialists. The book is largely based upon a conference on the group method of which Dr. White acted as chairman. The orthodox treatment of persons struggling with mental ills has been chiefly a relationship between the patient and the specialist although for a long time the value of a social environment in effecting cures has been recognized. This book deals with therapeutic measures carried on through group associations, one of the most interesting of which is a psychodrama. Although the book is written for psychiatric readers mainly it has valuable insight for the sociologist, the psychologist, the social worker, and all who are interested in dealing with perplexed human nature.

Helping Teachers Understand Children is a different book than most of those that have dealt with child problems. It is the product of the interest of a group of teachers who were willing to study themselves as well as their boys and girls and not attempt merely to discuss the difficulties of children and parents but instead to analyze the causes of the individual problems that arose within the school system and the part the teacher and the system had in their causation. It is one of the most needed of books for teachers who can cut away from self-defending, academically established presuppositions and face the realities of

their profession. It will be for them nothing less than a book of revelations.

The Biology of Schizophrenia contains the Salomon Memorial Lectures given at the Academy of Medicine in 1944 for the first time by someone not a psychiatrist. The author, one of the best known of those committed to research in endocrinology, grapples with the survival meaning of schizophrenia. Evolution has moved along two distinct lines, the egocentric and the exclusive colony welfare. The human development avoided each as the sole line of evolution. A schizophrenic is one who moves away from the belongingness which social adjustment on the human level demands. His behavior is wholly egocentric. This chronic retreat from a mature life-attitude is discussed within the background of the human endocrine endowment.

Hypoanalysis is a discussion of hypnosis not for the purpose of giving a patient suggestions that at least for a time can suppress his maladjustments but rather for the gaining of knowledge quickly and directly of the inner life of the person, an insight which can be interpreted and dealt with by the psychoanalytic technique. It is not a crusading book, but a calm, intensely interesting record of cases demonstrating the value of hypnosis as part of the technique of the trained and responsible psychoanalyst.

The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child is the first volume of an annual devoted to the study of the tensions of childhood, the interpretation of child needs and the therapeutic measures for dealing with maladjustments that endanger normal growth. The topics cover a wide range and are written by child specialists who have in common their commitment to the psychoanalytic hypotheses. The reader of the book is likely to be convinced that the quantity of literature dealing with child welfare is far in excess of our present means of bringing this to teachers, parents and others who direct causal influences upon child life. Here, as elsewhere in social relations, research has far outdistanced application of the knowledge gathered as a means of lessening the difficulties of people in trouble.

ERNEST R. GROVES

University of North Carolina

CREATIVE DEMOBILIZATION. Vol. I, Principles of National Planning, by E. A. Gutkind; Vol. II, Case Studies in National Planning, ed. by E. A. Gutkind.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. 331 pp., and 280 pp. \$12.00 a set.

These two volumes appeared in England in 1942 to awaken the British people to the need for a "creative demobilization" at the end of the war. They are published in the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction series, the first book of which, Mannheim's *Diagnosis of Our Time*, contains the moral tenor of the present work, i.e., planning for freedom.

In the minds of the British public, the considerable war damage in England and the hard-felt sacrifices of everyday necessities by its whole population, as well as the prospect of precarious shifts in the international scene, particularly within the British Empire, have given the problem of post-war reconstruction both a concrete, if not acute, urgency and an ethical significance which borders on religious command. It was with shrewd understanding of the public heart and mind, and a stroke of subtle statesmanship, that, at the height of the war's crisis "When we stood alone," the British Government entrusted Sir William Beveridge with a complete overhauling of "Social Insurance and Allied Services." But nothing could symptomize the new temper of the country more pointedly than did the election immediately after the war by which the British people demanded changes as profound as their organic form of life and elastic social structure would permit. They wanted the end of the war to terminate the individualistic era from which the conflict had risen and to start an era which combines social responsibility with individual freedom. At the threshold of this epoch lies the period of demobilization which, according to the present work, to be constructive must be "creative."

Creative Demobilization is a prolegomenon to planning. The first volume elaborates general principles of social planning, while the second, a collection of case studies by experts, interprets and illustrates some of the principles. The author postulates a system of planning which, far from prescribing mechanistically the life pattern of every individual, purposes to secure a social framework within which every individual can live freely. Planning, therefore, is totally different from police control; in fact, it is its opposite. It is the method by which society organizes itself to afford an opportunity for personal freedom. Since, according to the author, that freedom can be realized only in individual responsibility toward society, social

planning is planning for freedom. However much it may be a social technique, planning, therefore, is first of all social ethics.

Social transformation through planning is different from, and more penetrating than, social reconstruction. The present alternative "between co-operation within a democratic community and domination by totalitarian methods; between a free and undivided personality and a regimented robot" (Vol. I, p. 3) strikes at the foundations of our social structure. If personal freedom is the aim of social organization, the individualistic system of *laissez faire* must be superseded by a planned system of communalism; or, to speak subjectively, the system of *homo economicus* must be replaced by one of *homo socialis*. Such change from competition to cooperation, from casual to causal, from insecurity to stability, is neither repetition nor renovation of the past. In the author's deliberate terminology it is nothing less than a "creative" process, namely, the establishment of an environment within which "social man" can rise.

It is the author's guiding thesis that such an environment can be produced only by national planning. National planning is master planning. It is not concerned with details. It does not displace regional and local planning. On the contrary, it builds the frame within which decentralized planning can operate securely. The first volume of this work lays down the principles of a master plan for Great Britain. It is concerned with the physical problems of land and water, agriculture, industry, transportation and communication, as well as with the social tasks of housing, work, distribution, and recreation. These issues are considered from the point of view of the principles of integration, diversification, rationalization, and balance. The most challenging proposition is the plea for a national approach to the problem of settlement. The author favors a system of national zoning within which highways and parks frame regions. In this regional landscape homogeneous areas would be fashioned into functional communities in which there would be balance between agriculture and industry, country and town. These communities would be governed by collective interests "in general and in detail." "Private interests must be subordinated to this principle without impeding personal freedom" (Vol. I, p. 284). In the companion book specialists such as A. W. Ashby and J. H. Jones il-

luminate some principles of the first volume in case studies concerned with issues of human geography, agriculture and industry, and decentralization. Among others there are brief essays on national development of electricity, redistribution of population, towns, and settlements, land utilization and administration, and industrial ecology. Included also are some specific proposals dealing, for instance, with a national coastal park in North Cornwall and with railway electrification.

Gutkind's book is a critical and enthusiastic preface to national planning. It leans on some of the best studies available, especially those by the American National Resources Committee which are quoted frequently and to good advantage. Although the propositions refer particularly to Great Britain, they are relevant to other countries as well. Especially does the thesis concerning nation-wide planning have an impetus of historical compulsion which can be described only by those who benefit from the disorder of obsolescence. The thesis is the more persuasive for the author's repeated emphasis on the world-wide frame to which national planning has to be oriented. The book has the distinct merit of stimulation and presents a program for British national planning which, if accepted by English authorities, should make other countries envious; but it lacks the basic prerequisite of a study on planning, namely, realism. Even if the first volume were less vague and abstract, it would still suffer from visionarism sufficiently to expose it to fatal attacks. The chief criticism in this connection is not that the author is liberal with denunciations, categorical imperatives, and blueprints, which detract constantly from the concrete issue. Rather, the crucial objection is that he does not relate his thesis to the social, economic, and psychological conditions prevailing in Great Britain. His planning, therefore, is not scheming but dreaming, and his principles are not axioms but convictions. However inspiring his utopia may be, and however cogent his faith may appear to fellow-believers, they lack the power of objective reality without which all our plans are vain.

PHILIPP WEINTRAUB

Hunter College

NEW CITIES FOR OLD: CITY BUILDING IN TERMS OF SPACE, TIME, AND MONEY. By Louis Justement. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946. 232 pp. \$4.50. Illustrated.

This book is an important addition to the growing literature on urban redevelopment by an architect who knows urban economics and society as well as design and aesthetics. Mr. Justement offers a program for the complete, methodical rebuilding of U. S. cities every fifty years.

This program hinges upon the adoption of urban redevelopment laws and Federal financial assistance which would stimulate and direct the reconstruction of entire urban regions in accordance with comprehensive master plans. Municipal authorities would determine the areas for redevelopment and the order of work, and would be responsible to the Federal authority (Urban Redevelopment Corporation) in matters of audit and broad policy principles. Land assembly would also be undertaken by municipalities or by Municipal Realty Corporations acting for various corporate units within an urban region. Land thus acquired would be leased to private developers for periods not exceeding fifty years, except land for projects consisting entirely of individual houses which might be sold. The price paid by the city for land and improvements would be based on "fair market value" as of the approval date of the pertinent redevelopment legislation. Valuations might be made in advance of actual acquisition with due allowance for fluctuations in dollar purchasing power and depreciation of improvements. The projects of private developers would be consistent with regional master plans, created and implemented with a maximum of citizen participation through Metropolitan Planning Agencies. Allowing for matched Federal and Municipal payments to "de-housed" families, as well as the possibility of rebuilding more rapidly than the fifty year rate, Justement estimates his program would cost the Federal government a maximum yearly average of 2 billion dollars. This compares with expenditures for war at the rate of 2 billion dollars *a week* during 1944, and the recently approved subsidy of 500 million dollars a year for public roads which in a sense will merely permit us to escape more easily the ugliness and squalor of our cities.

The Justement proposal merits serious consideration both for the importance of the problem which it attacks, and for the quality of economic and social analysis which has gone into it. Although the author urges his rebuilding program as a desirable and effective method of achieving full employment in a compensatory economy, Keynes-

Hansen style, he is no single track materialist. Observing that "we do not live by bread alone," he writes, "If we have imagination as well as determination we shall do more than merely provide jobs; we shall deliberately plan to stimulate the creative ability of the individual citizen and to give the people the thrill that comes from participating in a great undertaking. . . . We can make it possible for the humblest citizen to feel that he is participating to some measure in the rebirth of his city" (p. 8). He calls for a city planning technique that is truly creative—not merely hurdle jumping and the piling up of burdensome regulations which yield such meagre results that protests are on the whole justified. He would achieve maximum social participation through mass education and prize competitions, the winners becoming the planning consultants to their local Metropolitan Planning Agencies which would no longer employ experts from a distance to draw up *The Whatshisname Plan*. In this way we can stimulate the "perceptivity of the people," provide opportunities for talented self-expression and thereby create new standards of beauty to replace those lost to mass production, individual frustration, and standardization.

Although Justement is convinced of the importance of his goals and the economic and social soundness of his program, he is aware of the objections which will be raised from "left, right, and center," many of which he answers quite effectively. Sociologists will feel, nevertheless, that he has slighted noneconomic values and nonrational behavior as factors in urban development, politics and economics. At the same time, they will find much of value in chapters devoted to redevelopment finance, to criticism of U. S. housing policies, and to a summary of pending redevelopment bills. Part II, "A Case Study in City Planning," Washington, D. C., is noteworthy though somewhat superfluous to the book's core ideas. It contains 24 excellent plates with the author's comments covering L'Enfant's conceptions, Washington today, and the author's suggestions. Finally, sociologists will recognize a book by an architect with something to say to social scientists, quite unlike other architects who merely "discover," with verbosity and incoherence, what social scientists have been studying and writing for years.

N. J. DEMERATH

University of North Carolina

TWENTIETH CENTURY SOCIOLOGY. By Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.). New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945. 754 pp. \$6.00.

While the editors of this Symposium state that the presentation would have been more uniform and consistent had the chapters been written by a single author, to this reviewer one of the most significant features of the work is the relatively high degree of consistency and uniformity evidenced. It is true that there are exceptions to the generally uniform approach, but these exceptions are not crucial. In Part I of the Symposium which is "intended to cover the greater part of the special fields in sociology," the uniformity is especially in evidence. The student of sociology would immediately anticipate this probability upon glancing at a sampling of the list of contributors to this section. The sources, methodological approaches, as well as the directions of the sociological analyses of Talcott Parsons, Howard Becker, Pitirim Sorokin, Robert MacIver, Florian Znaniecki, Robert Merton, Georges Gurvitch, and Wilbert Moore demonstrate certain basic agreements.

The sources and methodological approaches are European. Specifically Durkheim and his followers, Max Weber and the German sociologists, and Karl Marx and his interpreters, seem to have "set the stage" for the "definitely new era in sociology" (Parsons, p. 43) into which sociology is emerging. If the validity of Joseph Schumpeter's judgment that Karl Marx made the greatest single contribution to sociology that has ever been made can be accepted, and if Albert Salomon is correct in his assertion that Max Weber "became a sociologist in a long and intense dialogue with the ghost of Karl Marx" (p. 596), and if Talcott Parsons' location of a high degree of agreement between Durkheim and Weber is valid, then the proposition might be advanced that this emerging "new era" in sociology might well be termed *Neo-Marxian* in its implications.

This tentative proposition must be qualified by the statement that it is the methodological implications of Marxism which are of primary significance to this "school"; substantive elements appear to be rejected in directions consonant with Max Weber's rejections in his "dialogue with the ghost of Karl Marx." Positive agreement appears to be fairly evident with regard to the analytical significance of the subjective, to the fictitious nature of the individual-social dilemma,

and to the fact that the area of the "social" constitutes an independent area for systematic investigation.

Although the editors assert that "polemics are kept to a minimum" in the symposium, yet the directions of the polemics are significantly uniform. In general they are directed against empiricism in both its positivistic and idealistic variants. It is the judgment of Howard Becker that Read Bain, George Lundberg and L. L. Bernard are orthodox representatives of the "positivistic sect" (p. 71); P. A. Sorokin finds the efforts of this group "especially industriously to use a 'precise quantitative method'" to be "crude and naive" (pp. 115-116); R. M. MacIver is critical of the "extreme positivists" who are "hotfoot for absolute and final certainty" (pp. 130-131); Talcott Parsons presents as "unsatisfactory" those theories which rest upon the assumptions of empiricism; and Florian Znaniecki rejects the biological and biopsychological empiricism of Spencer, Giddings, Small, Ward, Sumner, Park, Burgess and Keller (pp. 188-196). The polemical oppositions to empiricism include not only methodological, but substantive elements as well; in the "new era" of sociology "no competent modern sociologist can be a Comtean, a Spencerian, or even a Marxian" (Parsons, p. 50).

It is obviously impossible in a book review to critically examine all the facets and implications of this approach. That the approach represented shows definite tendencies towards becoming a "school," especially in America, is apparent; as it develops, radical reconstruction in American sociological thinking will either become necessary or polemical oppositions may be expected to become more stringent.

Some attention should be given to certain other phases of the Symposium. For example, to Wilbert Moore the effort devoted to elaboration of the "culture lag" theory represents a waste of "much time and labor" in "demonstrating the obvious and completely misinterpreting its significance" (p. 464). There are those sociologists who would take issue with these and other statements. For example, many would disagree with the characterization by R. E. L. Faris of regional sociology at the University of North Carolina as being primarily characterized by "a general reform aspect" with the purpose of "altering the administrative aspects of government to fit in with conceptions of regionalism" (p. 556).

Students of the historical development of

sociology will be interested in the analyses in Part II of the Symposium of developments in Europe, England, and South America. Especially of pertinence is Claude Levi-Strauss' interpretation of French sociology and the analysis of Russian sociology by Max Lasetson. Professor Levi-Strauss' interpretation correctly locates Durkheim at the center of French sociology. But he, like Jay Rumney, appears to be concerned lest sociology forget its eighteenth-century ancestry in the tradition of social criticism (p. 505, Jay Rumney, p. 564). Sociologists, to Levi-Strauss, "cannot hope to be successful if they are not constantly helped and supported with a general, humanist culture back of them" (p. 536). The implication of such a statement is to warn against the dangers to humanist culture of the lack of a discipline, such as sociology has tended to be, which reserves as a part of its function, the criticism of norms. *Anomie* may be a "price" of the tradition of social criticism, but the question may be raised as to whether it is not a "just price" for the maintenance of humanistic culture. Sociology could become a "technology" for the prevention of and/or the production of *anomie*.

JAMES E. FLEMING

University of Maryland

ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND SOCIAL SECURITY. By A. G. B. Fisher. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. 362 pp. \$5.00.

This volume deals with the fundamental problems of the economic intercourse of nations. It investigates traditional patterns of thinking and acting by dissecting the psychological foundations of the underlying traditions of international trade. The volume confronts the reader also with the expected consequences of shortsighted economic policies. Professor Fisher, a prominent economist and political scientist, shows with the insight and foresight of a mature scholar, adequate understanding of the craving of nations for "security." But in his opinion security (economic and political) cannot be attained by direct action. It is an essential by-product of intelligent social adjustment. Shortsighted and rigid economic policies, however attractive for the politician operating with self-imposed blinkers, and for the voter who is avoiding penetrating thinking, sooner or later lead to insecurity and to lower living standards. Only from the courageous disclosure of fundamental economic facts and factors to the man in

the street does the author expect an "adaptive response" of nations to economic problems.

The relationship between well-developed national communities and the slowly and spasmodically growing world society has often been likened to the relationship between a mature civilized man who is prepared to adjust his conduct to physical and social exigencies and the child who expects the outside world to be adjusted to his selfish desires. Trade policies of nations related to international intercourse indeed frequently display an infantile desire to make the world accept measures which would favor only one segment of the international community. Professor Fisher does not accept as sufficient justification for the shortsighted economic actions of small and large nations the fact that world society is still young and inexperienced. One may assume, however, that the author would approve of most of the suggestions included in the proposals of the American Government for the coming international trade conference.

However valuable the diagnostic section of Mr. Fisher's study is, his therapeutical suggestions, full of original thought, are even more important. Statesmen, public officials dealing with international affairs, and others interested in fundamental problems of economics and politics will read this volume with profit. The book is a neat and significant addition to the literature of international economics; it breaks new ground in sound political thinking.

ERVIN HEXNER

International Monetary Commission

MAN AND SOCIETY: THE SCOTTISH INQUIRY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By Gladys Bryson. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1945. 287 pp. \$3.00.

The questionable belief that the distinction between observing and theorizing is radical and, what has even less justification, the belief that this distinction marks off the sciences from philosophy have together led to the neglect of the real continuity between the inquiries formerly conducted under the name of moral philosophy and those now conducted under the name of social science. This book, which is a study of the efforts of a group of eighteenth century philosophers to establish an empirical study of man and society, contributes to the repair of that neglect.

The men treated are David Hume, Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, Adam Fergu-

son, Dugald Stewart, Lord Kames (Henry Home) and Lord Monboddo (James Burnet). It was an academic group; all save the first, who was prevented by the orthodox from securing a chair, and the last two, who were members of the Court of Session, were professors at the Scottish universities. But it was not a provincial group; the universities were alive with the intellectual ferment produced by Locke and Newton and Montesquieu. And it was an influential group; Kant in Germany was awakened from his "dogmatic slumber" by Hume, Cousin in France was largely indebted to Reid and Stewart, and in this country the Scottish philosophy was popularized by President McCosh at Princeton and President Porter at Yale.

What were the ideas of these men? All save Hume are often grouped as the Common Sense School, from the easy appeal to common beliefs by which they proposed to refute the subjectivism of Berkeley and the skepticism of Hume. Sometimes they are called the Moral Sense School, because most of them agreed that there is a faculty of immediate moral judgment. Sometimes they are called the Sentimentalists from their insistence that sensation and feeling are more important than reason in determining man's actions. But all such attempts to pigeon-hole these men fail to do justice to the variety of their intellectual interests and to their varying amounts of agreement and disagreement. Professor Bryson has rescued them from such summary treatment by careful and ample study.

The methodology of these thinkers was consciously imitative of Newtonian physics. As the planetary motions had been explained by subsumption under general laws of motion, so the particular facts of human conduct are to be explained by general principles of human nature. The range of facts considered was extensive; the chapter headings of their books are as varied as those of the texts we now use in introductory courses in the social sciences. The explanatory principles were too easily developed; we have learned greater caution in the formulation of psychological laws than these men had. But the insight was sound that a foundation in an adequate psychology is needed for the understanding of the social activities of men.

The theory of human nature which these men took as basic is more idealistic than ours is apt to be. Thus Adam Smith (the tradition of individualistic economics notwithstanding) believed that

sympathy is a universal and natural trait, because of which, indeed, it is possible for selves to emerge from society. In particular, the psychology of these men suffered from the absence of an evolutionary and biological context of explanation. The feverish interest which Lord Monboddo exhibited in the search for men with tails was due to the old theory of a "great chain of being" all places in which are contemporaneously filled rather than to the Darwinian temporalization of that conception.

We cannot return to the context of ideas in which these men lived, and Professor Bryson would not argue that we should try. But we can secure a partial escape from the provincialism of time by viewing our own methods and concepts as having developed in a long process of inquiry in which other men have worked with other tools. To an understanding of how a group of able men formulated theories of man and society in part like and in part unlike ours, Professor Bryson has made a valuable contribution.

The notes provide extensive bibliographical references; there is also a list of the principal works of the authors discussed, and an index.

MILTON H. WILLIAMS

Syracuse University

REVEILLE FOR RADICALS. By Saul D. Alinsky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. 228 pp. \$2.50.

Reveille for Radicals could well be subtitled *A Manual for Organizers of People's Organizations*. As such it has invaluable suggestions for those undertaking to help peoples express their desires for better living through effective organization. The techniques are spelled out: the approach, the preparation for first meetings, the handling of meetings, the handling of conflicts, the follow through, and finally the exhilaration of success.

This is no academic discourse on the principles of community organization. Indeed, the methods that usually pass for community organization—an imposed procedure and structure—come in for some deserved rough handling.

"A People's Organization is dedicated to an eternal war. It is a war against poverty, misery, delinquency, disease, injustice, hopelessness, despair, and unhappiness."

In another place Alinsky describes a People's Organization as a deep driving force, striking and cutting at the very roots of all the evils which beset

the people. Its tactics and weapons are those used by people fighting for their own children, their own homes, their own jobs, their own lives.

There is no question about the evangelical conviction of Alinsky as it burns in this volume, no doubt of the desirability of the ends that the People's Organization drives toward, no quibble about the stature of the radicals needed for the job. The reader may well ask who is this radical for whom reveille is sounded. Alinsky's ascription to him of all the virtues boils down to the person who believes above everything else in people as people and is willing to fight *for* and *with* them to bring about the conditions that make lives satisfying. These radicals are already in operation. They began back of the yards in Chicago, and they are fanning out over America. Alinsky is calling for countless more to help achieve what Herbert Croly years ago so hopefully called the promise of American life.

ARTHUR E. FINK

University of North Carolina

UNDERSTANDING MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY. Edited by Ray V. Sowers and John W. Mullen. Chicago: The Eugene Hugh Publishers, Inc., 1946. 237 pp. Volume II of the American Family Magazine Book Foundation.

This valuable collection of essays published as a tribute to the life and work of Ernest R. Groves is a most welcome addition to the literature in the field. The seventeen contributors represent eight professions, a fact which highlights the many facets of education for and counseling in marriage and family life. There are chapters by four sociologists, four clergymen, three physicians, two school administrators, a social worker, a home economist, a psychologist, and a lawyer. As in most symposium-type books, the contributions are of unequal length and value. To this reviewer the most meaty and significant essays are those by: J. K. Folsom dealing with social change and the American family; E. W. Burgess pointing out the part played by research; N. R. Kavinoky outlining the contributions of the physician to marital adjustment; M. L. Ramsey describing marriage education at the high school level; E. C. Hamblen writing on the endocrinology of adolescence and climacteric; and R. V. Sowers portraying, all too briefly, the life of Professor E. R. Groves, presenting his accomplishments in many pioneer educational movements, and listing all of his articles,

books and editorial connections, a truly stupendous total.

Other chapters include: Ada Arlitt's cases and comments on emotional maturity; John Bradway's suggestions regarding legal aspects; L. Foster Wood's extension of remarks on spiritual values; Sidney Goldstein's analysis of emerging patterns of the American family; Catherine Groves' sane and balanced description of the counselor in relation to domestic problems; W. Clark Ellzey's stimulating narrative of his experiments as a pastor in teaching classes in marriage problems to recently married couples; and R. L. Dickinson's very brief account of sterilization without unsexing. Many will regret the fact that there was not a longer contribution from this other pioneer in the sex education field.

The only essay which seems at many points to be out of harmony with the spirit of the remainder of the volume is "Two Views of the Family" by Edgar Schmiedeler, Executive Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference. This chapter is rich in contradictions, illogical inferences, and medieval thought. On page 97 he writes of "... such modern vagaries as free love ethics, birth control, abortion, divorce at will, sterilization, the rearing of the child by the state, radical feminism..." He declares boldly that "... political liberalism leads to political anarchism and the destruction of the state." Father Schmiedeler further states categorically that physical love must not be separated from procreation. One wonders whether he would advise parents who have had five children by the time they have reached the age of thirty to remain continent for the remainder of their married lives. He admits that the child's first need in development is for love and happiness between the parents. How happy would these parents be if they followed his advice? He appears to link "free love advocates" with the (to him deplorable) tendency for the state to take over a larger share of the education of the child. He also bemoans the trend in which "there has... been a decided increase in the provision of food, of health measures, of books, and of transportation facilities, and of trips and outings through the medium of the schools..." Probably most of us have assumed that these developments are a valued part of our American way of life. There is not space to point out further evidence that this essay reveals a point of view widely at variance

with that of the life and work of the one in whose honor the book was published.

The format and typography of the book are excellent as is also the portrait of Dr. Groves in the frontispiece. There are a few errors which slipped by the proofreaders, as "fense" on page 163 and "mathematician" on page 92. There is no index. The reviewer was amused when he first saw the volume to note on the cover a small design silhouetting a family which consists of two parents and two children. He wonders whether this family is to be regarded as "completed" and, if so, whether the two-child family represents the ideal of the planners of and contributors to this compact and useful book.

HERBERT D. LAMSON

University of Maine

WHEN YOU MARRY. By Evelyn Millis Duvall and Reuben Hill. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1945. 450 pp. \$2.40.

This is not an ordinary textbook. Its style and approach are quite at variance with the volumes one usually finds on the shelves of the college bookstore. Whether this makes it a better book than others, or a poorer, is a question for debate. It differs in that it deliberately seeks the level of the reader of high school or college age and attempts to speak to him in his own terms and from the background of his own conceptions. In a sense this gives the impression of "talking down" to the reader, and it is possible that the student might resent the approach. On the other hand, if the thesis of the authors is correct, that "this is functional education: to start where the student is and work outward, in this case to a broad understanding of the entire gamut of family problems," the student may be stimulated to increase his knowledge and skills and to broaden his attitudes in the direction of a more adequate personal preparation for marriage and family life.

It is not altogether correct to consider this volume simply as a college textbook. The authors envisaged its being used also as "the basis for self-study for many young couples who find themselves unable to attend a course in marriage and the family." In fact, the book had its origin in and developed out of a plan to provide materials for a course in the United States Armed Forces Institute.

When You Marry provides, what seems to me to be, a very adequate coverage of the essentials of the

subject. The criteria of value for a book with the purposes of this one are not so much the originality of data and hypotheses as inclusiveness, logic of arrangement and presentation, and readability. *When You Marry* rates high on each of these counts. Its primary sources are authoritative and contemporary. It includes figures, tables, and other graphic materials that are well selected. Appendices supply the Burgess-Cottrell Marriage Prediction Scale and a list of marriage and family counseling services.

DONALD S. KLAISS

University of North Carolina

THE RÔLE OF THE AGED IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY. By Leo W. Simmons. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1945. 317 pp. \$4.00.

This is one of the best books published in the field of sociology in recent years. One of the unique features of this report is the author's use of statistical techniques to discover the association between environmental and cultural conditions associated with the status and treatment of the aged in seventy-one tribes as presented in ethnographic and anthropological works. He selected one hundred and nine physical and cultural items and one hundred and twelve characteristics associated with the status and treatment of the aged. While the generalizations were based entirely on the statistical analyses of these items, correlations and other statistical information are presented in an appendix and the body of the book is devoted to concrete materials illustrating the tentative generalizations.

The question of the ways in which the aged attain security is presented in eight parts. The following are the general conclusions: (1) The aged are assured food chiefly by communal sharing, obligations imposed on relatives, and food taboos from which the aged are exempt. (2) They attain security through property rights, such as gifts or fees, cattle, heirlooms, family treasures, songs, and charms; these are extremely effective in securing services. (3) The prestige of the aged stems from the force of custom, fear of consequences, and special skills and knowledge which they possess. (4) Consideration of their welfare is in part the result of routine activities of an economic and personal nature performed by the aged. (5) The aged are particularly secure if through individual ability or a combination of social and cultural conditions they are able to wield civil and political

power. (6) Security is attained in that the aged are generally regarded as the repositories of knowledge, improvers of valuable information, and specialists in dealing with magic and religion. (7) Family arrangements and attachments, such as the acquisition of a second and younger wife, serving as caretakers and teachers of children, and obligations of kinsmen, is the single most important factor in giving them security. (8) They attain post-mortem prestige in a variety of ways, including honorific methods of dying, imparting "last words," and giving special blessings.

The frequency and variations in the above practices were studied in relation to the general factors of climate, permanence or impermanence of residence, availability of food supply, patriarchal or matriarchal family organization, sex, and forms of economic maintenance—collection, hunting, fishing, herding, and agriculture.

One reason why this work is such an excellent production is that the author not only has a very objective approach, but, being in the Department of Sociology at Yale, is thoroughly familiar with Sumner's conceptions of the power and functions of folkways and mores.

HARVEY J. LOCKE

University of Southern California

KOREA AND THE OLD ORDERS IN EASTERN ASIA. By M. Frederick Nelson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945. 326 pp. \$3.75.

Chao-hsien (in Japanese, Chosen) or Korea appears in authentic history in the Han dynastic records (2nd century B.C.), though the intrusion of Chinese chieftains and influence into the north of Korea (which is told in Chinese tradition as of the Shang period, 12th century B.C.) certainly goes far back. From the earliest phase of recorded history down to modern times this great mountainous peninsula, attached on the south to China Proper, opening northwestward to Manchuria and Mongolia, and pointing across the narrow sea to Japan, has had a unique relationship to the Chinese imperial system and civilization: while being China's god-child, Korea has always remained Korea, a nation separate and distinct. With China standing by, all-powerful in the first millennium of our era, often paralyzed by invasion or internal strife in the second millennium, Korea has waxed and waned as the changing dynasties and fortunes, and the perpetually expanding civilization of China, have waxed and waned.

The first part of Dr. Nelson's study presents the picture of Korea's acculturation by the Middle Kingdom (China), and of its relation to China in accordance with the principles of the Confucian social and political order. This order rested not upon law but upon the Confucian code of good conduct in social relations (*li*) as the effective principle governing rational relations between parent and offspring, ruler and subject. China was the parent, Korea the child.

While this ideal paternal relation on the part of China was developing, chieftains of Japan have from time immemorial been there in the picture too. As early as the second century A.D. island warriors were lashing the coasts of southern Korea, at times reducing to vassalage that region which by the seventh century was to flower under China's tutelage and become the reservoir from which Japan (by then growing toward nationhood) was to drink deeply of Chinese culture. It was from these springs that Japan took all of both Confucianism and Buddhism that it could engraft upon its tribal-communal naturalism and feudalism. In the seventh century Korea was so brilliantly Chinese that the Nipponese were captivated, and swallowed Korean-Chinese-Buddhist civilization at a gulp as in recent times they have swallowed our western culture—yet remaining always Japanese. So did the Koreans remain Korean. A Korean sage wrote in the 10th century: "In poetry, history, ceremony, music and the five cardinal relationships let us follow China, but in riding and dressing let us be Koreans."

These Koreans, whose kingdom the great Chinese Emperor of the T'ang Dynasty, Tai-Tsung, considered "a country of educated gentlemen," ever regarded Japanese contemptuously as barbarians. A savage Japanese invasion in 1592 turned contempt into hate. The warrior Hideyoshi, who unified Japan, tried to persuade the monarch of Korea to join him as an ally in invading China, as a preliminary step toward the conquest of Asia. The Korean reply is revealing and worth pondering. "Our two nations [China and Korea] have acted as a single family, maintaining the relationship of father and son as well as that of ruler and subject . . . We shall certainly not desert 'our lord and father nation' . . . Moreover, to invade another nation is an act of which men of culture and intellectual attainment should feel ashamed . . ." The sovereign of this country of oriental gentlemen of a time coincident with Sir

Walter Raleigh's venture in American colonization (Roanoke Island, 1584), was defining a code which we of America today are, with our Anglo-Saxon colleagues, somewhat vaguely trying to approximate in our behavior, as a means of persuading the United Nations to live by it.

Part I of Dr. Nelson's volume ends with an historical resume of "the East Asiatic International System" (i.e. the Chinese Confucian Order). Part II tells the story of the disintegration of that system, and of Korean decay, that developed during the Mongol (13th century) and Manchu (17th century) conquests of China and Korea, but was accelerated by Western intrusion (17th century onward) and consummated in the Japanese annexation of the Peninsula.

Western Powers, failing to comprehend the "familial" relation of Korea to China within the Confucian "natural order," dealt with Korea as though she were a vassal state. Thereby they nullified China's protective paternalistic rôle and left Korea, which was of little commercial interest to them, a prey to Japan. Japan, mobilizing her tribal ambitions with the accoutrements and tactics of western militant nationalism, lost no time in making the most of the situation. A Japanese-inspired *coup* was attempted in 1884, but failed. Chinese influence thereafter appeared to revive. But by a succession of astute moves, described step by step by Dr. Nelson, Japan had by 1894, with the connivance of the western nations, or at least without their interference, written finis to China's traditional relationship. There ended the Confucian International Order, and there Japan completed in bold letters the opening chapter of the swift ruthless epic that ended only on V-J-Day.

Part III chapter headings and sub-headings reveal the sequences in this drama of deterioration: "Legal Independence under Rival Sponsorship . . . Japanese . . . Russian . . ." "Loss of Independence . . . Russo-Japanese Rivalry . . . Anglo-Japanese Alliance . . ." "Loss of International Personality, 1905-10 . . . Residency-General of Japan . . . Complete Administration . . . Annexation."

The study is scholarly and thorough, well-documented, with a full "Select Bibliography." Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger, under whose guidance the work was done as a Ph.D. thesis at Duke University is, with its author, to be congratulated, both upon its quality and its useful timeliness. The reviewer finds the final chapter, however, entitled "Conclusion," very flat. One feels that the author

could have said much more. But—this was a thesis, and it is not in accordance with our "rules of propriety" affecting Ph.D. candidates for a man to step out too boldly on his own.

Of especial interest to readers of *SOCIAL FORCES* is this remark in the Introduction, which might well have been the theme for the more adequate conclusion which this work deserves: "In any reordering of Eastern Asia the tradition of the orders that have gone before should condition that which is to come. Especially is this true should world order be based upon regional communities of states with each region developing a unity greater than that possible on a world-wide scale" (p. xiv).

E. S. CRAIGHILL HANDY

Oakton, Virginia

CALABASHES AND KINGS. By Stanley D. Porteus. Palo Alto, California: Pacific Books, 1945. 245 pp. \$3.50.

On the map Hawaii appears as a half-dozen small islands located in the Pacific about twenty-five hundred miles due west of Mexico City. Inside the Territory, however, the islands appear as an organization of fifty or sixty large sugar and pineapple plantations and cattle ranches. These estates constitute the real economic, political, and social units of Hawaiian society. Honolulu, like ante-bellum Charleston and New Orleans, is a plantation capital. It is also one of the city links in the "main street of the world."

Porteus, an Australian-born resident of the islands, is professor of psychology at the University of Hawaii. In this book he turns from the study of the mentality of various racial and national groups to write a popular and newsy book on Hawaii, past and present. In the Introduction he tells us that he is moved to add one more book to an already large number on the subject in order to 1) satisfy an itch for writing, and to 2) correct some misconceptions about racial, social, and economic conditions in the islands which have led to unjustified criticism from without. If a charming and readable book will reduce criticism then *Calabashes and Kings* will reduce criticism. But apologists for the South and other suspect areas around the world have not found charming books to be very effective.

The people of Hawaii have been growing more and more sensitive about the moral position of the islands in the American and world economy, par-

ticularly since the Massey murder episode about 1930. They might learn something from the history of the South since the Nat Turner insurrection about 1830 when newspapers, North and South, began to take sides in a sectional controversy. It seems that plantation areas are almost regularly to be found among the morally sensitive parts of the world. The acquisition of such a guilt complex is an index that the society is being integrated into a larger moral order. To be sure most people in mainland United States rarely have occasion to think about Hawaii. They are too absorbed in their own problems. But jittery justification in advance of attack will certainly help bring on that attack in a form which will make all previous criticism seem very mild indeed.

In his Introduction Porteus pays his respects to a number of previously published books on Hawaii. It is curious that by far the best book on social and economic Hawaii, Andrew Lind's *An Island Community*, is not mentioned. Therein is a point of view and a body of facts for understanding Hawaii that can really do some good.

EDGAR T. THOMPSON

Duke University

SOCIAL SECURITY AND RELATED SERVICES IN MICHIGAN, THEIR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING. By Claude R. Tharp. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1946. University of Michigan, Bureau of Government, Michigan Governmental Studies No. 16. 160 pp.

This monograph is a factual account of the legislative history and administrative organization of health, medical, and welfare services and public assistance and social insurance programs operating in the State of Michigan. The study also attempts a partial evaluation of the effectiveness of these social programs in terms of administrative functions and financial operations. It is useful as a guide to the State and Federal agencies handling social security and related activities in the State. A major weakness of the book is its failure to deal with the more basic causes creating these social security needs, as administration and financing are tools rather than the base on which social security programs rest.

The domination of the Federal Government in the field of social security becomes very evident in this volume. Railroad Retirement and Railroad Unemployment Insurance and Old Age and Survivors Insurance are federally operated programs

in which the State government has no rôle. Unemployment compensation, while State operated, must meet certain Federal requirements. Grants-in-aid by the Federal Government for various public assistance programs and certain health and welfare services likewise tend to create a certain uniformity among all States in the laws shaping these activities, although there is considerable variation in the administrative organization and amount of available funds for each State.

The hodgepodge of Federal and State agencies operating these programs in Michigan illustrates the lack of coordination so evident in our social security set-up. This confused organization is due to such factors as the constitutional relationship of the Federal and State government, political expediency, and a social security system whose legislative history is one of piecemeal development.

In the discussion of the various social security programs, the study follows an almost uniform pattern of including the eligibility requirements for securing these services, the amount of benefit payments or types of services that are rendered, the method of financing the program, and the administrative organization handling the activity.

The book will have only a limited appeal to students of social security and public administration and to officials and citizens concerned with social security measures in the State of Michigan. The work would have been of far more value if the author had included a realistic program for an effective system of social security and related services in the State.

SOLOMON SUTKER

University of North Carolina

THE FARMER'S LAST FRONTIER: AGRICULTURE, 1860-1897. By Fred A. Shannon. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1945. 434 pp. \$5.00.

The fifth of the nine volume work, *The Economic History of the United States*, this book is a comprehensive history of American agriculture from 1860 to 1897. It deals with the farmer and nature, the westward movement of agricultural settlements, the disposal of the public domain, land and labor problems of the South, mechanization and the special problems of prairie farmers, the livestock industry in the plains, problems of marketing and finance, the influence of western competition upon eastern agriculture, governmental activity in agriculture, agrarian uprisings and cooperation, and the farmer's place in the nation.

Standards of research in history and objective sociology are hardly comparable. What seems to the historian as a thoroughly profound interpretation of facts may appear to be an over-simplification to the sociologist. For example, the shortness of family tenure in early American history is explained largely by the existence of a vast frontier, while in later decades it is attributed mainly to an increase in tenancy and in the frequency of mortgage and tax foreclosures. But, why would farmers prefer the rigors of the frontier to the more peacefully sedate life of well-settled communities? Why, also, were farmers of the later decades unable to liquidate their mortgages and pay their taxes? Why, with the expansion of railroads, the growth of population, and the emergence of the United States as a world power, were the farmers bedeviled by poor markets, low purchasing power, and political unrest? Why, in spite of the Homestead Act and numerous other laws designed to implement the land into the hands of the farmers did tenancy continue to increase for seventy years? Why do farmers grow in dependence upon the federal government as it does more for them? Such questions as these remain unanswered, although the implications are that their solutions are self-evident.

This study is a meticulous collection of facts, many of which are little talked about in American agricultural history, and are much less widely known in the socio-economic literature. For example, few readers will know in advance that "the earlier settlers of Kansas did not pursue agriculture with any great vigor" (p. 34); or that from 1860 to 1870 New England, New York, Pennsylvania, the East North Central Area except Michigan, and the Gulf states except Arkansas, Georgia and Texas, experienced net losses of population by emigration (p. 39). The majority of readers will be surprised to learn that "the populist upheaval of the 1890's did more than any other thing to convert the Agricultural Colleges of the Middle West into true institutions of higher learning of a distinctive type" (p. 276). How many students know that the Homestead Act of 1862 granted its benefits to aliens as well as citizens who had never fought against the United States or given comfort to its enemies? Or that this law was followed by The Timber Culture Act of 1873, The Desert Land Act of 1877, and The Timber and Stone Act of 1878, and that these four Acts were considered basic in American land policy? These are samples

of information that is seldom dispensed to the ordinary student who feeds upon the highlights rather than upon the meat of agricultural history.

This study has defined the scope of American agricultural history admirably from the viewpoint of subject matter. A similar study for the whole period since 1607 is needed. Its interpretations are undoubtedly its main weakness. It lacks the analytical incisiveness found, for example, in L. C. Gray's, *History of Agriculture in Southern United States up to 1860*. It lays out too big a job to be covered thoroughly in less than 1200 pages. This may be excusable if one considers the other eight volumes of the series, which the reviewer has not read. However, the book presumes to be complete in itself, which should justify more thought analysis of its contents. Yet, with this limitation it justifies a serious reading, particularly by southern rural sociologists.

OTIS DURANT DUNCAN

Oklahoma Agricultural
and
Mechanical College

FARMERS OF THE WORLD. The Development of Agricultural Extension. Edited and written by Edmund deS. Brunner, Irwin T. Sanders, and Douglas Ensminger, in collaboration with thirteen other writers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. 208 pp. \$2.50.

This book is written by sixteen different writers, each selected for his particular qualifications in terms of experience, background, training, and living "on the spot" in the several areas of the world chosen for analysis and description. A short biographical sketch about each author is given at the beginning of the book.

The introductory chapter deals with the nature of extension among farm people. This is followed by two chapters describing extension in nonliterate societies, the first giving a statement of the diversity and change in the culture of such societies, and the second presenting a discussion of the Pacific Islands.

The next section treats of peasant societies. Their general characteristics are described, then the following areas are analyzed: China, India, the Arabs, the Balkans, and Latin America.

Then follows a description of extension in the Euro-American society. Euro-American rural society is analyzed in a comparative treatment which places emphasis on the outstanding characteristics

such as its emphasis on the city, the impersonal and independent nature of the farmer, and the whole complex of commerce-trade-industry. These characteristics differentiate Euro-American (Western) culture from that of the folk and preliterate societies. Other chapters in this section deal with extension in the United Kingdom, in Northwest Europe, and in the United States. A concluding chapter discusses the rôle of extension in world reconstruction.

One might wonder whether or not the fundamental nature of agriculture would lead to similarities in practices and methods of extension work among farmers throughout the world. Is there something about the agricultural mode of life that is homogeneous and universal? Do working with plants and animals, the tilling of the soil, and carrying on the elementary processing techniques associated therewith, demand a similarity and a high degree of common experience among peoples everywhere? Do farmers in one country, or in one part of the world, demand one type of counseling and advising, and in other parts a different pattern?

Man builds culture to meet his needs. Since the production of plants and animals is the basic and common core of agriculture everywhere, and since plants and animals have so many things in common, it would seem that farming peoples would build similar cultures wherever they are found.

The book under review was written to analyze and describe the development of agricultural extension among the several countries and areas of the world. But some of its by-products bear upon the above questions and seem to be equally as valuable, if not more so than that of the main theme. Two of these by-products are: (1) the tremendously interesting and enlightening description of agricultural methods and of the culture of the people engaged in farming in the various areas described, and (2) the fact that fundamentally the approach of the technical and governmental advisers is similar in all the countries. The main differences arise in those countries that have turned to mechanization and other capitalistic developments. This produces the principal differences in the approach of the extension workers in the various countries. This is emphasized by one of the collaborators in the chapter devoted to "Euro-American Rural Society," and written by Carle Zimmerman, of Harvard University.

Another idea develops, as the various chapters

portray the life and type of social organization involved in extension activity among the several societies, namely, that local customs, beliefs, habits and mores lend a compelling influence to the work of extension agents and advisers. One cannot work among the Arab "Fellahin" (farmers) without being aware of the rôle of religious and village custom. To ignore these folk and localized patterns of thinking, feeling, and believing is to insure failure on the part of the extension worker. And so it is in the other societies. But, in spite of this, the reader of this book must be impressed by the similarity and common features involved in all the areas studied. One finds everywhere the emphasis upon land, family, "*Gemeinschaft*."

There is one significant fact that impresses the student of extension work, especially as it has developed in the United States, as he reads this treatise on world-wide extension: What has become of the name of Dr. Seaman A. Knapp? The reviewer was not able to find that name in the book, and it is not in the index. How could a group of writers so distinguished as are the authors of this book leave out the greatest force behind the extension movement? "Write the lesson in the soil!" This was the philosophy of Dr. Knapp. Has extension gotten away from that fundamental emphasis on "Demonstration?" Curiously enough, the jacket covering the present book contains an advertisement by the publishers of another of their books, entitled *Seaman A. Knapp, Schoolmaster of American Agriculture*, by Joseph C. Bailey. In that statement credit is given to Knapp as the great pioneer of extension, which he was.

B. O. WILLIAMS

University of Georgia

SUBURBANIZATION IN WEBSTER, NEW YORK. By Earl Lomon Koos and Edmund de S. Brunner. Rochester: The University of Rochester, 1945. 95 pp.

This publication is Number One in The University of Rochester's Studies of Metropolitan Rochester. Dr. Brunner has worked with three previous studies of this village—in 1923 for the Institute for Social and Religious Research, in 1930 for President Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, and in 1936 under the joint sponsorship of the United States Department of

Agriculture and the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences. This present study actually constitutes a fourth set of observations in a series.

In addition to data from the Census, school records, town and county records, churches and other institutions and organizations of the town, a large number of interviews were conducted and schedules were obtained for 80 percent of the households in Webster.

The first part of the material is a presentation of the statistical findings entitled "The Statistics Show." The population is divided as to Farm, Non-farm, and Commuter and these three groups studied as to age distribution, nativity, size of household, education of householders, year of migration and place of previous residence, stage of family at time of migration, occupations, church affiliations, etc. The reasons for migration to Webster are given and analyzed by age of migrant, though they might have been even more significant if they could have been analyzed also by year of migration.

The second part of the study is entitled "And the People Say." This is a very interesting and well-organized summary of the results of the interviews and attempts to show the motivations and attitudes behind the bare statistics. The points of difference between the newcomers and the early residents are clearly presented from both sides, and an attempt is made to present the conclusions as practical suggestions.

The main weakness in the study seems to be the lack of discussion concerning the effects of the war on suburbanization in Webster, particularly since 38 percent of the in-migrant families moved to Webster in 1940 or later. The study mentions that between 1930 and 1940 the rural-farm population had 77 percent of the total increase, not more than 20 percent of which was natural increase. It seems that the value of the study would have been increased if this farm group had been studied further and the assimilation of farm migrants compared with the assimilation of commuter migrants. However, this study is a significant contribution to the study of suburbanization and should be of value also to those interested in the more general field of migration.

DANIEL O. PRICE

University of North Carolina

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The project is under the direction of Dr. Thorsten Sellin, Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Department in the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Sellin is also the Editor of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.

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The periodical is issued four times a year, in October, December, March, May.
Current Volume: Volume 25.

Claims for copies lost in the mails must be received within 30 days (domestic).
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